For what it’s worth, here’s some bibliography in case anyone is interested in researching (moral) intuitions in philosophy.
An excerpt from my MA thesis:
“There are several possible characterizations of what intuitions are precisely supposed to be. Exceptionalists (e.g. Sosa, Ludwig) argue that intuitions are analytic or conceptual truths, a priori, and/or dealing with conceptual competence. Particularists (e.g. Bealer, Huemer, Schwitzgebel, Kagan) argue that intuitions have a distinct phenomenology, such as being snap judgments that are not consciously inferred from any other belief, or are a sui generis faculty. Minimalists (e.g. Machery, Lewis) argue that intuitions are not different from the application of concepts in ordinary life. (Machery, 2017, Ch. 2)”
I borrowed this terminology from Chapter 2 of Edouard Machery’s book, Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds (2017).
For what it’s worth, here’s some bibliography in case anyone is interested in researching (moral) intuitions in philosophy.
An excerpt from my MA thesis:
“There are several possible characterizations of what intuitions are precisely supposed to be. Exceptionalists (e.g. Sosa, Ludwig) argue that intuitions are analytic or conceptual truths, a priori, and/or dealing with conceptual competence. Particularists (e.g. Bealer, Huemer, Schwitzgebel, Kagan) argue that intuitions have a distinct phenomenology, such as being snap judgments that are not consciously inferred from any other belief, or are a sui generis faculty. Minimalists (e.g. Machery, Lewis) argue that intuitions are not different from the application of concepts in ordinary life. (Machery, 2017, Ch. 2)”
I borrowed this terminology from Chapter 2 of Edouard Machery’s book, Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds (2017).