I’m not against abortion (except very late term abortion, to some degree), because unwanted pregnancy violates a woman’s right to bodily autonomy (that trumps the right to live, to some degree).
Why does women’s right to bodily autonomy trump foetuses’ right to life? I understand one can have a system where welfare is discounted in such a way that all one’s intuitions are preserved, but I do not think this is a good way of figuring out one’s moral theory. I prefer starting from the most fundamental intuitions, and then figure out what follows. Increasing happiness is fundamentally good to me, so I am open to the possibility of farming happy animals being good too (depending on the indirect effects).
I wonder, if you say happy animal farming is permissible, what do you think about happy slavery (breeding people to be used as slaves, guaranteeing a net-positive welfare) or happy human cannibalism?
I strongly endorse expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism, so I am in favour of increasing impartial welfare regardness of what it entails. I doubt human slavery or cannibalism would increase welfare, but I would support them if they did (accounting for direct and indirect effects).
Future human-years can only be discounted (in this context) if that discounting results in choosing the state where those humans do not exist.
I feel like this rule is arbitrary, as I do not see any fundamental difference between future human-years of existing and future people.
Most people have the moral intuition that the right to bodily autonomy trumps the right to live. We see that in dozens of moral dilemma’s, so it is pretty coherent. That right to bodily autonomy is also special in many other ways, and it can be directly derived from the moral theory of mild welfarism, as the right to discount the welfare of others if those discounted individuals cannot validly complain. The question is how much does that right to bodily autonomy trump other rights? In terms of mild welfarism: how much welfare are we allowed to discount? I suggest for collective decisions, we have to democratically decide how much we are allowed to discount, or how strong the right to bodily autonomy is.
If you endorse expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism, you should be against happy animal farming because those animals would be much better-off on a sanctuary where they live much longer with a higher welfare. Same goes for happy slavery: those happy human slaves would be better-off if they were not treated as slaves. According to total utilitarianism, you may have a duty to sacrifice yourself by bringing into existence huge numbers of (slightly) happy beings and taking care of them. Basically the very repugnant conclusion. That utilitarianism is rather totalitarian utilitarianism: extremely demanding. To avoid this repugnant conclusion, and hence to justify happy animal farming, you should believe that welfare is not interpersonally comparable, i.e. that you cannot sum everyone’s welfare. But you believe that the welfare of a shrimp is comparable to that of a human.
The fundamental difference between future human-years of existing and future people is based on the difference between existing and non-existing people. Existing people can complain against their welfare being discounted in those states where they exist, but possible future people who are never brought into existence, will never exist and hence cannot complain against their welfare being discounted in those states where they would exist. Hence, I don’t think this difference based on existence is arbitrary.
Most people have the moral intuition that the right to bodily autonomy trumps the right to live.
Killing a foetus violates their right to bodily autonomy? I agree most people support abortion, but there is still a significant fraction against it. It looks like 36 % in the United States think it should be illegal in all/​most cases. A much smaller fraction of the population would be against killing farmed animals for food in all/​most cases if they had good lives. So I think farming animals would be good under mild welfarism if the discounts to welfare were determined democratically.
If you endorse expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism, you should be against happy animal farming because those animals would be much better-off on a sanctuary where they live much longer with a higher welfare.
The annual welfare is proportional to the population (N), and welfare per animal-year. None of these factors should be maximised. A sufficiently large population would imply negative welfare per animal-year given a limited pool of resources. Having only a few animals with super high welfare would not be optimum due to implying a tiny population. I assume people would not want to farm lots of animals with super high welfare if they were not being raised for meat.
