Thanks a lot for this Jess, I’m in a similar situation, and have gone through similar considerations (though perhaps not articulated as clearly as yours!) Here are some of those thoughts, which I hope are the sort of thing you were looking for even though I’m not one of the people who’s thought about it more than you, and also am not particularly well versed in the relevant empirical facts.
Consequentialist considerations aren’t the only thing motivating me. To be honest, a huge part of my motivation comes from a strong emotional sense of “I don’t like this, and I don’t want to be part of it.” The more I think and learn about the industry that produces my milk and eggs, the more uncomfortable and upset I feel about it, and the more I feel that I want to completely disassociate myself from it.
I know this isn’t exactly in line with the EA mentality of using reason and evidence to determine the ethical choices we make.
I don’t think this is out of line with EA. First, this sense can point to consequentialist considerations, and trusting it somewhat in some circumstances can be a good heuristic for avoiding bad consequences even when you can’t immediately list them all. Secondly, effective altruism isn’t consequentialism.
By going vegan myself, therefore, there’s some chance I’ll encourage others to think more about their dietary choices and reduce their consumption of animal products. I’m never going to be a militant vegan who tries to persuade everyone else she meets to go meat-free—it’s just not my personality and I think it’s unlikely to be effective—but I’m happy to strike up non-confrontational conversations and discuss my reasons with people.
The extent to which you’ll reduce others’ consumption of animal products will vary hugely depending on your personality and approach—right down to approximately zero reduction. If you actively strike up non-confrontational conversations you’ll probably do more than most! By contrast, I think I’ve only had a mild influence on one close person, and that hasn’t affected their behaviour (though there are temporary situational impediments to this anyway).
I broadly agree with Katja Grace that if one can use the time/energy/willpower etc. that one would spend being vegetarian/vegan more effectively towards other altruistic activities, then it probably makes sense not to be vegetarian/vegan
Is this because you think your altruistic activities have astronomical impact, as I guess Katja does? I don’t for my own part, so I’ve never wanted to rely on this being true for me.
in my personal case, I’m really not sure that the costs of veganism are fungible in this way—perhaps just because they really are relatively small
In my case it’s pretty clear they are—perhaps because they are relatively large for me! I definitely think vegetarianism’s notably reduced my happiness, and veganism did so significantly more, which has both an intrinsic cost and large knock-on ones.
In theory this seems like it could work, but my main concern is that it’s much easier to stick to a very simple rule—“I’m a vegan”—than it is to stick to a vaguer one—“I’m 95% vegan.”
Totally agree—besides the costs you mention, I found there was a significant willpower cost from turning each potential non-vegan meal into a weighty moral decision.
Thanks a lot for this Jess, I’m in a similar situation, and have gone through similar considerations (though perhaps not articulated as clearly as yours!) Here are some of those thoughts, which I hope are the sort of thing you were looking for even though I’m not one of the people who’s thought about it more than you, and also am not particularly well versed in the relevant empirical facts.
I don’t think this is out of line with EA. First, this sense can point to consequentialist considerations, and trusting it somewhat in some circumstances can be a good heuristic for avoiding bad consequences even when you can’t immediately list them all. Secondly, effective altruism isn’t consequentialism.
The extent to which you’ll reduce others’ consumption of animal products will vary hugely depending on your personality and approach—right down to approximately zero reduction. If you actively strike up non-confrontational conversations you’ll probably do more than most! By contrast, I think I’ve only had a mild influence on one close person, and that hasn’t affected their behaviour (though there are temporary situational impediments to this anyway).
Is this because you think your altruistic activities have astronomical impact, as I guess Katja does? I don’t for my own part, so I’ve never wanted to rely on this being true for me.
In my case it’s pretty clear they are—perhaps because they are relatively large for me! I definitely think vegetarianism’s notably reduced my happiness, and veganism did so significantly more, which has both an intrinsic cost and large knock-on ones.
Totally agree—besides the costs you mention, I found there was a significant willpower cost from turning each potential non-vegan meal into a weighty moral decision.