One action /ā sub-cause area I tend to conceive as more robustly good than many others is preventing the continued development of insect farming (Insect Institute, Observatoire National de lāElevage dāInsectes). Since farmed insects are so small (and that the implications of insect farming on the rest of the world donāt seem outsized), it seems intuitively unlikely that harms from preventing it could lead to more suffering than the counterfactual (as opposed to farming of bigger animals, where āenvironmentalā effects may dominate the welfare impact). Meanwhile, I have difficulty seeing how the amount of insect farms in the world could significantly impact other aspects of the long-term future (in the way, say, getting rid of animal farming altogether might), which reduces my worries about long-term cluelessness, increasing S-risks, etc.
Nonetheless, even this carries significant risk of being net-negative, the crux-being how significant insect suffering is. If it turns out mealworms arenāt sentient, for example, less mealworm farming would probably mean more fish suffering (for fishmeal), and perhaps more factory farming of land vertebrates for pet food. Not to mention, obviously, the opportunity cost associated with āhelpingā non-sentient animals.
Like you, I do also think that the Shrimp Welfare Project is an example of a very robust cause: in fact, this is the non-insect-farming org to which I currently donate the most.
Also, small nitpick: an āineffectiveā intervention will generally have a negative EV (see Tomasik), though of course, not necessarily an āextremely negativeā EV as I think was you concern in the post.
thank you for the thoughtful reply! I think what you say about insect farming makes sense, I also like this cause area a lot. Although it looks like I am more worried than you about the indirect effects on other farming practices, like fish farming or factory farming of land animals.
And thank you for the link to the Tomasik post, he makes good points! Do you think I should change the original wording?
I think itās unlikely that limiting insect farming increases fish farming or factory farming very significantly, since itās mostly meant to be feed for animals in these situations. Iād be more worried if insect meal marketed itself as a substitute for human-consumed animals or fishes. And even in the case of pet food, since itās much more expensive for now than other pet food ingredients (to my understanding), itās not clear that letting insect farming spread would significantly reduce the number of factory farmed animals.
You could update the wording in the post if you like, though if you find it time-consuming, you donāt have to spend time on that. Most readers probably find the distinction as you frame it quite intuitive.
One action /ā sub-cause area I tend to conceive as more robustly good than many others is preventing the continued development of insect farming (Insect Institute, Observatoire National de lāElevage dāInsectes). Since farmed insects are so small (and that the implications of insect farming on the rest of the world donāt seem outsized), it seems intuitively unlikely that harms from preventing it could lead to more suffering than the counterfactual (as opposed to farming of bigger animals, where āenvironmentalā effects may dominate the welfare impact). Meanwhile, I have difficulty seeing how the amount of insect farms in the world could significantly impact other aspects of the long-term future (in the way, say, getting rid of animal farming altogether might), which reduces my worries about long-term cluelessness, increasing S-risks, etc.
Nonetheless, even this carries significant risk of being net-negative, the crux-being how significant insect suffering is. If it turns out mealworms arenāt sentient, for example, less mealworm farming would probably mean more fish suffering (for fishmeal), and perhaps more factory farming of land vertebrates for pet food. Not to mention, obviously, the opportunity cost associated with āhelpingā non-sentient animals.
Like you, I do also think that the Shrimp Welfare Project is an example of a very robust cause: in fact, this is the non-insect-farming org to which I currently donate the most.
Also, small nitpick: an āineffectiveā intervention will generally have a negative EV (see Tomasik), though of course, not necessarily an āextremely negativeā EV as I think was you concern in the post.
Hi JoA,
thank you for the thoughtful reply! I think what you say about insect farming makes sense, I also like this cause area a lot. Although it looks like I am more worried than you about the indirect effects on other farming practices, like fish farming or factory farming of land animals.
And thank you for the link to the Tomasik post, he makes good points! Do you think I should change the original wording?
I think itās unlikely that limiting insect farming increases fish farming or factory farming very significantly, since itās mostly meant to be feed for animals in these situations. Iād be more worried if insect meal marketed itself as a substitute for human-consumed animals or fishes. And even in the case of pet food, since itās much more expensive for now than other pet food ingredients (to my understanding), itās not clear that letting insect farming spread would significantly reduce the number of factory farmed animals.
You could update the wording in the post if you like, though if you find it time-consuming, you donāt have to spend time on that. Most readers probably find the distinction as you frame it quite intuitive.
Thank you, those are good points! I am now more optimistic about reducing insect farming and might even donate to that cause :)