Thanks for the thorough analysis (you seem to have covered a lot of ground with little time!).
I have been interested in warning shots, albeit from biosecurity, but I think as you point out it could work quite well for AI too as long as take-off is not too fast. I am curious: Did you get a feeling that the movements you studied were able to make more of warning shots from having prepared and organized beforehand? Or could they quite effectively have impact by only retroactively responding to those events afterwards?
I found that for biosecurity, it seems possible that the chance of a warning shot is so high that it might be worthwhile preparing for it, especially if such preparations are likely to pay off. And to perhaps tie my comment a bit more closely to AI, it might be that the warning shot in bio is also a warning shot in AI, if the engineered pathogen was made possible by AI (there seems to be a possibility for quite a lot of catastrophe risk overlap between AI and bio).
Thank you @Ulrik Horn! I think warning shots may very well be important.
From my other piece: building up organizations in anticipation of future ‘trigger events’ is vital for protests, so that they can mobilize and scale in response – the organizational factor which experts thought was most important for protests. I think the same is true for GMOs: pre-existing social movements were able to capitalise on trigger events of 1997/1998, in part, because of prior mobilisation starting in 1980s.
I also think that engineered pathogen event is a plausible warning shot for AI, though we should also broaden our scope of what could lead to public mobilisation. Lots of ‘trigger events’ for protest groups (e.g. Rosa Parks, Arab Spring) did not stem from warning shots, but cases of injustice. Similarly, there weren’t any ‘warning shots’ which posed harm for GMOs. (I say more about this in other piece!)
Thanks for the thorough analysis (you seem to have covered a lot of ground with little time!).
I have been interested in warning shots, albeit from biosecurity, but I think as you point out it could work quite well for AI too as long as take-off is not too fast. I am curious: Did you get a feeling that the movements you studied were able to make more of warning shots from having prepared and organized beforehand? Or could they quite effectively have impact by only retroactively responding to those events afterwards?
I found that for biosecurity, it seems possible that the chance of a warning shot is so high that it might be worthwhile preparing for it, especially if such preparations are likely to pay off. And to perhaps tie my comment a bit more closely to AI, it might be that the warning shot in bio is also a warning shot in AI, if the engineered pathogen was made possible by AI (there seems to be a possibility for quite a lot of catastrophe risk overlap between AI and bio).
Thank you @Ulrik Horn! I think warning shots may very well be important.
From my other piece: building up organizations in anticipation of future ‘trigger events’ is vital for protests, so that they can mobilize and scale in response – the organizational factor which experts thought was most important for protests. I think the same is true for GMOs: pre-existing social movements were able to capitalise on trigger events of 1997/1998, in part, because of prior mobilisation starting in 1980s.
I also think that engineered pathogen event is a plausible warning shot for AI, though we should also broaden our scope of what could lead to public mobilisation. Lots of ‘trigger events’ for protest groups (e.g. Rosa Parks, Arab Spring) did not stem from warning shots, but cases of injustice. Similarly, there weren’t any ‘warning shots’ which posed harm for GMOs. (I say more about this in other piece!)