I think it’s more appropriate to use Bostrom’s Moral Parliament to deal with conflicting moral theories.
Your approach might be right if the theories you’re comparing used the same concept of utility, and merely disagreed about what people would experience.
But I expect that the concept of utility which best matches human interests will say that “infinite utility” doesn’t make sense. Therefore I treat the word utility as referring to different phenomena in different theories, and I object to combining them as if they were the same.
Similarly, I use a dealist approach to morality. If you show me an argument that there’s an objective morality which requires me to increase the probability of infinite utility, I’ll still ask what would motivate me to obey that morality, and I expect any resolution of that will involve something more like Bostrom’s parliament than like your approach.
I think it’s more appropriate to use Bostrom’s Moral Parliament to deal with conflicting moral theories.
Your approach might be right if the theories you’re comparing used the same concept of utility, and merely disagreed about what people would experience.
But I expect that the concept of utility which best matches human interests will say that “infinite utility” doesn’t make sense. Therefore I treat the word utility as referring to different phenomena in different theories, and I object to combining them as if they were the same.
Similarly, I use a dealist approach to morality. If you show me an argument that there’s an objective morality which requires me to increase the probability of infinite utility, I’ll still ask what would motivate me to obey that morality, and I expect any resolution of that will involve something more like Bostrom’s parliament than like your approach.