Here is a toy model about how to think about maximising welfare. If welfare per animal-year was proportional to the logarithm of the cost per animal-year (c = C/​N) as a fraction of that for zero welfare (c_0), as self-reported life satisfaction is roughly proportional to the real gross domestic product (real GDP) per capita, the annual welfare would be proportional to N*ln(c/​c_0). Note this does not explicitly depend on the lifespan of the animals. The ratio between annual welfare and cost, which is what I would want to maximise, would be proportional to N*ln(c/​c_0)/​C = ln(c/​c_0)/​c. This tends to 0 as c increases, which illustrates total welfare is not maximised by maximising the welfare per animal-year. The derivative of ln(c/​c_0)/​c with respect to c is (1 - ln(c/​c_0))/​c^2, which is 0 for ln(c/​c_0) = 1, positive for ln(c/​c_0) < 1, and negative for ln(c/​c_0) > 1. So the ratio between annual welfare and cost would be maximum for ln(c/​c_0) = 1, when the cost per animal-year is 2.72*c_0.
Eggs from barns cost around 1 $/​kg in the European Union (EU), which means their production cost is lower than that (such that selling eggs is profitable), and I estimate hens in barns have roughly neutral lives. So the toy model above suggests the production cost which maximises welfare is lower than 2.72 $/​kg. I have little confidence in this. I am just illustrating how I would think about it.
According to total utilitarianism, you may have a duty to sacrifice yourself by bringing into existence huge numbers of (slightly) happy beings and taking care of them.
I fully endorse expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism (ETHU), but I do not think it is that demanding. I think donating more and better is the best strategy to maximise impact for the vast majority of people, even ones working in impact-focussed organisations. Huge sacrifices like donating to the point of becoming extremely poor are a surefire way of not maximising future donations because they greatly decrease future earnings.
The fundamental difference between future human-years of existing and future people is based on the difference between existing and non-existing people. Existing people can complain against their welfare being discounted in those states where they exist, but possible future people who are never brought into existence, will never exist and hence cannot complain against their welfare being discounted in those states where they would exist. Hence, I don’t think this difference based on existence is arbitrary.
You seem to be implying that future human-years of existing people are necessary, and therefore can complain, whereas those of future people are not, and hence cannot complain. If so, what determines whether future human-years are necessary? Saying that future human-years are necessary if they belong to existing people would be assuming the conclusion.
I meant that prohibiting abortion violates the right to bodily autonomy of the mother: her body is required for the pregnancy, and the pregnancy was against her will. So the body of the mother is used as merely a means. Abortion and killing a foetus does not violate the right to bodily autonomy of the foetus, because the body of the foetus is not used as a means to achieve someone else’s ends. If the body of the foetus did not exist, there was no pregnancy and then the objective of the mother, not to be pregnant, is automatically achieved. So the presence of the body of the foetus is not necessary. So the body of the foetus is not used as a means.
Those 36% of US population that are against abortion, do not count, because they have an inconsistent ethic that involves unwanted arbitrariness (discrimination). Their ethic is speciesist, whereby human foetuses have a higher moral status than non-human animals. They believe that foetuses should not be killed whereas non-human animals are allowed to be killed. Such speciesist discrimination is arbitrary, and cannot be wanted by non-human animals. Hence unwanted arbitrariness. If such unwanted arbitrariness would be permissible, then we would be permitted to arbitrarily exclude the opinions of those people that are against abortion and arbitrarily exclude those people from democracy.
How many people would be against killing and eating individuals if those individuals had positive lives? If speciesism is excluded, and hence ‘individuals’ can refer to humans as well, then I expect a vast majority would be against such killing. Even if that means the individuals are not brought into existence.
About your total utilitarianism: the loss of welfare of a human who loves the taste of meat but is no longer allowed to eat meat, is smaller than the loss of welfare of all the animals who would be prematurely killed and eaten by that human. Hence, breeding animals but not killing and eating them, would increase total welfare. Also: the loss of welfare of a human who gives a bit of money to an animal sanctuary is smaller than the loss of welfare of animals on a sanctuary that lacks money to buy things for the animals. Hence, to increase total welfare, the human should give a bit of money to the animal sanctuary. And by the same reasoning he should give some money to another sanctuary that breeds and helps extra animals. And so, according to total utilitarianism, the human is not allowed to eat meat and is obligated to donate a lot of money to animal sanctuaries.
