(Note: My judgments between outcomes here should be qualified with âignoring other reasonsâ, specifically reasons that donât come from interests or their satisfaction for the existence of those interests or interest holders over their nonexistence.)
Ok, I think I first have to make my claim stronger (actually capturing the first part of its first statement in the intro):
Only Actual Interests: Interests provide reasons for their further satisfaction, but neither an interest nor its satisfaction provides reasons for the existence of that interest over its nonexistence.
It follows from this that a mind with no interests at all is no worse than a mind with interests, regardless of how satisfied its interests might have been. In particular, a joyless mind with no interest in joy is no worse than one with joy. A mind with no interests isnât much of a mind at all, so I would say that this effectively means itâs no worse for the mind to not exist.
It would also follow that nonexistence of the mind is not worse, from the universal rejection of the Transfer Thesis (I was mistaken about its equivalence to Only Actual Interests). In my language:
No Transfer: Interests provide reasons for their further satisfaction, but neither an interest nor its satisfaction provides reasons for the existence of that interestâs holder over its nonexistence.
On suffering,
Only Actual Interests at least says itâs no worse for a mind to not have an interest in the absence of suffering, and hence to not suffer than it is to suffer, because Suffering implies an interest in its absence, by my definition. Similarly, No Transfer would imply itâs not worse for the mind to not exist.
There are a few ways to complete the argument that come to mind:
1. If a mind has a constant interest in not suffering which is satisfied to the degree it is not suffering, then not suffering at all would fully satisfy this interest, and not existing at all would be no worse, according to No Transfer.
2. If not, to start, we should assume that if a mind is suffering, if it were suffering less but still suffering (or another mind existed in its place and was suffering less), that would be better, because, e.g. its interest in not suffering would be more satisfied or its interest in not suffering would not be as strong. In particular, its interest in not suffering through its given experience would be completely unsatisfied in both cases, but stronger in the case of worse suffering.
Then, denote by A an outcome in which the mind is suffering, and by B the outcome in which the mind is not suffering (or does not exist). If we can use the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), transitivity, completeness, and claim the existence of a hypothetical outcome C in which the mind (or a replacement) would be suffering less, then we would get AâșB . To start by our choice of C, we have AâșC. Since C is suffering, we would get CâȘŻB by completeness, and then by transitivity and IIA, AâșB, so it would be better for the mind to not suffer (or not exist). Unfortunately, if there is a minimum amount of suffering in a suffering experience (over all hypothetical outcomes), this argument wouldnât apply to it.
Only Actual Interests: Interests provide reasons for their further satisfaction, but neither an interest nor its satisfaction provides reasons for the existence of that interest over its nonexistence.
It follows from this that a mind with no interests at all is no worse than a mind with interests, regardless of how satisfied its interests might have been. In particular, a joyless mind with no interest in joy is no worse than one with joy. A mind with no interests isnât much of a mind at all, so I would say that this effectively means itâs no worse for the mind to not exist.
If you make this argument that âitâs no worse for the joyful mind to not exist,â you can make an exactly symmetrical argument that âitâs not better for the suffering mind to not exist.â If there was a suffering mind theyâd have an interest in not existing, and if there was a joyful mind theyâd have an interest in existing.
In either case, if there is no mind then we have no reason to care about whether the mind exists, and if there is a mind then we have a reason to actâin one case we prefer the mind exist, and in the other case we prefer the mind not exist.
To carry your argument you need an extra principle along the lines of âthe existence of unfulfilled interests is bad.â Of course thatâs whatâs doing all the work of the asymmetryâif unfulfilled interests are bad and fulfilled interests are not good, then existence is bad. But this has nothing to do with actual interests, itâs coming from very explicitly setting the zero point at the maximally fulfilled interest.
If you make this argument that âitâs no worse for the joyful mind to not exist,â you can make an exactly symmetrical argument that âitâs not better for the suffering mind to not exist.
If I make these claims without argument, yes, but I am giving arguments for the first and against the second, based on a more general claim which is intuitively asymmetric and a few intuitive assumptions about the ordering of outcomes, which together imply âthe existence of unfulfilled interests is badâ, but not on their own.
The negation of âneither an interestnor its satisfactionprovides reasons for the existence of that interest over its nonexistenceâ would mean pulling interests up by their bootstraps (for at least one specific interest):
âan interest or its satisfaction provides reasons for the existence of that interest over its nonexistenceâ. I think this is far less plausible, see my section âWhy Only Actual Interestsâ.
The symmetric claim also seems less plausible:
âneither an interestnor its unsatisfactionprovides reasons for the nonexistence of that interest over its existenceâ
For example, the fact that you would fail to keep a promise is indeed a reason not to make it in the first place. Or, that fact that you would not climb mount Everest successfully is a reason to not try to do so in the first place.
Letâs consider a given preference from the point of view of a given outcome after choosing it, in which the preference either exists or does not:
1. The preference exists:
a. If thereâs an outcome in which the preference exists and is more satisfied, and all else is equal, it would have been irrational to have chosen this one (over it, and at all).
b. If thereâs an outcome in which the preference exists and is less satisfied, and all else is equal, it would have been irrational to have chosen the other outcome (over this one, and at all).
c. If thereâs an outcome in which the preference does not exist, and all else is equal, the preference itself does not tell us if either would be irrational to have chosen.
2. The preference doesnât exist:
a. If thereâs an outcome in which the preference exists, regardless of its degree of satisfaction, and all else equal, the preference itself does not tell us if either would have been irrational to have chosen.
