Cancellation of prominent SAI geo-engineering experiments (30-60% influence* for SCOPEx, 10-30%* for cancellation of SPICE); De-nuclearization in Kazakhstan in early 1990s (5-15%) and in Sweden in late 1960s (1-15%); Reagan’s move towards a ‘nuclear freeze’ in the 1980s, and subsequent international treaties (20-40%* for former, 5-15%* for latter); Changing UK’s climate policies in 2019 (40-70%* for specific emissions reductions); Germany’s phase-out of nuclear power from 2011 to 2023 (10-30%); Domestic bans on CFCs in late 1970s (5-25%), and influential for stricter international governance from 1990 (1-10%); Europe’s de-facto moratorium on GMOs in late 1990s (30-50%)
I would like to note that none of that had been met with corporations willing to spend potentially dozens of billions of dollars on lobbying, due to the availability of the capital and the enormous profits to be made; and none of these clearly stand out to policymakers as something uniquely important from the competitiveness perspective. AI is more like railroads; it’d be great to make it more like CFCs in the eyes of policymakers, but for that, you need a clear scientific consensus on the existential threat from AI.
It makes sense to study the effectiveness of protests and other activism in general and figure out good strategies to use; but due to the differences, I believe it is too easy to learn wrong lessons from restrictions on GMOs and nuclear and have a substantial net-negative impact.
With AI, we want the policymakers to understand the problem and try to address it; incentivising them to address the public’s concerns won’t lead to the change we need.
The messaging from AI activists should be clear but epistemically honest; we should ask the politicians to listen to the experts, we shouldn’t ask them to listen to the loudest of our voices (as the loudest voices are likely to make claims that the policymakers will know to be incorrect or the representatives of AI companies will be able to explain why they’re wrong, having the aura of science on their side).
Studying protests in general is great; studying whatever led to the Montreal Protocol and the Vienna Convention is excellent; but we need to be clearly different from people who had protested railroads.
—
Also, I’m not sure there’s an actual moratorium on GM crops in Europe- many GMO are officially imported and one GM crop (corn, I think?) is cultivated inside the EU
I’m so sorry it’s taken me so long to respond, Mikhail!
<I would like to note that none of that had been met with corporations willing to spend potentially dozens of billions of dollars on lobbying>
I don’t think this is true, for GMOs, fossil fuels, or nuclear power. It’s important total lobbying capacity/potential, from actual amount spent on lobbying.… Total annual total technology lobbying is in the order hundreds of million: the amount allocated for AI lobbying is, by definition, less. This is a similar to total annual lobbying (or I suspect lower) than than biotechnology spending for GMOs. Annual climate lobbying over £150 million per yearas I mentioned in my piece. The stakes are also high for nuclear power. As mentioned in my piece, legislation in Germany to extend plant lifetimes in 2010 offered around €73 billion in extra profits for energy companies, some firms sued for billions of Euros after Germany’s reversal. (Though, I couldn’t find an exact figure for nuclear lobbying).
< none of these clearly stand out to policymakers as something uniquely important from the competitiveness perspective >
I also feel this is too strong. Reagan’s national security advisors were reluctant about his arms control efforts in 1980s because of national security concerns. Some politicians in Sweden believed nuclear weapons were uniquely important for national security. If your point is that AI is more strategically important than these other examples, then I would agree with you. Though your phrasing is overly strong.
< AI is more like railroads >
I don’t know if this is true … I wonder how strategically important railroads were? I also wonder how profitable they were? Seems to be much more state involvement in railroads versus AI… Though, this could be an interesting case study project!
< AI is more like CFCs in the eyes of policymakers, but for that, you need a clear scientific consensus on the existential threat from AI >
I agree you need scientific input, but CFCs also saw widespread public mobilisation (as described in the piece).
< incentivising them to address the public’s concerns won’t lead to the change we need >
This seems quite confusing. Surely, this depends on what the public’s concerns are?
< the loudest voices are likely to make claims that the policymakers will know to be incorrect >
This also seems confusing to me. If you believe that policymakers regularly sort the “loudest voices” from real scientists, in general, why do you think that regulations with “substantial net-negative impact” passed wrt GMOs/nuclear?
< Also, I’m not sure there’s an actual moratorium on GM crops in Europe >
Yes, with “moratorium” I’m referring to a de-facto moratorium on new approvals of GMOs 1999-2002. In general, though, Europe grows a lot less GMOs than other countries: 0.1 million hectares annually versus >70 million hectares in US. I wasn’t aware Europe imports GMOs from abroad.