You are correct to assume that people would not want to farm lots of animals with super high welfare if they were not being raised for meat. That means those people are not total utilitarians.
If you want to maximize the ratio of annual welfare and cost, and if annual welfare does not explicitly depend on the lifespan of the animals, then you run into the replacement problem: the belief that killing an animal painlessly and bringing another animal into existence that has the same momentaneous welfare, is morally neutral. That would assume that animals would not have a personal identity over time. But there is evidence that animals are concerned about their future and do not want to be prematurely killed.
To be honest, I think that you are deluding yourself by believing that expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism is not that demanding. The belief that huge sacrifices would cause you to be less effective in doing good, seems to be like merely a rationalization. I don’t know of any total utilitarian who could not do a little more sacrifice in order to do more good. You can donate to the point that you are very poor and still work as hard, or even harder, to earn as much money, or even more money. I think total utilitarians should at least be honest and acknowledge that they are not doing all the things that would maximize total welfare. All total utilitarians that I know, are able to donate a little bit more on the margin and do more good.
About future human-years: a human who exists today can validly complain today that his/​her welfare in the future is discounted. A human who does not exist today and will never come into existence cannot validly complain today that his/​her welfare in the worlds where s/​he is brought into existence in the future, is discounted. Hence, future human-years of humans who exist today always count at least as much as future human-years of humans who will never exist. Note that most humans believe that they have a personal identity over time, that they do identify themselves with future human-years.
Perhaps I understand your position. Here is a line of argument that results in your conclusion based on total utilitarianism. Suppose for simplicity every individual can choose between four options:
A: veganism: not buying and eating animal products. This option generates the second lowest total welfare, higher than option B.
B: unhappy animal farming: buying and eating products from factory farms where animals live unhappy lives. This generates the lowest total welfare.
C: happy animal farming: buying and eating products from farms where animals live happy lives. This option generates the second highest total welfare, lower than option D but higher than A and B.
D: animal sanctuary: eating vegan and donating money to a sanctuary that breeds animals and give those animals long and very happy lives. This generates the highest welfare.
In terms of total welfare, we have D > C > A > B. Therefore, if everyone was total utilitarian, everyone should choose D. In extremis, total utilitarianism entails that everyone should sacrifice themselves a lot in order to bring into existence huge numbers of very happy animals that live on a sanctuary. However, if only you are total utilitarian, then according to act utilitarianism it would be wrong for you to choose D when other, non-utilitarian people are extremely reluctant to choose D. Sidenote: if you were a rule utilitarian instead of an act utilitarian, you could have to follow the rule that everyone has to follow, namely choosing option D, even if other people do not follow that rule (i.e. do not choose that option D). So I assume you are an act utilitarian.
There are two things to consider: which option you should choose for yourself, and which option you should choose for other people. I’ll argue that you should choose option A for yourself and, importantly, option C for others.
As a total act utilitarian, you should choose option A for yourself. Sure, option A is dominated by options D and C. But those two options are more expensive: in C you have to pay extra money for the meat, because meat from happy animals is more expensive than vegan products and meat from unhappy factory farmed animals. In option D you have to donate money to the sanctuary. However, it is very likely that donating your money to the most cost-effective animal welfare charities improves total welfare more than donating that money to an animal sanctuary or a farm where animals are happy. In particular, the extra money that you would spend on high-welfare meat when you choose option C, could better be spend on effective campaigns to transition people from option B to C.
This brings me to the second issue: which option should you choose for other people? Most people currently choose option B. Persuading them to choose option C might be feasible with campaigns that require a bit of money, whereas shifting people to option D might be unfeasible, no matter how much money you throw at such a campaign. At first sight, total utilitarianism seems to suggest that the best strategy is to have people switch to option D, but that may be unfeasible or too costly. Note that in terms of total welfare, it is better to persuade people to choose option C instead of option A.
So there you have it: choose veganism for yourself and happy meat for others. That would be the conclusion of a total act utilitarian.