So, all else equal besides the existence or degree of satisfaction of the given preference, itâs always rational to choose an outcome in which the preference does not exist, but itâs irrational to choose an outcome in which the preference exists but is less satisfied than in another outcome.
(I made the same argument here, but this is a cleaner statement.)
(Note: My judgments between outcomes here should be qualified with âignoring other reasonsâ, specifically reasons that donât come from interests or their satisfaction for the existence of those interests or interest holders over their nonexistence.)
Ok, I think I first have to make my claim stronger (actually capturing the first part of its first statement in the intro):
Only Actual Interests: Interests provide reasons for their further satisfaction, but neither an interest nor its satisfaction provides reasons for the existence of that interest over its nonexistence.
It follows from this that a mind with no interests at all is no worse than a mind with interests, regardless of how satisfied its interests might have been. In particular, a joyless mind with no interest in joy is no worse than one with joy. A mind with no interests isnât much of a mind at all, so I would say that this effectively means itâs no worse for the mind to not exist.
It would also follow that nonexistence of the mind is not worse, from the universal rejection of the Transfer Thesis (I was mistaken about its equivalence to Only Actual Interests). In my language:
No Transfer: Interests provide reasons for their further satisfaction, but neither an interest nor its satisfaction provides reasons for the existence of that interestâs holder over its nonexistence.
On suffering,
Only Actual Interests at least says itâs no worse for a mind to not have an interest in the absence of suffering, and hence to not suffer than it is to suffer, because Suffering implies an interest in its absence, by my definition. Similarly, No Transfer would imply itâs not worse for the mind to not exist.
There are a few ways to complete the argument that come to mind:
1. If a mind has a constant interest in not suffering which is satisfied to the degree it is not suffering, then not suffering at all would fully satisfy this interest, and not existing at all would be no worse, according to No Transfer.
2. If not, to start, we should assume that if a mind is suffering, if it were suffering less but still suffering (or another mind existed in its place and was suffering less), that would be better, because, e.g. its interest in not suffering would be more satisfied or its interest in not suffering would not be as strong. In particular, its interest in not suffering through its given experience would be completely unsatisfied in both cases, but stronger in the case of worse suffering.
Then, denote by A an outcome in which the mind is suffering, and by B the outcome in which the mind is not suffering (or does not exist). If we can use the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), transitivity, completeness, and claim the existence of a hypothetical outcome C in which the mind (or a replacement) would be suffering less, then we would get AâșB . To start by our choice of C, we have AâșC. Since C is suffering, we would get CâȘŻB by completeness, and then by transitivity and IIA, AâșB, so it would be better for the mind to not suffer (or not exist). Unfortunately, if there is a minimum amount of suffering in a suffering experience (over all hypothetical outcomes), this argument wouldnât apply to it.
If you make this argument that âitâs no worse for the joyful mind to not exist,â you can make an exactly symmetrical argument that âitâs not better for the suffering mind to not exist.â If there was a suffering mind theyâd have an interest in not existing, and if there was a joyful mind theyâd have an interest in existing.
In either case, if there is no mind then we have no reason to care about whether the mind exists, and if there is a mind then we have a reason to actâin one case we prefer the mind exist, and in the other case we prefer the mind not exist.
To carry your argument you need an extra principle along the lines of âthe existence of unfulfilled interests is bad.â Of course thatâs whatâs doing all the work of the asymmetryâif unfulfilled interests are bad and fulfilled interests are not good, then existence is bad. But this has nothing to do with actual interests, itâs coming from very explicitly setting the zero point at the maximally fulfilled interest.
If I make these claims without argument, yes, but I am giving arguments for the first and against the second, based on a more general claim which is intuitively asymmetric and a few intuitive assumptions about the ordering of outcomes, which together imply âthe existence of unfulfilled interests is badâ, but not on their own.
The negation of âneither an interest nor its satisfaction provides reasons for the existence of that interest over its nonexistenceâ would mean pulling interests up by their bootstraps (for at least one specific interest):
âan interest or its satisfaction provides reasons for the existence of that interest over its nonexistenceâ. I think this is far less plausible, see my section âWhy Only Actual Interestsâ.
The symmetric claim also seems less plausible:
âneither an interest nor its unsatisfaction provides reasons for the nonexistence of that interest over its existenceâ
For example, the fact that you would fail to keep a promise is indeed a reason not to make it in the first place. Or, that fact that you would not climb mount Everest successfully is a reason to not try to do so in the first place.
Fehige defends the asymmetry between preference satisfaction and frustration on rationality grounds. This is my take:
Letâs consider a given preference from the point of view of a given outcome after choosing it, in which the preference either exists or does not:
1. The preference exists:
a. If thereâs an outcome in which the preference exists and is more satisfied, and all else is equal, it would have been irrational to have chosen this one (over it, and at all).
b. If thereâs an outcome in which the preference exists and is less satisfied, and all else is equal, it would have been irrational to have chosen the other outcome (over this one, and at all).
c. If thereâs an outcome in which the preference does not exist, and all else is equal, the preference itself does not tell us if either would be irrational to have chosen.
2. The preference doesnât exist:
a. If thereâs an outcome in which the preference exists, regardless of its degree of satisfaction, and all else equal, the preference itself does not tell us if either would have been irrational to have chosen.
So, all else equal besides the existence or degree of satisfaction of the given preference, itâs always rational to choose an outcome in which the preference does not exist, but itâs irrational to choose an outcome in which the preference exists but is less satisfied than in another outcome.
(I made the same argument here, but this is a cleaner statement.)