It sounds like youâre describing negative hedonistic utilitarianism, specifically. Although I would describe myself as suffering-focused and leaning towards negative consequentialism, I have two main points of disagreement with negative hedonistic utilitarianism, and a third which Iâve only thought a little about:
1. Hedonism. I wouldnât get into Nozickâs experience machine or subject myself to wireheading (except for altruistic reasons), i.e. I see no reason to seek pleasure for its own sake like this or have my preferences satisfied by illusions. I think itâs for these reasons that Iâve never really used psychoactive substances, including even caffeine and alcohol (I donât think people who do are doing anything wrong; they just have different preferences, and I do want their preferences to be satisfied).
I havenât seen a convincing case for hedonism, but I also havenât been looking much, so this could of course just be my ignorance. I think preferences are a more pluralistic value, and they could allow individuals to make the kinds of trade-offs in their own lives that they themselves would like to make. Arguments against NU for not respecting preferences can often be extended to arguments against hedonism, generally. So, for now, I lean mostly towards negative preference consequentialism, but not specifically negative preference utilitarianism (NPU).
Also, some of the major impossibility theorems in population ethics donât apply to negative preference consequentialism, precisely because positive welfare is impossible. You might say the same about NU (instead of just assigning it no value), but the asymmetry in valuing suffering but not pleasure is harder to justify than the treatment of a satisfied preference as no better than its absence, since preferences seem to have value conditional upon their existence. It seems silly to induce preferences in others just to satisfy them. For example, I convince you to really want a hotdog, and then give you a hotdog. Are you better off? Iâd say no. I think convincing someone to no longer prefer something they had preferred before may be good. On the other hand, convincing someone their preferences have been satisfied when they havenât in reality also seems off, and the experience machine could also do this.
Peter Singer was a negative preference utilitarian for most of his career, but is now closer to a classical utilitarian, from my understanding.
Iâm not sure whether a preference should be experienced as satisfied or frustrated for it to matter, but I do lean weakly towards yes, since I lean towards empty individualism (basically each experience should be considered a separate individual) by default and I donât think we should be concerned with trying to satisfy the preferences of the long dead (if they wonât come back to life).
Btw, under empty individualism, if they can justify the procreation asymmetry (that an individual would have a bad existence is a reason to not bring them into existence, and that an individual would have a good existence is not a reason to bring them into existence), a negative utilitarian would be justified in valuing suffering but not pleasure, because experiences of suffering would be bad existences which are bad to bring about, while experiences of pleasure would be âgoodâ existences, to which weâre indifferent.
Choose r,0<r<1 , and for each outcome, rank the utilities of each individual (perhaps after first aggregating utilities within each individual) in increasing (nondecreasing) order u1,u2,âŚ,un. Choose the outcome which maximizes
nâi=1riâ1ui
Since I do lean towards empty individualism, all trade-offs would actually be interpersonal, though.
3. That the order of events in time doesnât matter. I also suspect that for personal trade-offs specifically, the order of events does matter in a way that the major consequentialist theories donât usually allow, AFAIK. I think, with valuing preferences inherently, this could best explain aversion to get into the experience machine and the importance of consent, which consequentialist theories tend to only value instrumentally. I havenât thought much about what such a theory could look like, though.
(Iâm not very sympathetic to rights-based theories; I think it makes sense to violate the rights of some to protect the rights of others, and the order in which this happens shouldnât matter, since it isnât a question of paternalism but of trade-offs between people. Also, the only right I would recognize is to preference satisfaction.)
Under empty individualism again, though, order would have to matter for interpersonal tradeoffs, too, for this to mean much.
It sounds like youâre describing negative hedonistic utilitarianism, specifically. Although I would describe myself as suffering-focused and leaning towards negative consequentialism, I have two main points of disagreement with negative hedonistic utilitarianism, and a third which Iâve only thought a little about:
1. Hedonism. I wouldnât get into Nozickâs experience machine or subject myself to wireheading (except for altruistic reasons), i.e. I see no reason to seek pleasure for its own sake like this or have my preferences satisfied by illusions. I think itâs for these reasons that Iâve never really used psychoactive substances, including even caffeine and alcohol (I donât think people who do are doing anything wrong; they just have different preferences, and I do want their preferences to be satisfied).
I havenât seen a convincing case for hedonism, but I also havenât been looking much, so this could of course just be my ignorance. I think preferences are a more pluralistic value, and they could allow individuals to make the kinds of trade-offs in their own lives that they themselves would like to make. Arguments against NU for not respecting preferences can often be extended to arguments against hedonism, generally. So, for now, I lean mostly towards negative preference consequentialism, but not specifically negative preference utilitarianism (NPU).
Also, some of the major impossibility theorems in population ethics donât apply to negative preference consequentialism, precisely because positive welfare is impossible. You might say the same about NU (instead of just assigning it no value), but the asymmetry in valuing suffering but not pleasure is harder to justify than the treatment of a satisfied preference as no better than its absence, since preferences seem to have value conditional upon their existence. It seems silly to induce preferences in others just to satisfy them. For example, I convince you to really want a hotdog, and then give you a hotdog. Are you better off? Iâd say no. I think convincing someone to no longer prefer something they had preferred before may be good. On the other hand, convincing someone their preferences have been satisfied when they havenât in reality also seems off, and the experience machine could also do this.
Peter Singer was a negative preference utilitarian for most of his career, but is now closer to a classical utilitarian, from my understanding.
Iâm not sure whether a preference should be experienced as satisfied or frustrated for it to matter, but I do lean weakly towards yes, since I lean towards empty individualism (basically each experience should be considered a separate individual) by default and I donât think we should be concerned with trying to satisfy the preferences of the long dead (if they wonât come back to life).
Btw, under empty individualism, if they can justify the procreation asymmetry (that an individual would have a bad existence is a reason to not bring them into existence, and that an individual would have a good existence is not a reason to bring them into existence), a negative utilitarian would be justified in valuing suffering but not pleasure, because experiences of suffering would be bad existences which are bad to bring about, while experiences of pleasure would be âgoodâ existences, to which weâre indifferent.
2. Aggregation by summation of independent terms. There are arguments for it (independence/âseparability axioms, Harsanyiâs utilitarian theorem), but I think personal and interpersonal trade-offs should be treated differently in order to prioritize the worst off, and prioritize them more than summation allows without introducing discontinuities. Erik Carlsonâs Moderate Trade-off Theory is a bit closer to where I lean now. This is how itâs defined:
Choose r,0<r<1 , and for each outcome, rank the utilities of each individual (perhaps after first aggregating utilities within each individual) in increasing (nondecreasing) order u1,u2,âŚ,un. Choose the outcome which maximizes
Since I do lean towards empty individualism, all trade-offs would actually be interpersonal, though.
3. That the order of events in time doesnât matter. I also suspect that for personal trade-offs specifically, the order of events does matter in a way that the major consequentialist theories donât usually allow, AFAIK. I think, with valuing preferences inherently, this could best explain aversion to get into the experience machine and the importance of consent, which consequentialist theories tend to only value instrumentally. I havenât thought much about what such a theory could look like, though.
(Iâm not very sympathetic to rights-based theories; I think it makes sense to violate the rights of some to protect the rights of others, and the order in which this happens shouldnât matter, since it isnât a question of paternalism but of trade-offs between people. Also, the only right I would recognize is to preference satisfaction.)
Under empty individualism again, though, order would have to matter for interpersonal tradeoffs, too, for this to mean much.