Clearly you find me arrogant, but there’s not much I can do about that—I’ve tried to be as polite as I can, but clearly that was insufficient.
You come across as arrogant for a few reasons which are in principle fixable.
1: You seem to believe people who don’t share your values are simply ignorant of them, and not in a deep “looking for a black cat in an unlit room through a mirror darkly” sort of way. If you think your beliefs are prima facie correct, fine, most people do—but you still have to argue for them.
2: You mischaracterize utilitarianism in ways that are frankly incomprehensible, and become evasive when those characterizations are challenged. At the risk of reproducing exactly that pattern, here’s an example:
In humanitarian action effectiveness is an instrumental value not an intrinsic value
...
EA is a form of utilitarianism, and when the word effective is used it has generally been in the sense of “cost effective”. If you are not an effective altruist (which I am not), then cost effectiveness—while important—is an instrumental value rather than an intrinsic value.
...
I’m not a utilitarian, so I reject the premise of this question when presented in the abstract as it is here. Effectiveness for me is an instrumental value
As you have been more politely told many times in this comment section already: claiming that utilitarians assign intrinsic value to cost-effectiveness is absurd. Utilitarians value total well-being (though what exactly that means is a point of contention) and nothing else. I would happily incinerate all the luxury goods humanity has ever produced if it meant no one ever went hungry again. Others would go much further.
What I suspect you’re actually objecting to is aggregation of utility across persons—since that, plus the grossly insufficient resources available to us, is what makes cost-effectiveness a key instrumental concern in almost all situations—but if so the objection is not articulated clearly enough to engage with.
3: Bafflingly, given (1), you also don’t seem to feel the need to explain what your values are! You name them (or at least it seems these are yours) and move on, as if we all understood
humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence
in precisely the same way. But we don’t. For example: utilitarianism is clearly “impartial” and “neutral” as I understand them (i.e. agent-neutral and impartial with respect to different moral patients) whereas folk-morality is clearly not.
I’m guessing, having just googled that quote, that you mean something like this
Humanity means that human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable.
Neutrality means that humanitarian aid must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute.
Impartiality means that humanitarian aid must be provided solely on the basis of need, without discrimination.
Independence means the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from political, economic, military or other objectives.
in which case there’s a further complication: you’re almost certainly using “intrinsic value” and “instrumental value” in a very different sense from the people you’re talking to. The above versions of “independence” and “neutrality” are, by my lights, obviously instrumental—these are cultural norms for one particular sort of organization at one particular moment in human history, not universal moral law.
Thanks for your comment. I’ll try to address each of your points.
“You seem to believe people who don’t share your values are simply ignorant of them… If you think your beliefs are prima facie correct, fine, most people do—but you still have to argue for them.”
In general, no—I do not believe that people who don’t share my values are simply ignorant of them, and I have communicated poorly if that is your impression. Nor do I believe that my beliefs are prima facie correct, and I don’t think I’ve claimed that in any of these comments. I did not post here to argue for my beliefs—I don’t expect anybody on this forum to agree with them—but to point out that the paper under discussion fails to deal with those beliefs adequately, which seemed to me a weakness.
“You mischaracterize utilitarianism in ways that are frankly incomprehensible, and become evasive when those characterizations are challenged.”
I think it’s an exaggeration to say that my characterisation is “frankly incomprehensible” and that I “become evasive” when challenged. My characterisation may be slightly inaccurate, but it’s not as if I am a million miles away from common understanding, and I have tried to be as direct as possible in my responses.
The confusion may arise from the fact that when I claim that effectiveness is an intrinsic value, I am making that claim for effective altruism specifically, rather than utilitarianism more broadly. And indeed effectiveness does appear to be an intrinsic value for effective altruism—because if what effective altruists proposed was not effective, it would not constitute effective altruism.
Your final point has the most traction:
“Bafflingly, given (1), you also don’t seem to feel the need to explain what your values are! You name them (or at least it seems these are yours) and move on, as if we all understood… I’m guessing, having just googled that quote, that you mean something like this”
I was indeed referring to these principles, and you’re right—I didn’t explain them! This may have been a mistake on my part, but as I implied above, my intent was not to persuade anybody here to accept those principles. I am not expecting random people on a message board to even be aware of these principles—but I would expect an academic who writes a paper on the subject that in part intends to refute the arguments of organisations involved in humanitarian action to refer to these principles at least in passing, wouldn’t you?
“you’re almost certainly using “intrinsic value” and “instrumental value” in a very different sense from the people you’re talking to.”
