@tobycrisford šø ās points about conclusions that are extremely sensitive to small changes in highly uncertain values is very important and this post (which I donāt think is parody based on the authorās previous posts) is a great demonstration of the pitfalls.
Iāve commented before that these sorts of calculations that show astronomical but uncertain numbers for shrimp welfare or insect welfare or wild animal welfare could also lead down this nematode welfare route. Itās not obvious to me why someone who concludes that shrimps are hugely morally significant would not also conclude that black soldier fly maggots are hugely morally significant, and then that nematodes are hugely morally significant.
(the organism on the far right is Giardia)
Interested to hear from Insect Welfare and Wild Animal Welfare advocates why they disagree that nematodes are the primary moral concern of planet Earth.
Pascalās bugging and the Rebugnant Conclusion (Sebo, 2024). :P
Interested to hear from Insect Welfare and Wild Animal Welfare advocates why they disagree that nematodes are the primary moral concern of planet Earth.
Iām sympathetic to difference-making risk aversion and difference-making ambiguity aversion (although see here) and assign nematodes a quite low probability of mattering much at all to me, low enough for now that Iām inclined to ignore them altogether (and what would have gone to nematodes instead goes to mitigating s-risks). Mites, springtails, copepods and insect larvae seem substantially more likely to matter to me, based on my beliefs about their capacities.
Still, Iād rather not go 100% on invertebrates either, also due to my difference-making sympathies. Iād deal with this like normative uncertainty and use a kind of bucket approach, like the Property Rights approach and hedging, with normative uncertainty about difference-making and approaches to dealing with uncertainty, about the nature of consciousness and moral patienthood and how to deal with it (although also see this), and about aggregation. So, roughly in practice, based on the probabilities of making a difference, probabilities of moral patienthood, attitudes towards risk and aggregation, I have a humans bucket, a mammals and birds bucket, a fish bucket, a shrimp and insects bucket, a mites, springtails and copepods bucket, and an s-risks bucket.
Thanks for sharing, Michael! I would be curious to know which donations you would recommend if you fully endorsed expectationaltotalhedonisticutilitarianism, like I do, as a moral theory (not necessarily as a decision criterion).
If using precise credences, then Iād be a strong longtermist (probably focusing on existential risks of some kind) or chase infinities. I havenāt thought a lot from this perspective about practical donation recommendations, if Iām assuming not suffering-focused. If suffering-focused (like I actually am), then probably CLR.
I would say a 10^-100 chance of 10^100 QALY is as good as 1 QALY. However, even if I thought the risk of human extinction over the next 10 years was 10 % (I guess it is 10^-7), I would not conclude decreasing it would be astronomically cost-effective. One should be scope-sensitive not only to large potential benefits, but also their small probabilities. Longtermists typically come up with huge amounts of benefits (e.g. 10^50 QALY), and then independently guess a probability which is only moderately small (e.g. 10^-10), which results in huge expected benefits (e.g. 10^40 QALY). Yet, the amount of benefits is not independent from their probability. For reasonable distributions describing the benefits, I think the expected benefits coming from very large benefits will be negligible. For example, if the benefits are described by a power law distribution with tail index alpha > 0, their probability will be proportional to ābenefitsā^-(1 + alpha), so the expected benefits linked to a given amount of benefits will be proportional to ābenefitsā*ābenefitsā^-(1 + alpha) = ābenefitsā^-alpha. This decreases with benefits, so the expected benefits coming from astronomical benefits will be negligible.
I personally think one should only care about expected welfare, so I would be happy to act based on a very low probability of animalsā welfare being sufficiently high to matter. What is your criteria for caring about animals of a given species? Do you have a minimum probability of sentience? If so, why that specific value? RP estimated a probability of 6.8 % of adult nematodes being sentient. People routinely care about events which are much less likely, although the welfare of nematodes conditional on sentience would still have to be sufficiently high for them to matter conditional on sentience.
I confirm the post is not parody. I found that remark funny in a good way.
I would also be curious to hear from people enthusiastic about invertebrate welfare, but not nematode welfare. RP estimated a probability of 8.2 % of silkworms being sentient, which is just 1.21 (= 0.082/ā0.068) times their probability of adult nematodes being sentient.
