So this is devaluing the position of a hypothetical someone opposing EA, rather than honestly engaging with their criticisms.
Thatâs a non-sequitur. Thereâs no inconsistency between holding a certain conclusionâthat âevery decent person should share the basic goals or values underlying effective altruismââand âhonestly engaging with criticismsâ. I do both. (Specifically, I engage with criticisms of EA principles; Iâm very explicit that the paper is not concerned with criticisms of âEAâ as an entity.)
Iâve since reworded the abstract since the âevery decent personâ phrasing seems to rub people the wrong way. But it is my honest view. EA principles = beneficentrism, and rejecting beneficentrism is morally indecent. Thatâs a view I hold, and Iâm happy to defend it. Youâre trying to assert that my conclusion is illegitimate or âdishonestâ, prior to even considering my supporting reasons, and thatâs frankly absurd.
The whole point is that systemic change is very hard to estimate. It is like sitting on a local maximum of awesomeness, and we know that there must be higher hillsâhigher maximaâout there, but we do not know how to get there; any particular systemic change might as well make things worse.
Yes, and my âwhole pointâ is to respond to this by observing that oneâs total evidence either supports the gamble of moving in a different direction, or it does not. You donât seem to have understood my argument, which is fine (Iâm guessing you donât have much philosophy background), but it really should make you more cautious in your accusations.
Or, more clearly: By not mentioning uncertainty in this paragraph, I do believe you are arguing against a strawperson, as the presence of uncertainty is absolutely crucial to the argument.
Itâs all about uncertaintyâthatâs what âin expectationâ refers to. Iâm certainly not attributing certainty to the proponent of systemic changeâthat would indeed be a strawperson, but itâs an egregious misreading to think that Iâm making any such misattribution. (Especially since the immediately preceding paragraphs were discussing uncertainty, explicitly and at length!)
the sentence âThis claim is ⌠trueâ just really, really gets to me
Again, I think this is just a result of your not being familiar with the norms of philosophy. Philosophers talk about true claims all the time, and it doesnât mean that theyâre failing to engage honestly with those who disagree with them.
So the question is not âamong all of these completely equivalent permissible options, should I choose the highest-paying one and earn to give?â
Now this is a straw man! The view I defend there is rather that âwe have good moral reasons to prefer better-paying careers, from among our permissible options, if we would donate the excess earnings.â Reasons always need to be balanced against countervailing reasons. The point of the appeal to permissibility is just to allow that some careers may be ruled out as a matter of deontic constraints. But obviously more moderate harms also need to be considered, and balanced against the benefits, and I never suggest otherwise.
The most common arguments I am aware of against billionaire philanthropists are...
Those arenât arguments against how EA principles apply to billionaires, so arenât relevant to my paper.
So that is what I mean by âarguing against strawpeopleâ
You didnât accurately identify any misrepresentations or fallacies in my paper. Itâs just a mix of (i) antecedently disliking the strength of my conclusion, (ii) not understanding philosophy, and (iii) your being more interested in a different topic than what my paper addresses.
Thatâs a non-sequitur. Thereâs no inconsistency between holding a certain conclusionâthat âevery decent person should share the basic goals or values underlying effective altruismââand âhonestly engaging with criticismsâ. I do both. (Specifically, I engage with criticisms of EA principles; Iâm very explicit that the paper is not concerned with criticisms of âEAâ as an entity.)
Iâve since reworded the abstract since the âevery decent personâ phrasing seems to rub people the wrong way. But it is my honest view. EA principles = beneficentrism, and rejecting beneficentrism is morally indecent. Thatâs a view I hold, and Iâm happy to defend it. Youâre trying to assert that my conclusion is illegitimate or âdishonestâ, prior to even considering my supporting reasons, and thatâs frankly absurd.
Yes, and my âwhole pointâ is to respond to this by observing that oneâs total evidence either supports the gamble of moving in a different direction, or it does not. You donât seem to have understood my argument, which is fine (Iâm guessing you donât have much philosophy background), but it really should make you more cautious in your accusations.
Itâs all about uncertaintyâthatâs what âin expectationâ refers to. Iâm certainly not attributing certainty to the proponent of systemic changeâthat would indeed be a strawperson, but itâs an egregious misreading to think that Iâm making any such misattribution. (Especially since the immediately preceding paragraphs were discussing uncertainty, explicitly and at length!)
Again, I think this is just a result of your not being familiar with the norms of philosophy. Philosophers talk about true claims all the time, and it doesnât mean that theyâre failing to engage honestly with those who disagree with them.
Now this is a straw man! The view I defend there is rather that âwe have good moral reasons to prefer better-paying careers, from among our permissible options, if we would donate the excess earnings.â Reasons always need to be balanced against countervailing reasons. The point of the appeal to permissibility is just to allow that some careers may be ruled out as a matter of deontic constraints. But obviously more moderate harms also need to be considered, and balanced against the benefits, and I never suggest otherwise.
Those arenât arguments against how EA principles apply to billionaires, so arenât relevant to my paper.
You didnât accurately identify any misrepresentations or fallacies in my paper. Itâs just a mix of (i) antecedently disliking the strength of my conclusion, (ii) not understanding philosophy, and (iii) your being more interested in a different topic than what my paper addresses.