they seem to argue more for āweāre clueless about how much we should do ECLā?
I think they suggest that thereās just a lot of subtlety in working out the implications of acausal decision theories in practice. Which is reason to expect more crucial considerations in this domain generally /ā reason to doubt your āby definitionā argument.
but why should I expect their attempts to do so to backfire
Why should you expect them to be positive in expectation either? (The broader point of the unawareness sequence is that thereās an ambiguous pile of positive and negative effects to weigh up.)
On the simulators, it just seems like its hard to think of possible simulator-motivations where us reaching good outcomes in the simulation would be bad for the base reality, and easy to think of ones where it would be neutral or good.
But then weāre back to the Extrapolation argument, which you claimed you werenāt committed to. Iām saying, even if the balance of effects we can think of looks good, weāre looking at a super tiny sliver of the set of effects our fully aware selves would be weighing up ā and itās a biased sample of such effects, so extrapolating from that sample is dubious.
āBut then weāre back to the Extrapolation argument, which you claimed you werenāt committed to.ā
No, I didnāt claim thatāI said the snippet you quoted wasnāt the Extrapolation argument, and I stand by that. Iām definitely sympathetic to something like Extrapolation in general.
The original snippet was more about the acausal stuff, and wasnāt Extrapolation, and the distinct argument I subsequently mentioned about simulators was Extrapolation.
Thereās no quick objection I can give to your response specifically (except to simplistically say āno, I donāt buy it, we know more than that, we can have some reasonable guesses about simulatorsā intentionsā) - properly laying out my disagreements would take a little bit of time and effort, as is usually the case for deep worldview differences.
I think they suggest that thereās just a lot of subtlety in working out the implications of acausal decision theories in practice. Which is reason to expect more crucial considerations in this domain generally /ā reason to doubt your āby definitionā argument.
Why should you expect them to be positive in expectation either? (The broader point of the unawareness sequence is that thereās an ambiguous pile of positive and negative effects to weigh up.)
But then weāre back to the Extrapolation argument, which you claimed you werenāt committed to. Iām saying, even if the balance of effects we can think of looks good, weāre looking at a super tiny sliver of the set of effects our fully aware selves would be weighing up ā and itās a biased sample of such effects, so extrapolating from that sample is dubious.
āBut then weāre back to the Extrapolation argument, which you claimed you werenāt committed to.ā
No, I didnāt claim thatāI said the snippet you quoted wasnāt the Extrapolation argument, and I stand by that. Iām definitely sympathetic to something like Extrapolation in general.
(Edited for tone)
Sorry, I donāt understand. The snippet I quoted ā about acausal stuff and simulations ā is whatās at issue in this discussion.
Regardless, Iām still interested in where you object to my response to Extrapolation. Could you please say more on that?
The original snippet was more about the acausal stuff, and wasnāt Extrapolation, and the distinct argument I subsequently mentioned about simulators was Extrapolation.
Thereās no quick objection I can give to your response specifically (except to simplistically say āno, I donāt buy it, we know more than that, we can have some reasonable guesses about simulatorsā intentionsā) - properly laying out my disagreements would take a little bit of time and effort, as is usually the case for deep worldview differences.