Yes, this may be the case. In another comment in this thread I reconsidered my position, and suggested that humanitarian principles are a curious mix of intrinsic and instrumental. But I’m not sure my usage is that far away from the common usage, is it? I also raised the point that they are in fact contested—partly for the cultural reason you raise—and the way in which they are viewed varies from organisation to organisation. Obviously this will cause more concern for people who prefer their principles much cleaner!
You come across as arrogant for a few reasons which are in principle fixable.
1: You seem to believe people who don’t share your values are simply ignorant of them, and not in a deep “looking for a black cat in an unlit room through a mirror darkly” sort of way. If you think your beliefs are prima facie correct, fine, most people do—but you still have to argue for them.
2: You mischaracterize utilitarianism in ways that are frankly incomprehensible, and become evasive when those characterizations are challenged. At the risk of reproducing exactly that pattern, here’s an example:
As you have been more politely told many times in this comment section already: claiming that utilitarians assign intrinsic value to cost-effectiveness is absurd. Utilitarians value total well-being (though what exactly that means is a point of contention) and nothing else. I would happily incinerate all the luxury goods humanity has ever produced if it meant no one ever went hungry again. Others would go much further.
What I suspect you’re actually objecting to is aggregation of utility across persons—since that, plus the grossly insufficient resources available to us, is what makes cost-effectiveness a key instrumental concern in almost all situations—but if so the objection is not articulated clearly enough to engage with.
3: Bafflingly, given (1), you also don’t seem to feel the need to explain what your values are! You name them (or at least it seems these are yours) and move on, as if we all understood
in precisely the same way. But we don’t. For example: utilitarianism is clearly “impartial” and “neutral” as I understand them (i.e. agent-neutral and impartial with respect to different moral patients) whereas folk-morality is clearly not.
I’m guessing, having just googled that quote, that you mean something like this
in which case there’s a further complication: you’re almost certainly using “intrinsic value” and “instrumental value” in a very different sense from the people you’re talking to. The above versions of “independence” and “neutrality” are, by my lights, obviously instrumental—these are cultural norms for one particular sort of organization at one particular moment in human history, not universal moral law.
Thanks for your comment. I’ll try to address each of your points.
“You seem to believe people who don’t share your values are simply ignorant of them… If you think your beliefs are prima facie correct, fine, most people do—but you still have to argue for them.”
In general, no—I do not believe that people who don’t share my values are simply ignorant of them, and I have communicated poorly if that is your impression. Nor do I believe that my beliefs are prima facie correct, and I don’t think I’ve claimed that in any of these comments. I did not post here to argue for my beliefs—I don’t expect anybody on this forum to agree with them—but to point out that the paper under discussion fails to deal with those beliefs adequately, which seemed to me a weakness.
“You mischaracterize utilitarianism in ways that are frankly incomprehensible, and become evasive when those characterizations are challenged.”
I think it’s an exaggeration to say that my characterisation is “frankly incomprehensible” and that I “become evasive” when challenged. My characterisation may be slightly inaccurate, but it’s not as if I am a million miles away from common understanding, and I have tried to be as direct as possible in my responses.
The confusion may arise from the fact that when I claim that effectiveness is an intrinsic value, I am making that claim for effective altruism specifically, rather than utilitarianism more broadly. And indeed effectiveness does appear to be an intrinsic value for effective altruism—because if what effective altruists proposed was not effective, it would not constitute effective altruism.
Your final point has the most traction:
“Bafflingly, given (1), you also don’t seem to feel the need to explain what your values are! You name them (or at least it seems these are yours) and move on, as if we all understood… I’m guessing, having just googled that quote, that you mean something like this”
I was indeed referring to these principles, and you’re right—I didn’t explain them! This may have been a mistake on my part, but as I implied above, my intent was not to persuade anybody here to accept those principles. I am not expecting random people on a message board to even be aware of these principles—but I would expect an academic who writes a paper on the subject that in part intends to refute the arguments of organisations involved in humanitarian action to refer to these principles at least in passing, wouldn’t you?
“you’re almost certainly using “intrinsic value” and “instrumental value” in a very different sense from the people you’re talking to.”
Yes, this may be the case. In another comment in this thread I reconsidered my position, and suggested that humanitarian principles are a curious mix of intrinsic and instrumental. But I’m not sure my usage is that far away from the common usage, is it? I also raised the point that they are in fact contested—partly for the cultural reason you raise—and the way in which they are viewed varies from organisation to organisation. Obviously this will cause more concern for people who prefer their principles much cleaner!