I think the full section addresses this (but let me know if you disagree), via the following:
Alternatively, if one believes that there are compelling arguments that billionaire philanthropy necessarily does more harm than good, then they might instead conclude that the best thing billionaires can do is voluntarily pay more taxes (i.e., donate to the US Treasury). That would be a surprising result, and I doubt that many actually believe it, but it is at least conceptually possible. But even that is no objection to EA principles, but just a possible implication of them (when combined with unusual empirical assumptions).
The general point (as stressed throughout the paper) being that we need to take total evidence into account. If thereās evidence that āactively trying to do good they will ultimately do harmā then rationally doing good actually entails something different from what youāre imagining when you describe them as āactively tryingā. EA principles would imply that we draw billionairesā attention to these risks, and encourage them to help in whatever ways are actually better in expectation.
Sure, I donāt think what youāre saying is technically incorrect it is just for me rhetorically, I would read you as being less sincere and therefore less convincing in engagement with critics if there seems to be some implication that comes across a bit like āunless people believe something stupid, then their critiques donāt make senseā - but this may also be a reaction to seeing only the excerpted quote and not the whole text
I think the full section addresses this (but let me know if you disagree), via the following:
The general point (as stressed throughout the paper) being that we need to take total evidence into account. If thereās evidence that āactively trying to do good they will ultimately do harmā then rationally doing good actually entails something different from what youāre imagining when you describe them as āactively tryingā. EA principles would imply that we draw billionairesā attention to these risks, and encourage them to help in whatever ways are actually better in expectation.
Sure, I donāt think what youāre saying is technically incorrect it is just for me rhetorically, I would read you as being less sincere and therefore less convincing in engagement with critics if there seems to be some implication that comes across a bit like āunless people believe something stupid, then their critiques donāt make senseā - but this may also be a reaction to seeing only the excerpted quote and not the whole text