SureâIâm not claiming âEA doctrineâ has no putative counter-examples which should lead us to doubt it. But these counter-examples should rely on beliefs about propositions not assessments of behaviour: if EA says âit is better to do X than Yâ, yet this seems wrong, this is a reason to doubt EA, but whether anyone is actually doing X (or X instead of Y) is irrelevant. âEA doctrineâ (ditto most other moral views) urges us to be much less selfishâthat I am selfish anyway is not an argument against it.
SureâIâm not claiming âEA doctrineâ has no putative counter-examples which should lead us to doubt it. But these counter-examples should rely on beliefs about propositions not assessments of behaviour: if EA says âit is better to do X than Yâ, yet this seems wrong, this is a reason to doubt EA, but whether anyone is actually doing X (or X instead of Y) is irrelevant. âEA doctrineâ (ditto most other moral views) urges us to be much less selfishâthat I am selfish anyway is not an argument against it.