Widespread public mobilisation certainly helps to get more policymakers on board with regulation, but the mobilisation has to be caused by a scientific consensus and be pointing at the scientific consensus
If you believe that policymakers regularly sort the “loudest voices” from real scientists
I was talking about the loudest of the activist voices: I’m worried policymakers might hear the public is concerned about hugely beneficial technology instead the public being concerned about the technical reasons for doom and pointing at the scientists to listen to who can explain these reasons
a de-facto moratorium on new approvals
For the context, I want lots of narrow AI to be allowed; I also want things with potential to kill everyone to be prevented from being created, with no chance of someone getting through, anywhere in the planet.
I would like to note that none of that had been met with corporations willing to spend potentially dozens of billions of dollars on lobbying, due to the availability of the capital and the enormous profits to be made; and none of these clearly stand out to policymakers as something uniquely important from the competitiveness perspective. AI is more like railroads; it’d be great to make it more like CFCs in the eyes of policymakers, but for that, you need a clear scientific consensus on the existential threat from AI.
It makes sense to study the effectiveness of protests and other activism in general and figure out good strategies to use; but due to the differences, I believe it is too easy to learn wrong lessons from restrictions on GMOs and nuclear and have a substantial net-negative impact.
With AI, we want the policymakers to understand the problem and try to address it; incentivising them to address the public’s concerns won’t lead to the change we need.
The messaging from AI activists should be clear but epistemically honest; we should ask the politicians to listen to the experts, we shouldn’t ask them to listen to the loudest of our voices (as the loudest voices are likely to make claims that the policymakers will know to be incorrect or the representatives of AI companies will be able to explain why they’re wrong, having the aura of science on their side).
Studying protests in general is great; studying whatever led to the Montreal Protocol and the Vienna Convention is excellent; but we need to be clearly different from people who had protested railroads.
—
Also, I’m not sure there’s an actual moratorium on GM crops in Europe- many GMO are officially imported and one GM crop (corn, I think?) is cultivated inside the EU
I’m so sorry it’s taken me so long to respond, Mikhail!
<I would like to note that none of that had been met with corporations willing to spend potentially dozens of billions of dollars on lobbying>
I don’t think this is true, for GMOs, fossil fuels, or nuclear power. It’s important total lobbying capacity/potential, from actual amount spent on lobbying.… Total annual total technology lobbying is in the order hundreds of million: the amount allocated for AI lobbying is, by definition, less. This is a similar to total annual lobbying (or I suspect lower) than than biotechnology spending for GMOs. Annual climate lobbying over £150 million per year as I mentioned in my piece. The stakes are also high for nuclear power. As mentioned in my piece, legislation in Germany to extend plant lifetimes in 2010 offered around €73 billion in extra profits for energy companies, some firms sued for billions of Euros after Germany’s reversal. (Though, I couldn’t find an exact figure for nuclear lobbying).
< none of these clearly stand out to policymakers as something uniquely important from the competitiveness perspective >
I also feel this is too strong. Reagan’s national security advisors were reluctant about his arms control efforts in 1980s because of national security concerns. Some politicians in Sweden believed nuclear weapons were uniquely important for national security. If your point is that AI is more strategically important than these other examples, then I would agree with you. Though your phrasing is overly strong.
< AI is more like railroads >
I don’t know if this is true … I wonder how strategically important railroads were? I also wonder how profitable they were? Seems to be much more state involvement in railroads versus AI… Though, this could be an interesting case study project!
< AI is more like CFCs in the eyes of policymakers, but for that, you need a clear scientific consensus on the existential threat from AI >
I agree you need scientific input, but CFCs also saw widespread public mobilisation (as described in the piece).
< incentivising them to address the public’s concerns won’t lead to the change we need >
This seems quite confusing. Surely, this depends on what the public’s concerns are?
< the loudest voices are likely to make claims that the policymakers will know to be incorrect >
This also seems confusing to me. If you believe that policymakers regularly sort the “loudest voices” from real scientists, in general, why do you think that regulations with “substantial net-negative impact” passed wrt GMOs/nuclear?
< Also, I’m not sure there’s an actual moratorium on GM crops in Europe >
Yes, with “moratorium” I’m referring to a de-facto moratorium on new approvals of GMOs 1999-2002. In general, though, Europe grows a lot less GMOs than other countries: 0.1 million hectares annually versus >70 million hectares in US. I wasn’t aware Europe imports GMOs from abroad.
I appreciate the reply!
Widespread public mobilisation certainly helps to get more policymakers on board with regulation, but the mobilisation has to be caused by a scientific consensus and be pointing at the scientific consensus
I was talking about the loudest of the activist voices: I’m worried policymakers might hear the public is concerned about hugely beneficial technology instead the public being concerned about the technical reasons for doom and pointing at the scientists to listen to who can explain these reasons
For the context, I want lots of narrow AI to be allowed; I also want things with potential to kill everyone to be prevented from being created, with no chance of someone getting through, anywhere in the planet.
$957m in the US alone in 2023 on tech (less on AI): https://www.cnbc.com/2024/02/02/ai-lobbying-spikes-nearly-200percent-as-calls-for-regulation-surge.html