Strong upvoted as that was possibly the most compelling rebuttal to the simulation argument I’ve seen in quite a while, which was refreshing for my peace of mind.
That being said, it mainly targets the idea of a large-scale simulation of our entire world. What about the possibility that the simulation is for a single entity and that the rest of the world is simulated at a lower fidelity? I had the thought that a way to potentially maximize future lives of good quality would be to contain each conscious life in a separate simulation where they live reasonably good lives catered to their preferences, with the apparent rest of the world being virtual. Given, I doubt this conjecture because in my own opinion my life doesn’t seem that great, but it seems plausible at least?
Also, that line about the diamond statue of Hatsune Miku was very, very amusing to this former otaku.
Changing the simulation hypothesis from a simulation of a world full of people to a simulation of an individual throws the simulation argument out the window. Here is how Sean Carroll articulates the first three steps of the simulation argument:
We can easily imagine creating many simulated civilizations.
Things that are that easy to imagine are likely to happen, at least somewhere in the universe.
Therefore, there are probably many civilizations being simulated within the lifetime of our universe. Enough that there are many more simulated people than people like us.
The simulation argument doesn’t apply to you, as an individual. Unless you think that you, personally, are going to create a simulation of a world or an individual — which obviously you’re not.
Changing the simulation hypothesis from a world-scale simulation to an individual-scale simulation also doesn’t change the other arguments against the simulation hypothesis:
The bottoming out argument. This is the one from Sean Carroll. Even if we supposed you, personally, were going to create individual-scale simulations in the future, eventually a nesting cascade of such simulations would exhaust available computation in the top-level universe, i.e. the real universe. The bottom-level simulations within which no further simulations are possible would outnumber higher-level ones. The conclusion of the simulation argument contradicts a necessary premise.[1]
The ethical argument. It would be extremely unethical to imprison an individual in a simulation without their consent, especially a simulation with a significant amount of pain and suffering that the simulators are programming in. Would you create an individual-scale simulation even of an unrealistically pleasant life, let alone a life with significant pain and suffering? If we had the technology to do this today, I think it would be illegal. It would be analogous to false imprisonment, kidnapping, torture, or criminal child abuse (since you are creating this person).
The computational waste argument. The amount of computation required to make an individual-scale simulation would require at least as much computation as creating a digital mind in the real universe. In fact, it would require more computation, since you also to have to simulate the whole world around the individual, not just the individual themselves. If the simulators think marginally, they would prefer to use these resources to create a digital mind in the real universe or put them to some other, better use.
If the point of the simulation is to cater it to the individual’s preferences, we should ask:
a) Why isn’t this actually happening? Why is there so much unnecessary pain and suffering and unpleasantness in every individual’s life? Why simulate the covid-19 pandemic?
b) Why not cater to the individual’s fundamental and overriding preference not to be in a simulation?
c) Why not put these resources toward any number of superior uses that must surely exist?[2]
Perhaps most importantly, changing the simulation hypothesis from world-scale to individual-scale doesn’t change perhaps the most powerful counterargument to the simulation hypothesis:
The unlimited arbitrary, undisprovable hypotheses argument. There is no reason to think the simulation hypothesis makes any more sense or is any more likely to be true than the hypothesis that the world you perceive is an illusion created by an evil demon or a trickster deity like Loki. There are an unlimited number of equally arbitrary and equally unjustified hypotheses of this type that could be generated. In my previous comment, I argued that versions of the simulation hypotheses in which the laws of physics or laws of nature are radically different in the real universe than in the simulation are supernatural hypotheses. Versions of the simulation hypothesis that assume real universe physics is the same as simulation physics suffer from the bottoming out argument and the computational waste argument. So, either way, the simulation hypothesis should be rejected. (Also, whether the simulation has real universe physics or not, the ethical argument applies — another reason to reject it.)
