Lets assume for the moment that the probabilities involved are known with certainty. If I understand your original âway outâ correctly, then it would apply just as well in this case. You would embrace being irrational and still refuse to give the mugger your wallet. But I think here, the recommendations of expected utility theory in a Pascalâs mugger situation are doing well âon their own termsâ. This is because expected utility theory doesnât tell you to maximize the probability of increasing your utility, it tells you to maximize your utility in expectation, and thatâs exactly what handing over your wallet to the mugger does. And if enough people repeated it enough times, some of them would eventually find themselves in a rare situation where the muggerâs promises were real.
In reality, the probabilities involved are not known. Thatâs an added complication which gives you a different way out of having to hand over your wallet, and thatâs the way out Iâm advocating we take in this post.
Lets assume for the moment that the probabilities involved are known with certainty. If I understand your original âway outâ correctly, then it would apply just as well in this case. You would embrace being irrational and still refuse to give the mugger your wallet. But I think here, the recommendations of expected utility theory in a Pascalâs mugger situation are doing well âon their own termsâ. This is because expected utility theory doesnât tell you to maximize the probability of increasing your utility, it tells you to maximize your utility in expectation, and thatâs exactly what handing over your wallet to the mugger does. And if enough people repeated it enough times, some of them would eventually find themselves in a rare situation where the muggerâs promises were real.
In reality, the probabilities involved are not known. Thatâs an added complication which gives you a different way out of having to hand over your wallet, and thatâs the way out Iâm advocating we take in this post.