Well, an effective environmentalist can be someone whose environmentalism is effective. Likewise, an evangelical Christian could be someone who is evangelical in their Christianity. You could argue that an evangelical Christian only counts as such if they spend 2% of their time on a soapbox or knock on fifty doors per week but that would be extreme. Can’t an (aspiring) effective altruist just be someone whose altruism is as effective as they can make it?
“Someone who believes that to be a good altruist, you should use evidence and reason to do the most good with your altruistic actions, and puts at least some time or money behind the things they therefore believe will do the most good”
Your examples don’t track my statements of what is required (merely having a belief about the definition of a term ‘good Christian’).
“(*) To be a good altruist, you should use evidence and reason to do the most good with your altruistic actions.”
What about someone who believes this but engages in only ineffective altruism because they don’t care much about being a ‘good altruist’? I can see there being many people like this. They realise that to be a ‘good altruist’ they should maximise their cost effectiveness, and they find it an interesting research area, but all of their actual altruism is related to people they know, causes they personally are invested in but aren’t terribly helpful, etc.
Ah, I see. You were thinking about the kind of attributes involved in affiliation: e.g. self-identification, belief, general action or specific stipulated actions.
I was arguing along a different axis—whether it would be better to restrict the standard to the domain of altruism or make it unrestricted.
Well, an effective environmentalist can be someone whose environmentalism is effective. Likewise, an evangelical Christian could be someone who is evangelical in their Christianity. You could argue that an evangelical Christian only counts as such if they spend 2% of their time on a soapbox or knock on fifty doors per week but that would be extreme. Can’t an (aspiring) effective altruist just be someone whose altruism is as effective as they can make it?
A stronger option is:
“Someone who believes that to be a good altruist, you should use evidence and reason to do the most good with your altruistic actions, and puts at least some time or money behind the things they therefore believe will do the most good”
Your examples don’t track my statements of what is required (merely having a belief about the definition of a term ‘good Christian’).
“(*) To be a good altruist, you should use evidence and reason to do the most good with your altruistic actions.”
What about someone who believes this but engages in only ineffective altruism because they don’t care much about being a ‘good altruist’? I can see there being many people like this. They realise that to be a ‘good altruist’ they should maximise their cost effectiveness, and they find it an interesting research area, but all of their actual altruism is related to people they know, causes they personally are invested in but aren’t terribly helpful, etc.
Ah, I see. You were thinking about the kind of attributes involved in affiliation: e.g. self-identification, belief, general action or specific stipulated actions.
I was arguing along a different axis—whether it would be better to restrict the standard to the domain of altruism or make it unrestricted.