I personally think the strongest argument for reducing malevolence is its relevance for s-risks (see section Robustness: Highly beneficial even if we fail at alignment), since I believe s-risks are much more neglected than they should be.
Uncertainty regarding the value of the future. I’m generally much more excited about making the future go better rather than “bigger” (reducing X-risk does the latter), so the more reducing malevolence does the latter more than the former, the less certain I am it should be a priority. (Again, this applies to any kind of work that reduces X-risks, though.)
Info / attention hazards. Perhaps the best way to avoid these malevolence scenarios is to ignore them and avoid making them more salient.
Interesting question you asked, thanks! I added a link to this comment in a footnote.
Thanks a lot for your work on this neglected topic!
You mention,
Could you give more detail on which of the counter-considerations (and motivations) you consider strongest?
Thanks Miranda! :)
I personally think the strongest argument for reducing malevolence is its relevance for s-risks (see section Robustness: Highly beneficial even if we fail at alignment), since I believe s-risks are much more neglected than they should be.
And the strongest counter-considerations for me would be
Uncertainty regarding the value of the future. I’m generally much more excited about making the future go better rather than “bigger” (reducing X-risk does the latter), so the more reducing malevolence does the latter more than the former, the less certain I am it should be a priority. (Again, this applies to any kind of work that reduces X-risks, though.)
Info / attention hazards. Perhaps the best way to avoid these malevolence scenarios is to ignore them and avoid making them more salient.
Interesting question you asked, thanks! I added a link to this comment in a footnote.