I did have in mind that non-experientialist goods could count, but as you suggest, experientialist goods (or goods that depend on their acknowledgement to count, including non-hedonic ones, so other than pleasure) would probably be weakened during torture, so that could introduce a confounder. The comparison now would be mostly be between hedonic bads and non-experientialist goods.
Another issue is how to determine the weight of non-experientialist goods, especially if we don’t want to be paternalistic or alienating. If we do so by subjective appreciation, then it seems like we’re basically just turning them back into experientialist goods. If we do so via subjective weights (even if someone can’t appreciate a good at the time, they might still insist it’s very important and we could infer how good it is for them), its subjective weight could also be significantly reduced during torture. So we still wouldn’t necessarily be comparing the disvalue of torture to the maximum value of non-experientialist goods using Tim’s judgement while being tortured.
Instead, if we do still want to use subjective weights, we might consider the torture and non-hedonic goods happening at different times (and in different orders?), for equal durations, and ask Tim during the torture, during the non-hedonic goods and at other times whether the non-hedonic goods make up for the torture. If the answers agree, then great. But if they disagree, this could be hard to resolve, because Tim’s answer could be biased in each situation: he underweights non-hedonic goods during torture and otherwise while not focusing on them, and he underweights torture while not being tortured.
EDIT: On the other hand, if I tried to come up with a cognitively plausible objective cardinal account of subjective weights and value, I’d expect torture to be able to reach the max or get close to it, and that would be enough to say that negative hedonic welfare can be at least about as bad as goods can be good (in aggregate, in a moment).
I did have in mind that non-experientialist goods could count, but as you suggest, experientialist goods (or goods that depend on their acknowledgement to count, including non-hedonic ones, so other than pleasure) would probably be weakened during torture, so that could introduce a confounder. The comparison now would be mostly be between hedonic bads and non-experientialist goods.
Another issue is how to determine the weight of non-experientialist goods, especially if we don’t want to be paternalistic or alienating. If we do so by subjective appreciation, then it seems like we’re basically just turning them back into experientialist goods. If we do so via subjective weights (even if someone can’t appreciate a good at the time, they might still insist it’s very important and we could infer how good it is for them), its subjective weight could also be significantly reduced during torture. So we still wouldn’t necessarily be comparing the disvalue of torture to the maximum value of non-experientialist goods using Tim’s judgement while being tortured.
Instead, if we do still want to use subjective weights, we might consider the torture and non-hedonic goods happening at different times (and in different orders?), for equal durations, and ask Tim during the torture, during the non-hedonic goods and at other times whether the non-hedonic goods make up for the torture. If the answers agree, then great. But if they disagree, this could be hard to resolve, because Tim’s answer could be biased in each situation: he underweights non-hedonic goods during torture and otherwise while not focusing on them, and he underweights torture while not being tortured.
EDIT: On the other hand, if I tried to come up with a cognitively plausible objective cardinal account of subjective weights and value, I’d expect torture to be able to reach the max or get close to it, and that would be enough to say that negative hedonic welfare can be at least about as bad as goods can be good (in aggregate, in a moment).