Something like Holden Karnofsky’s approach here (which Anthony DiGiovanni shared with me on a recent post on insect suffering)
(Context for other readers: To be clear, I don’t endorse Karnofsky’s model, which I think is kind of ad hoc and doesn’t address the root problem of arbitrariness in our credences. The least bad epistemic framework for addressing that problem, IMO, is imprecise probabilities (accounting for unawareness).)
(Context for other readers: To be clear, I don’t endorse Karnofsky’s model, which I think is kind of ad hoc and doesn’t address the root problem of arbitrariness in our credences. The least bad epistemic framework for addressing that problem, IMO, is imprecise probabilities (accounting for unawareness).)
Sorry, you did say this in the other thread as well and I should have made that clear in my comment originally. Have now edited.