I don’t need to be persuaded to care about animal/insect/machine suffering in the first place.
That’s great, because that is also the starting point of my book. From the introduction:
Before I dive deeper, I should clarify the values that underlie this book. A key principle is impartiality: suffering matters equally irrespective of who experiences it. In particular, I believe we should care about all sentient beings, including nonhuman animals. Similarly, I believe suffering matters equally regardless of when it is experienced. A future individual is no less (and no more) deserving of moral consideration than someone alive now. So the fact that a moral catastrophe takes place in the distant future does not reduce the urgency of preventing it, if we have the means to do so. I will assume that you broadly agree with these fundamental values, which form the starting point of the book.
That is, I’m not dwelling on an argument for these fundamental values, as that can be found elsewhere.
I agree with this answer.
That’s great, because that is also the starting point of my book. From the introduction:
That is, I’m not dwelling on an argument for these fundamental values, as that can be found elsewhere.