A Pascalās mugging by nematodes? Nematodes as utility monsters?
@tobycrisford šø ās points about conclusions that are extremely sensitive to small changes in highly uncertain values is very important and this post (which I donāt think is parody based on the authorās previous posts) is a great demonstration of the pitfalls.
Iāve commented before that these sorts of calculations that show astronomical but uncertain numbers for shrimp welfare or insect welfare or wild animal welfare could also lead down this nematode welfare route. Itās not obvious to me why someone who concludes that shrimps are hugely morally significant would not also conclude that black soldier fly maggots are hugely morally significant, and then that nematodes are hugely morally significant.
(the organism on the far right is Giardia)
Interested to hear from Insect Welfare and Wild Animal Welfare advocates why they disagree that nematodes are the primary moral concern of planet Earth.
Pascalās bugging and the Rebugnant Conclusion (Sebo, 2024). :P
Iām sympathetic to difference-making risk aversion and difference-making ambiguity aversion (although see here) and assign nematodes a quite low probability of mattering much at all to me, low enough for now that Iām inclined to ignore them altogether (and what would have gone to nematodes instead goes to mitigating s-risks). Mites, springtails, copepods and insect larvae seem substantially more likely to matter to me, based on my beliefs about their capacities.
Still, Iād rather not go 100% on invertebrates either, also due to my difference-making sympathies. Iād deal with this like normative uncertainty and use a kind of bucket approach, like the Property Rights approach and hedging, with normative uncertainty about difference-making and approaches to dealing with uncertainty, about the nature of consciousness and moral patienthood and how to deal with it (although also see this), and about aggregation. So, roughly in practice, based on the probabilities of making a difference, probabilities of moral patienthood, attitudes towards risk and aggregation, I have a humans bucket, a mammals and birds bucket, a fish bucket, a shrimp and insects bucket, a mites, springtails and copepods bucket, and an s-risks bucket.
Thanks for sharing, Michael! I would be curious to know which donations you would recommend if you fully endorsed expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism, like I do, as a moral theory (not necessarily as a decision criterion).
If using precise credences, then Iād be a strong longtermist (probably focusing on existential risks of some kind) or chase infinities. I havenāt thought a lot from this perspective about practical donation recommendations, if Iām assuming not suffering-focused. If suffering-focused (like I actually am), then probably CLR.
Thanks, Michael. For readersā reference, CLR stands for Center on Long-Term Risk.
I would say a 10^-100 chance of 10^100 QALY is as good as 1 QALY. However, even if I thought the risk of human extinction over the next 10 years was 10 % (I guess it is 10^-7), I would not conclude decreasing it would be astronomically cost-effective. One should be scope-sensitive not only to large potential benefits, but also their small probabilities. Longtermists typically come up with huge amounts of benefits (e.g. 10^50 QALY), and then independently guess a probability which is only moderately small (e.g. 10^-10), which results in huge expected benefits (e.g. 10^40 QALY). Yet, the amount of benefits is not independent from their probability. For reasonable distributions describing the benefits, I think the expected benefits coming from very large benefits will be negligible. For example, if the benefits are described by a power law distribution with tail index alpha > 0, their probability will be proportional to ābenefitsā^-(1 + alpha), so the expected benefits linked to a given amount of benefits will be proportional to ābenefitsā*ābenefitsā^-(1 + alpha) = ābenefitsā^-alpha. This decreases with benefits, so the expected benefits coming from astronomical benefits will be negligible.
Hi Henry,
I personally think one should only care about expected welfare, so I would be happy to act based on a very low probability of animalsā welfare being sufficiently high to matter. What is your criteria for caring about animals of a given species? Do you have a minimum probability of sentience? If so, why that specific value? RP estimated a probability of 6.8 % of adult nematodes being sentient. People routinely care about events which are much less likely, although the welfare of nematodes conditional on sentience would still have to be sufficiently high for them to matter conditional on sentience.
I confirm the post is not parody. I found that remark funny in a good way.
I would also be curious to hear from people enthusiastic about invertebrate welfare, but not nematode welfare. RP estimated a probability of 8.2 % of silkworms being sentient, which is just 1.21 (= 0.082/ā0.068) times their probability of adult nematodes being sentient.