C: happy animal farming: buying and eating products from farms where animals live happy lives. This option generates the second highest total welfare, lower than option D but higher than A and B.
D: animal sanctuary: eating vegan and donating money to a sanctuary that breeds animals and give those animals long and very happy lives. This generates the highest welfare.
I think C would have higher welfare than D for the reasons I mentioned in my last comment. The welfare per animal-year in D would be higher than in C, but the population in D would be much lower than in C.
I am ignoring effects on wild animals, but I think these are the driver of the overall effect. I think decreasing the consumption of animal-based food tends to increase the population of wild animals due to decreasing cropland, and the counterfactual land having more wild animals. So I believe it is beneficial/​harmful if wild animals have positive/​negative lives.
So I assume you are an act utilitarian.
I confirm I am an act utilitarian (in terms of my moral theory), although I use rules/​heuristic all time to make decisions (for example, being honest).
As a total act utilitarian, you should choose option A for yourself.
I agree I should follow a plant-based diet. I do not know whether this is good or bad for animals due to unclear possibly dominant effects on wild animals. However, it is cheaper and healthier, and therefore allows me to donate more to the most cost-effective invertebrate welfare interventions, which I think is the most important consideration for maximising my altruistic impact.
This brings me to the second issue: which option should you choose for other people? Most people currently choose option B. Persuading them to choose option C might be feasible with campaigns that require a bit of money, whereas shifting people to option D might be unfeasible, no matter how much money you throw at such a campaign. At first sight, total utilitarianism seems to suggest that the best strategy is to have people switch to option D, but that may be unfeasible or too costly. Note that in terms of total welfare, it is better to persuade people to choose option C instead of option A.
B is the cheapest, and therefore allows for the largest population of farmed animals, and smallest population of wild animals. So, if these have negative lives, B can be the best. I have little idea about whether wild animals have good or bad lives, so I am mostly agnostic about whether decreasing the consumption of animal-based food is good or bad, regardless of whether it comes from farmed animals with positive or negative lives.
I expect animal welfare in D to be higher than in C, almost by definition. In D, the purpose is to have as many animals as happy as possible, without killing them. Whereas in C, the prime objective remains killing and eating the animals. The farmers do not intend to maximize the welfare of the farmed animals. The population in D may be lower than in C, but the population size in D is chosen to maximize animal welfare, whereas the population size in C is chosen to maximize farmers profits. If population size in C is larger than in D, the welfare of the animals in C is suboptimal.
With choosing option C for others, I actually meant not trying to reject option C for others, e.g. not campaigning against option C, not spending money on trying to switch people to option A instead of option C. I agree that the most cost-effective invertebrate welfare interventions are more effective than interventions to switch people from B to C. Or, if you want, you can add another option B’, which is similar to B but with reduced animal suffering. Your favorite invertebrate welfare interventions correspond to switching people from B to B’, and that might at the moment be more effective than switching them from B to C.
Why does women’s right to bodily autonomy trump foetuses’ right to life? I understand one can have a system where welfare is discounted in such a way that all one’s intuitions are preserved, but I do not think this is a good way of figuring out one’s moral theory. I prefer starting from the most fundamental intuitions, and then figure out what follows. Increasing happiness is fundamentally good to me, so I am open to the possibility of farming happy animals being good too (depending on the indirect effects).
I strongly endorse expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism, so I am in favour of increasing impartial welfare regardness of what it entails. I doubt human slavery or cannibalism would increase welfare, but I would support them if they did (accounting for direct and indirect effects).
I feel like this rule is arbitrary, as I do not see any fundamental difference between future human-years of existing and future people.
Most people have the moral intuition that the right to bodily autonomy trumps the right to live. We see that in dozens of moral dilemma’s, so it is pretty coherent. That right to bodily autonomy is also special in many other ways, and it can be directly derived from the moral theory of mild welfarism, as the right to discount the welfare of others if those discounted individuals cannot validly complain. The question is how much does that right to bodily autonomy trump other rights? In terms of mild welfarism: how much welfare are we allowed to discount? I suggest for collective decisions, we have to democratically decide how much we are allowed to discount, or how strong the right to bodily autonomy is.