This argument also calls into question why we should think simulation physics is the same as real universe physics, i.e. why we should think the simulation hypothesis makes more sense as a naturalistic hypothesis than a supernatural hypothesis. The simulation hypothesis leans a lot on the idea that humans or post-humans in our hypothetical future will want to create “ancestor simulations”, i.e. realistic simulations of the simulators’ past, which is our present. If there were simulations, why would ancestor simulations be the most common type? Fantasy novels are about equally popular as historical fiction or non-fiction books about history. Would simulations skew toward historical realism significantly more than books currently do? Why not simulate worlds with magic or other supernatural phenomena? (Maybe we should conclude that, since this is more interesting, ghosts probably exist in our simulation. Maybe God is simulated too?) The “ancestor simulation” idea is doing a lot of heavy lifting; it’s not clear that this is in any way a justifiable assumption rather than an arbitrary one. The more I dig into the reasoning behind the simulation hypothesis, the more it feels like Calvinball.[3]
The individual-scale simulation hypothesis also introduces new problems that are unique to it:
Simulation of other minds. If you wanted to build a robot that could perfectly simulate the humans you know best, the underlying software would need to be a digital mind. Since, on the individual-scale simulation hypothesis, you are a digital mind, then the other minds in the simulation — at least the ones you know well — are as real as you are. You could try to argue that these other minds only need to be partially simulated. For example, the mind simulations don’t need to be running when you aren’t observing or interacting with these people. But then why don’t these people report memory gaps? If the answer is that the simulation fills in the gaps with false memories, what process continually generates new false memories? Why would this process be less computationally expensive than just running the simulation normally? (You could also try to say that consciousness is some kind of switch that can be flipped on or off for some simulations but not others. But I can’t think of any theory of consciousness this would be compatible with, and it’s a problem for the individual-scale simulation hypothesis if it just starts making stuff up ad hoc to fit the hypothesis.)
If we decide that at least the people you know well must be fully simulated, in the same way you are, then what about the people they know well? What about the people who they know well know well? If everyone in the world is connected through six degrees of separation or fewer, then it seems like individual-scale simulations are actually impossible and all simulations must be world-scale simulations.
Abandoning the simulation of history at large scale. Individual-scale simulations don’t provide the same informational value that world-scale simulations might. When people talk about why “ancestor simulations” would supposedly be valuable or desired, they usually appeal to the notion of simulating historical events on a large scale. This obviously wouldn’t apply to individual-scale simulations. To the extent credence toward the simulation hypothesis depends on this, an individual-scale simulation hypothesis may be even less credible than a world-scale simulation hypothesis.
The Wikipedia page on the simulation hypothesis notes that it’s a contemporary twist on a centuries-old if not millennia-old idea. We’ve replaced dreams and evil demons with computers, but the underlying idea is largely the same. The reasons to reject it are largely the same, although the simulation argument has some unique weaknesses. That page is a good resource for finding still more arguments against the simulation hypothesis.[4]
Carroll, who is a physicist and cosmologist, also criticizes the anthropic reasoning of the simulation argument. I recommend reading his post, it’s short and well-written.
You could try to argue that, despite society’s best efforts, it will be impossible to supress a large number of simulations from being created. Pursuing this line of argument re quires speculating about the specific details of a distant, transhuman or post-human future. Would an individual creating a simulation be more like an individual today operating a meth lab or launching a nuclear ICBM? I’m not sure we can know the answer to this question. If dangerous or banned technologies can’t be controlled, what does this say about existential risk? Will far future, post-human terrorists be able to deploy doomsday devices? If so, that would undermine the simulation argument. (Will post-humans even have the desire to be terrorists, or is that a defect of humanity?)
Related to this are various arguments that the simulation argument is self-defeating. We infer things about the real universe from our perceived universe. We then conclude that our perceived universe is a simulation. But, if it is, this undermines our ability to infer anything about the real universe from our perceived universe. In fact, this undermines the inference that our perceived universe is a simulation within a real universe. So, the simulation argument defeats itself.
In addition to all the above, I would be curious to hear empirical, scientific arguments about the amount of computation that might be required for world-scale simulations, which would be partly applicable to individual-scale simulations. Obviously, our universe can’t run a full-scale, one-to-one simulation of our universe with perfect fidelity — that would require more computation, matter, and energy than our universe has. If you only simulate the solar system with perfect fidelity, you can pare that down a lot. You can make other assumptions to pare down the computation required. It’s much less important than all the arguments and considerations described above, but if we get a better understanding of approximately how difficult or costly a world-scale simulation might be, that could help put some considerations like computational waste in perspective.
