The paper is about critical-level and critical-range views in population axiology. I argue that these views run into trouble once we start asking questions about biographical identity: identity between lives. I suggest that this trouble should spur us to shift our credences away from these views and towards the total view.
I end by noting a practical implication of this shift in credences: it increases the relative importance of ensuring humanity’s long-term survival and decreases the relative importance of improving humanity’s prospects conditional on survival.[1]
In a longer version of the paper, I suggest that this effect persists on a Maximise Expected Choiceworthiness (MEC) approach to moral uncertainty. See page 124 here.
Critical-Set Views, Biographical Identity, and the Long Term
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I have a new paper coming out in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Critical-Set Views, Biographical Identity, and the Long Term.
The paper is about critical-level and critical-range views in population axiology. I argue that these views run into trouble once we start asking questions about biographical identity: identity between lives. I suggest that this trouble should spur us to shift our credences away from these views and towards the total view.
I end by noting a practical implication of this shift in credences: it increases the relative importance of ensuring humanity’s long-term survival and decreases the relative importance of improving humanity’s prospects conditional on survival.[1]
In a longer version of the paper, I suggest that this effect persists on a Maximise Expected Choiceworthiness (MEC) approach to moral uncertainty. See page 124 here.