If you endorse expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism, you should be against happy animal farming because those animals would be much better-off on a sanctuary where they live much longer with a higher welfare. Same goes for happy slavery: those happy human slaves would be better-off if they were not treated as slaves. According to total utilitarianism, you may have a duty to sacrifice yourself by bringing into existence huge numbers of (slightly) happy beings and taking care of them. Basically the very repugnant conclusion. That utilitarianism is rather totalitarian utilitarianism: extremely demanding. To avoid this repugnant conclusion, and hence to justify happy animal farming, you should believe that welfare is not interpersonally comparable, i.e. that you cannot sum everyone’s welfare. But you believe that the welfare of a shrimp is comparable to that of a human.
The fundamental difference between future human-years of existing and future people is based on the difference between existing and non-existing people. Existing people can complain against their welfare being discounted in those states where they exist, but possible future people who are never brought into existence, will never exist and hence cannot complain against their welfare being discounted in those states where they would exist. Hence, I don’t think this difference based on existence is arbitrary.
Killing a foetus violates their right to bodily autonomy? I agree most people support abortion, but there is still a significant fraction against it. It looks like 36 % in the United States think it should be illegal in all/​most cases. A much smaller fraction of the population would be against killing farmed animals for food in all/​most cases if they had good lives. So I think farming animals would be good under mild welfarism if the discounts to welfare were determined democratically.
The annual welfare is proportional to the population (N), and welfare per animal-year. None of these factors should be maximised. A sufficiently large population would imply negative welfare per animal-year given a limited pool of resources. Having only a few animals with super high welfare would not be optimum due to implying a tiny population. I assume people would not want to farm lots of animals with super high welfare if they were not being raised for meat.
Here is a toy model about how to think about maximising welfare. If welfare per animal-year was proportional to the logarithm of the cost per animal-year (c = C/​N) as a fraction of that for zero welfare (c_0), as self-reported life satisfaction is roughly proportional to the real gross domestic product (real GDP) per capita, the annual welfare would be proportional to N*ln(c/​c_0). Note this does not explicitly depend on the lifespan of the animals. The ratio between annual welfare and cost, which is what I would want to maximise, would be proportional to N*ln(c/​c_0)/​C = ln(c/​c_0)/​c. This tends to 0 as c increases, which illustrates total welfare is not maximised by maximising the welfare per animal-year. The derivative of ln(c/​c_0)/​c with respect to c is (1 - ln(c/​c_0))/​c^2, which is 0 for ln(c/​c_0) = 1, positive for ln(c/​c_0) < 1, and negative for ln(c/​c_0) > 1. So the ratio between annual welfare and cost would be maximum for ln(c/​c_0) = 1, when the cost per animal-year is 2.72*c_0.
Eggs from barns cost around 1 $/​kg in the European Union (EU), which means their production cost is lower than that (such that selling eggs is profitable), and I estimate hens in barns have roughly neutral lives. So the toy model above suggests the production cost which maximises welfare is lower than 2.72 $/​kg. I have little confidence in this. I am just illustrating how I would think about it.
I fully endorse expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism (ETHU), but I do not think it is that demanding. I think donating more and better is the best strategy to maximise impact for the vast majority of people, even ones working in impact-focussed organisations. Huge sacrifices like donating to the point of becoming extremely poor are a surefire way of not maximising future donations because they greatly decrease future earnings.
You seem to be implying that future human-years of existing people are necessary, and therefore can complain, whereas those of future people are not, and hence cannot complain. If so, what determines whether future human-years are necessary? Saying that future human-years are necessary if they belong to existing people would be assuming the conclusion.
