First, as a rule of thumb, coeteris paribus, a decrease in the avg x-risk implies an increase in the expected duration of human survival—so yielding a proportionally higher expected value for reducing x-risk. I think this can be inferred from Thorstad’s toy model in Existential risk pessimism and the time of perils. So, if something reduces x-risk by 100x, I’m assuming it doesn’t make much difference, from my POV, if the prior x-risk is 1% or 10^-10 - because I’m assuming that EV will stay the same. This is not always true; I should have clarified this.
I think you mean that the expected value of the future will not change much if one decreases the nearterm annual existential risk without decreasing the longterm annual existential risk.
Thanks for clarifying!
I think you mean that the expected value of the future will not change much if one decreases the nearterm annual existential risk without decreasing the longterm annual existential risk.