You might think it’s reasonable to discount based on psychological similarity: something is less valuable to your later self the less like you that person is. Cf. The Time-Relative Interest Account of the badness of death (e.g. Holtug 2011). This wouldn’t justify a pure time preference, but it would justify a contingent time preference: in reality, you value stuff less the further in the future it happens, but not because of time per se, but because of reduced psychological connectededness, which so happens to occur of time.
I point this out to show that someone accept your reductio but get much the same practical result by other means.
Of course, someone who took this view would agree that some harm of size S that befalls you just before you enter the cryo chamber would be just as bad as one that befalls you as soon as you get out.
You might think it’s reasonable to discount based on psychological similarity: something is less valuable to your later self the less like you that person is. Cf. The Time-Relative Interest Account of the badness of death (e.g. Holtug 2011). This wouldn’t justify a pure time preference, but it would justify a contingent time preference: in reality, you value stuff less the further in the future it happens, but not because of time per se, but because of reduced psychological connectededness, which so happens to occur of time.
I point this out to show that someone accept your reductio but get much the same practical result by other means.
Of course, someone who took this view would agree that some harm of size S that befalls you just before you enter the cryo chamber would be just as bad as one that befalls you as soon as you get out.