Definitely: you are obviously right and Eliezer obviously wrong about this, imho.
BUT
I do think it is hindsight bias to some degree to think that “EA” as a collective or Will MacAskill as an individual are recorded as doing something wrong, in the sense of “predictably a bad idea” at any point in the passages you quote. (I know you didn’t actually claim that!) It’s not immoral to tell some to found a business, so it’s definitely not immoral to tell someone to found a business and give to charity. It’s not immoral to help someone make a legal, non-scammy trade, as the anonymous Japanese EA apparently did (“buy low and sell high” is not poor business ethics as far as I know, though I’m prepared to be corrected about that by someone who actually knows finance.) It’s a bit more controversial to say it’s not wrong to take very rich people’s money to do the sort of work EA charities do, but it’s certainly not obvious that it is, and nothing in the quoted passages actually shows that any individual had evidence that FTX were a bad org to be associated with. (They may well have, I’m not saying no one did wrong, I’m just saying no wrong-doing is suggested by the information quoted here.) Furthermore “take money from rich people for philanthropy and speculative academic research” isn’t exactly a uniquely EA practice!
That leaves suggesting FTX think in utilitarian terms about maximizing, but I think it is obviously a complicated question whether that was a knowably bad idea when it was done, and depends on the details of how it was done.
Of course, there may well have been wrong-doing at some point, but we need proper investigation before we decided. And furthermore, we can’t just assume that any wrongdoing, even severe wrongdoing, that did occur would have saved the depositors SBF stole from, who are the main victims of this whole mess. My guess is that once the early decision to encourage SBF to found Alameda was made by Will, and SBF received some early help from the community, withdrawing our support later would not have done very much to prevent FTX from becoming a successful business that stole from its customers. But those early decisions are probably the least morally suspicious, in that they were taken early when there was the least available information about the business ethics of SBF and FTX/Alameda available. To repeat: I don’t think telling someone to found a business to earn to give, or helping out a business make a legal, non-scammy trade, is itself immoral. (Again, I’m assuming the trade was legal and non-scammy, but very willing to be corrected!). The suspicious decisions that might have been decisive was maybe “get SBF and other FTX/Alameda high-ups to think in a utilitarian way’. But as I say, I don’t think its reasonable to hold that was clearly wrong at the time.
I’m more interested in reflecting on the foundational issues in EA-style thinking that contributed to the FTX debacle than in abscribing wrongdoing or immorality (though I agree that the whole episode should be thoroughly investigated).
Following a utilitarian logic, FTX/Alameda pursued a high-leverage strategy (Caroline on leverage); the decision to pursue this strategy didn’t account for the massive externalities that resulted from its failure
EA’s inability and/or unwillingness to vet FTX’s operations (lack of financial controls, lack of board oversight, no ring-fence around funds committed to the Future Fund) and SBF’s history of questionable leadership points to overeager power-seeking
EA leadership’s stance of minimal communication about their roles in the debacle points to a high weight placed on optics / face-saving (Holden’s post and Oli’s commenting are refreshing counterexamples though I think it’s important to hear more about their involvement at some point too)
Definitely: you are obviously right and Eliezer obviously wrong about this, imho.
BUT
I do think it is hindsight bias to some degree to think that “EA” as a collective or Will MacAskill as an individual are recorded as doing something wrong, in the sense of “predictably a bad idea” at any point in the passages you quote. (I know you didn’t actually claim that!) It’s not immoral to tell some to found a business, so it’s definitely not immoral to tell someone to found a business and give to charity. It’s not immoral to help someone make a legal, non-scammy trade, as the anonymous Japanese EA apparently did (“buy low and sell high” is not poor business ethics as far as I know, though I’m prepared to be corrected about that by someone who actually knows finance.) It’s a bit more controversial to say it’s not wrong to take very rich people’s money to do the sort of work EA charities do, but it’s certainly not obvious that it is, and nothing in the quoted passages actually shows that any individual had evidence that FTX were a bad org to be associated with. (They may well have, I’m not saying no one did wrong, I’m just saying no wrong-doing is suggested by the information quoted here.) Furthermore “take money from rich people for philanthropy and speculative academic research” isn’t exactly a uniquely EA practice!
That leaves suggesting FTX think in utilitarian terms about maximizing, but I think it is obviously a complicated question whether that was a knowably bad idea when it was done, and depends on the details of how it was done.
Of course, there may well have been wrong-doing at some point, but we need proper investigation before we decided. And furthermore, we can’t just assume that any wrongdoing, even severe wrongdoing, that did occur would have saved the depositors SBF stole from, who are the main victims of this whole mess. My guess is that once the early decision to encourage SBF to found Alameda was made by Will, and SBF received some early help from the community, withdrawing our support later would not have done very much to prevent FTX from becoming a successful business that stole from its customers. But those early decisions are probably the least morally suspicious, in that they were taken early when there was the least available information about the business ethics of SBF and FTX/Alameda available. To repeat: I don’t think telling someone to found a business to earn to give, or helping out a business make a legal, non-scammy trade, is itself immoral. (Again, I’m assuming the trade was legal and non-scammy, but very willing to be corrected!). The suspicious decisions that might have been decisive was maybe “get SBF and other FTX/Alameda high-ups to think in a utilitarian way’. But as I say, I don’t think its reasonable to hold that was clearly wrong at the time.
Thanks for this comment.
I’m more interested in reflecting on the foundational issues in EA-style thinking that contributed to the FTX debacle than in abscribing wrongdoing or immorality (though I agree that the whole episode should be thoroughly investigated).
Examples of foundational issues:
FTX was an explicitly maximalist project, and maximization is perilous
Following a utilitarian logic, FTX/Alameda pursued a high-leverage strategy (Caroline on leverage); the decision to pursue this strategy didn’t account for the massive externalities that resulted from its failure
The Future Fund failed to identify an existential risk to its own operation, which casts doubt on their/our ability to perform risk assessment
EA’s inability and/or unwillingness to vet FTX’s operations (lack of financial controls, lack of board oversight, no ring-fence around funds committed to the Future Fund) and SBF’s history of questionable leadership points to overeager power-seeking
MacAskill’s attempt to broker an SBF <> Elon deal re: purchasing Twitter also points to overeager power-seeking
Consequentialism straightforwardly implies that the ends justify the means at least sometimes; protesting that the ends don’t justify the means is cognitive dissonance
EA leadership’s stance of minimal communication about their roles in the debacle points to a high weight placed on optics / face-saving (Holden’s post and Oli’s commenting are refreshing counterexamples though I think it’s important to hear more about their involvement at some point too)