I meant that prohibiting abortion violates the right to bodily autonomy of the mother: her body is required for the pregnancy, and the pregnancy was against her will. So the body of the mother is used as merely a means. Abortion and killing a foetus does not violate the right to bodily autonomy of the foetus, because the body of the foetus is not used as a means to achieve someone else’s ends. If the body of the foetus did not exist, there was no pregnancy and then the objective of the mother, not to be pregnant, is automatically achieved. So the presence of the body of the foetus is not necessary. So the body of the foetus is not used as a means.
Those 36% of US population that are against abortion, do not count, because they have an inconsistent ethic that involves unwanted arbitrariness (discrimination). Their ethic is speciesist, whereby human foetuses have a higher moral status than non-human animals. They believe that foetuses should not be killed whereas non-human animals are allowed to be killed. Such speciesist discrimination is arbitrary, and cannot be wanted by non-human animals. Hence unwanted arbitrariness. If such unwanted arbitrariness would be permissible, then we would be permitted to arbitrarily exclude the opinions of those people that are against abortion and arbitrarily exclude those people from democracy.
How many people would be against killing and eating individuals if those individuals had positive lives? If speciesism is excluded, and hence ‘individuals’ can refer to humans as well, then I expect a vast majority would be against such killing. Even if that means the individuals are not brought into existence.
About your total utilitarianism: the loss of welfare of a human who loves the taste of meat but is no longer allowed to eat meat, is smaller than the loss of welfare of all the animals who would be prematurely killed and eaten by that human. Hence, breeding animals but not killing and eating them, would increase total welfare. Also: the loss of welfare of a human who gives a bit of money to an animal sanctuary is smaller than the loss of welfare of animals on a sanctuary that lacks money to buy things for the animals. Hence, to increase total welfare, the human should give a bit of money to the animal sanctuary. And by the same reasoning he should give some money to another sanctuary that breeds and helps extra animals. And so, according to total utilitarianism, the human is not allowed to eat meat and is obligated to donate a lot of money to animal sanctuaries.
You are correct to assume that people would not want to farm lots of animals with super high welfare if they were not being raised for meat. That means those people are not total utilitarians.
If you want to maximize the ratio of annual welfare and cost, and if annual welfare does not explicitly depend on the lifespan of the animals, then you run into the replacement problem: the belief that killing an animal painlessly and bringing another animal into existence that has the same momentaneous welfare, is morally neutral. That would assume that animals would not have a personal identity over time. But there is evidence that animals are concerned about their future and do not want to be prematurely killed.
To be honest, I think that you are deluding yourself by believing that expectational total hedonistic utilitarianism is not that demanding. The belief that huge sacrifices would cause you to be less effective in doing good, seems to be like merely a rationalization. I don’t know of any total utilitarian who could not do a little more sacrifice in order to do more good. You can donate to the point that you are very poor and still work as hard, or even harder, to earn as much money, or even more money. I think total utilitarians should at least be honest and acknowledge that they are not doing all the things that would maximize total welfare. All total utilitarians that I know, are able to donate a little bit more on the margin and do more good.
About future human-years: a human who exists today can validly complain today that his/​her welfare in the future is discounted. A human who does not exist today and will never come into existence cannot validly complain today that his/​her welfare in the worlds where s/​he is brought into existence in the future, is discounted. Hence, future human-years of humans who exist today always count at least as much as future human-years of humans who will never exist. Note that most humans believe that they have a personal identity over time, that they do identify themselves with future human-years.
Hi Vasco,
Perhaps I understand your position. Here is a line of argument that results in your conclusion based on total utilitarianism. Suppose for simplicity every individual can choose between four options:
A: veganism: not buying and eating animal products. This option generates the second lowest total welfare, higher than option B.
B: unhappy animal farming: buying and eating products from factory farms where animals live unhappy lives. This generates the lowest total welfare.
C: happy animal farming: buying and eating products from farms where animals live happy lives. This option generates the second highest total welfare, lower than option D but higher than A and B.
D: animal sanctuary: eating vegan and donating money to a sanctuary that breeds animals and give those animals long and very happy lives. This generates the highest welfare.
