Executive summary: The author argues that only aggregationist moral theories—those that sum the value of each person’s well-being—truly respect the separateness of persons, because they require caring about each individual’s welfare independently, whereas anti-aggregationist views implicitly treat additional people’s suffering as morally irrelevant once a worst-off individual is identified.
Key points:
Independent value requires independent desires: To genuinely value separate persons, one must have distinct, non-fungible desires for each person’s well-being; this leads naturally to aggregation, since satisfying more such desires is better.
Anti-aggregationist psychology is morally stingy: By focusing only on the worst-off individual (e.g., via maximin), anti-aggregationists neglect the independent moral significance of others’ suffering or flourishing.
Illustrative contrast: “Aggregating Amy” cares equally and separately about each person’s flourishing, whereas “Generic Jim” stops caring about others once someone worse-off is found—making Amy the more virtuous moral ideal.
Misuse of ‘separateness of persons’: Philosophers often use the phrase to defend principles like “large harms to one outweigh many small harms” or “interpersonal trade-offs are harder,” but the author claims the more important and literal sense is valuing each person independently.
Utilitarianism accommodates true separateness: Properly framed, utilitarianism values individuals first and the aggregate second—caring about the total only because each person’s welfare counts in its own right.
Conventional wisdom reversal: Contrary to common deontological critiques, it is anti-aggregationists—not aggregationists—who fail to respect the separate value of distinct persons.
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Executive summary: The author argues that only aggregationist moral theories—those that sum the value of each person’s well-being—truly respect the separateness of persons, because they require caring about each individual’s welfare independently, whereas anti-aggregationist views implicitly treat additional people’s suffering as morally irrelevant once a worst-off individual is identified.
Key points:
Independent value requires independent desires: To genuinely value separate persons, one must have distinct, non-fungible desires for each person’s well-being; this leads naturally to aggregation, since satisfying more such desires is better.
Anti-aggregationist psychology is morally stingy: By focusing only on the worst-off individual (e.g., via maximin), anti-aggregationists neglect the independent moral significance of others’ suffering or flourishing.
Illustrative contrast: “Aggregating Amy” cares equally and separately about each person’s flourishing, whereas “Generic Jim” stops caring about others once someone worse-off is found—making Amy the more virtuous moral ideal.
Misuse of ‘separateness of persons’: Philosophers often use the phrase to defend principles like “large harms to one outweigh many small harms” or “interpersonal trade-offs are harder,” but the author claims the more important and literal sense is valuing each person independently.
Utilitarianism accommodates true separateness: Properly framed, utilitarianism values individuals first and the aggregate second—caring about the total only because each person’s welfare counts in its own right.
Conventional wisdom reversal: Contrary to common deontological critiques, it is anti-aggregationists—not aggregationists—who fail to respect the separate value of distinct persons.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.