Strong upvoted as that was possibly the most compelling rebuttal to the simulation argument I’ve seen in quite a while, which was refreshing for my peace of mind.
That being said, it mainly targets the idea of a large-scale simulation of our entire world. What about the possibility that the simulation is for a single entity and that the rest of the world is simulated at a lower fidelity? I had the thought that a way to potentially maximize future lives of good quality would be to contain each conscious life in a separate simulation where they live reasonably good lives catered to their preferences, with the apparent rest of the world being virtual. Given, I doubt this conjecture because in my own opinion my life doesn’t seem that great, but it seems plausible at least?
Also, that line about the diamond statue of Hatsune Miku was very, very amusing to this former otaku.
Changing the simulation hypothesis from a simulation of a world full of people to a simulation of an individual throws the simulation argument out the window. Here is how Sean Carroll articulates the first three steps of the simulation argument:
We can easily imagine creating many simulated civilizations.
Things that are that easy to imagine are likely to happen, at least somewhere in the universe.
Therefore, there are probably many civilizations being simulated within the lifetime of our universe. Enough that there are many more simulated people than people like us.
The simulation argument doesn’t apply to you, as an individual. Unless you think that you, personally, are going to create a simulation of a world or an individual — which obviously you’re not.
Changing the simulation hypothesis from a world-scale simulation to an individual-scale simulation also doesn’t change the other arguments against the simulation hypothesis:
The bottoming out argument. This is the one from Sean Carroll. Even if we supposed you, personally, were going to create individual-scale simulations in the future, eventually a nesting cascade of such simulations would exhaust available computation in the top-level universe, i.e. the real universe. The bottom-level simulations within which no further simulations are possible would outnumber higher-level ones. The conclusion of the simulation argument contradicts a necessary premise.[1]
The ethical argument. It would be extremely unethical to imprison an individual in a simulation without their consent, especially a simulation with a significant amount of pain and suffering that the simulators are programming in. Would you create an individual-scale simulation even of an unrealistically pleasant life, let alone a life with significant pain and suffering? If we had the technology to do this today, I think it would be illegal. It would be analogous to false imprisonment, kidnapping, torture, or criminal child abuse (since you are creating this person).
The computational waste argument. The amount of computation required to make an individual-scale simulation would require at least as much computation as creating a digital mind in the real universe. In fact, it would require more computation, since you also to have to simulate the whole world around the individual, not just the individual themselves. If the simulators think marginally, they would prefer to use these resources to create a digital mind in the real universe or put them to some other, better use.
If the point of the simulation is to cater it to the individual’s preferences, we should ask:
a) Why isn’t this actually happening? Why is there so much unnecessary pain and suffering and unpleasantness in every individual’s life? Why simulate the covid-19 pandemic?
b) Why not cater to the individual’s fundamental and overriding preference not to be in a simulation?
c) Why not put these resources toward any number of superior uses that must surely exist?[2]
Perhaps most importantly, changing the simulation hypothesis from world-scale to individual-scale doesn’t change perhaps the most powerful counterargument to the simulation hypothesis:
The unlimited arbitrary, undisprovable hypotheses argument. There is no reason to think the simulation hypothesis makes any more sense or is any more likely to be true than the hypothesis that the world you perceive is an illusion created by an evil demon or a trickster deity like Loki. There are an unlimited number of equally arbitrary and equally unjustified hypotheses of this type that could be generated. In my previous comment, I argued that versions of the simulation hypotheses in which the laws of physics or laws of nature are radically different in the real universe than in the simulation are supernatural hypotheses. Versions of the simulation hypothesis that assume real universe physics is the same as simulation physics suffer from the bottoming out argument and the computational waste argument. So, either way, the simulation hypothesis should be rejected. (Also, whether the simulation has real universe physics or not, the ethical argument applies — another reason to reject it.)