In terms of total welfare, we have D > C > A > B. Therefore, if everyone was total utilitarian, everyone should choose D. In extremis, total utilitarianism entails that everyone should sacrifice themselves a lot in order to bring into existence huge numbers of very happy animals that live on a sanctuary. However, if only you are total utilitarian, then according to act utilitarianism it would be wrong for you to choose D when other, non-utilitarian people are extremely reluctant to choose D. Sidenote: if you were a rule utilitarian instead of an act utilitarian, you could have to follow the rule that everyone has to follow, namely choosing option D, even if other people do not follow that rule (i.e. do not choose that option D). So I assume you are an act utilitarian.
There are two things to consider: which option you should choose for yourself, and which option you should choose for other people. I’ll argue that you should choose option A for yourself and, importantly, option C for others.
As a total act utilitarian, you should choose option A for yourself. Sure, option A is dominated by options D and C. But those two options are more expensive: in C you have to pay extra money for the meat, because meat from happy animals is more expensive than vegan products and meat from unhappy factory farmed animals. In option D you have to donate money to the sanctuary. However, it is very likely that donating your money to the most cost-effective animal welfare charities improves total welfare more than donating that money to an animal sanctuary or a farm where animals are happy. In particular, the extra money that you would spend on high-welfare meat when you choose option C, could better be spend on effective campaigns to transition people from option B to C.
This brings me to the second issue: which option should you choose for other people? Most people currently choose option B. Persuading them to choose option C might be feasible with campaigns that require a bit of money, whereas shifting people to option D might be unfeasible, no matter how much money you throw at such a campaign. At first sight, total utilitarianism seems to suggest that the best strategy is to have people switch to option D, but that may be unfeasible or too costly. Note that in terms of total welfare, it is better to persuade people to choose option C instead of option A.
So there you have it: choose veganism for yourself and happy meat for others. That would be the conclusion of a total act utilitarian.
Thanks, Stijn!
I think C would have higher welfare than D for the reasons I mentioned in my last comment. The welfare per animal-year in D would be higher than in C, but the population in D would be much lower than in C.
I am ignoring effects on wild animals, but I think these are the driver of the overall effect. I think decreasing the consumption of animal-based food tends to increase the population of wild animals due to decreasing cropland, and the counterfactual land having more wild animals. So I believe it is beneficial/​harmful if wild animals have positive/​negative lives.
I confirm I am an act utilitarian (in terms of my moral theory), although I use rules/​heuristic all time to make decisions (for example, being honest).
I agree I should follow a plant-based diet. I do not know whether this is good or bad for animals due to unclear possibly dominant effects on wild animals. However, it is cheaper and healthier, and therefore allows me to donate more to the most cost-effective invertebrate welfare interventions, which I think is the most important consideration for maximising my altruistic impact.
B is the cheapest, and therefore allows for the largest population of farmed animals, and smallest population of wild animals. So, if these have negative lives, B can be the best. I have little idea about whether wild animals have good or bad lives, so I am mostly agnostic about whether decreasing the consumption of animal-based food is good or bad, regardless of whether it comes from farmed animals with positive or negative lives.
I expect animal welfare in D to be higher than in C, almost by definition. In D, the purpose is to have as many animals as happy as possible, without killing them. Whereas in C, the prime objective remains killing and eating the animals. The farmers do not intend to maximize the welfare of the farmed animals. The population in D may be lower than in C, but the population size in D is chosen to maximize animal welfare, whereas the population size in C is chosen to maximize farmers profits. If population size in C is larger than in D, the welfare of the animals in C is suboptimal.
With choosing option C for others, I actually meant not trying to reject option C for others, e.g. not campaigning against option C, not spending money on trying to switch people to option A instead of option C. I agree that the most cost-effective invertebrate welfare interventions are more effective than interventions to switch people from B to C. Or, if you want, you can add another option B’, which is similar to B but with reduced animal suffering. Your favorite invertebrate welfare interventions correspond to switching people from B to B’, and that might at the moment be more effective than switching them from B to C.
Thanks for the conversation!
Likewise!