This argument also calls into question why we should think simulation physics is the same as real universe physics, i.e. why we should think the simulation hypothesis makes more sense as a naturalistic hypothesis than a supernatural hypothesis. The simulation hypothesis leans a lot on the idea that humans or post-humans in our hypothetical future will want to create “ancestor simulations”, i.e. realistic simulations of the simulators’ past, which is our present. If there were simulations, why would ancestor simulations be the most common type? Fantasy novels are about equally popular as historical fiction or non-fiction books about history. Would simulations skew toward historical realism significantly more than books currently do? Why not simulate worlds with magic or other supernatural phenomena? (Maybe we should conclude that, since this is more interesting, ghosts probably exist in our simulation. Maybe God is simulated too?) The “ancestor simulation” idea is doing a lot of heavy lifting; it’s not clear that this is in any way a justifiable assumption rather than an arbitrary one. The more I dig into the reasoning behind the simulation hypothesis, the more it feels like Calvinball.[3]
The individual-scale simulation hypothesis also introduces new problems that are unique to it:
Simulation of other minds. If you wanted to build a robot that could perfectly simulate the humans you know best, the underlying software would need to be a digital mind. Since, on the individual-scale simulation hypothesis, you are a digital mind, then the other minds in the simulation — at least the ones you know well — are as real as you are. You could try to argue that these other minds only need to be partially simulated. For example, the mind simulations don’t need to be running when you aren’t observing or interacting with these people. But then why don’t these people report memory gaps? If the answer is that the simulation fills in the gaps with false memories, what process continually generates new false memories? Why would this process be less computationally expensive than just running the simulation normally? (You could also try to say that consciousness is some kind of switch that can be flipped on or off for some simulations but not others. But I can’t think of any theory of consciousness this would be compatible with, and it’s a problem for the individual-scale simulation hypothesis if it just starts making stuff up ad hoc to fit the hypothesis.)
If we decide that at least the people you know well must be fully simulated, in the same way you are, then what about the people they know well? What about the people who they know well know well? If everyone in the world is connected through six degrees of separation or fewer, then it seems like individual-scale simulations are actually impossible and all simulations must be world-scale simulations.
Abandoning the simulation of history at large scale. Individual-scale simulations don’t provide the same informational value that world-scale simulations might. When people talk about why “ancestor simulations” would supposedly be valuable or desired, they usually appeal to the notion of simulating historical events on a large scale. This obviously wouldn’t apply to individual-scale simulations. To the extent credence toward the simulation hypothesis depends on this, an individual-scale simulation hypothesis may be even less credible than a world-scale simulation hypothesis.
The Wikipedia page on the simulation hypothesis notes that it’s a contemporary twist on a centuries-old if not millennia-old idea. We’ve replaced dreams and evil demons with computers, but the underlying idea is largely the same. The reasons to reject it are largely the same, although the simulation argument has some unique weaknesses. That page is a good resource for finding still more arguments against the simulation hypothesis.[4]
Carroll, who is a physicist and cosmologist, also criticizes the anthropic reasoning of the simulation argument. I recommend reading his post, it’s short and well-written.
You could try to argue that, despite society’s best efforts, it will be impossible to supress a large number of simulations from being created. Pursuing this line of argument re quires speculating about the specific details of a distant, transhuman or post-human future. Would an individual creating a simulation be more like an individual today operating a meth lab or launching a nuclear ICBM? I’m not sure we can know the answer to this question. If dangerous or banned technologies can’t be controlled, what does this say about existential risk? Will far future, post-human terrorists be able to deploy doomsday devices? If so, that would undermine the simulation argument. (Will post-humans even have the desire to be terrorists, or is that a defect of humanity?)
Related to this are various arguments that the simulation argument is self-defeating. We infer things about the real universe from our perceived universe. We then conclude that our perceived universe is a simulation. But, if it is, this undermines our ability to infer anything about the real universe from our perceived universe. In fact, this undermines the inference that our perceived universe is a simulation within a real universe. So, the simulation argument defeats itself.
In addition to all the above, I would be curious to hear empirical, scientific arguments about the amount of computation that might be required for world-scale simulations, which would be partly applicable to individual-scale simulations. Obviously, our universe can’t run a full-scale, one-to-one simulation of our universe with perfect fidelity — that would require more computation, matter, and energy than our universe has. If you only simulate the solar system with perfect fidelity, you can pare that down a lot. You can make other assumptions to pare down the computation required. It’s much less important than all the arguments and considerations described above, but if we get a better understanding of approximately how difficult or costly a world-scale simulation might be, that could help put some considerations like computational waste in perspective.