Iâm curious what is your relative credence in non-materialist, âidealisticâ physicalism if youâre familiar with it?
Iâm not familiar enough with it to have much of a view, and I only skimmed. Correct me if Iâm misundertanding, but my guess is that basically classical/ânon-quantum phenomena can be sufficient for consciousness, since the quantum stuff going on in our heads doesnât seem that critical and could be individually replaced with âclassicalâ interactions while preserving everything else in the brain as well as our behaviour. I would say substrate doesnât matter and we can abstract away a lot of details, but some features of how interactions happen might matter (Iâm not a computational functionalist).
panpsychism (which assumes property dualism)
I guess this is a matter of definitions, but I donât think this is true, and as far as I can tell, non-materialist physicalism is also compatible with what many would recognize as panpsychism. I would call a theory panpsychist if it calls things like rocks, my desk, etc.. conscious. My post here doesnât assume dualism in panpsychism, and is compatible with illusionism, e.g. it applies to attention schema theory.
⌠my guess is that basically classical/ânon-quantum phenomena can be sufficient for consciousness, since the quantum stuff going on in our heads doesnât seem that critical and could be individually replaced with âclassicalâ interactions while preserving everything else in the brain as well as our behaviour.
Iâm not sure how to understand your âsufficientâ, since to our best knowledge the world is quantum, and the classical physics is only an approximation. (Quoting Pearce: âWhy expect a false theory of the world, i.e. classical physics, to yield a true account of consciousness?â.)
One reason Pearce needs quantum phenomena is the so-called binding problem of consciousness. For on Pearceâs account, âphenomenal binding is classically impossible.â IIRC the phenomenal binding is also what drives David Chalmers to dualism.
I would say substrate doesnât matter âŚ
It doesnât matter indeed on a physicalistic idealist account. But currently, as far as we know, only brains support phenomenal binding (as opposed to being mere âpsychotic noiseâ), for the reason of a huge evolutionary advantage (to the replicating genes).
⌠non-materialist physicalism is also compatible with what many would recognize as panpsychism âŚ
Iâm not sure how to understand your âsufficientâ, since to our best knowledge the world is quantum, and the classical physics is only an approximation.
I agree, but I think exclusively quantum phenomena like superposition arenât necessary in our account of consciousness; thatâs a detail we can abstract away. I think we could make all the important phenomena happen on a macroscopic scale where classical physics can adequately describe whatâs happening, e.g. use macroscopic balls instead of particles for signals.
Iâm not familiar enough with it to have much of a view, and I only skimmed. Correct me if Iâm misundertanding, but my guess is that basically classical/ânon-quantum phenomena can be sufficient for consciousness, since the quantum stuff going on in our heads doesnât seem that critical and could be individually replaced with âclassicalâ interactions while preserving everything else in the brain as well as our behaviour. I would say substrate doesnât matter and we can abstract away a lot of details, but some features of how interactions happen might matter (Iâm not a computational functionalist).
I guess this is a matter of definitions, but I donât think this is true, and as far as I can tell, non-materialist physicalism is also compatible with what many would recognize as panpsychism. I would call a theory panpsychist if it calls things like rocks, my desk, etc.. conscious. My post here doesnât assume dualism in panpsychism, and is compatible with illusionism, e.g. it applies to attention schema theory.
Thanks for the reply.
Iâm not sure how to understand your âsufficientâ, since to our best knowledge the world is quantum, and the classical physics is only an approximation. (Quoting Pearce: âWhy expect a false theory of the world, i.e. classical physics, to yield a true account of consciousness?â.)
One reason Pearce needs quantum phenomena is the so-called binding problem of consciousness. For on Pearceâs account, âphenomenal binding is classically impossible.â IIRC the phenomenal binding is also what drives David Chalmers to dualism.
It doesnât matter indeed on a physicalistic idealist account. But currently, as far as we know, only brains support phenomenal binding (as opposed to being mere âpsychotic noiseâ), for the reason of a huge evolutionary advantage (to the replicating genes).
Good point. Thanks :)
I agree, but I think exclusively quantum phenomena like superposition arenât necessary in our account of consciousness; thatâs a detail we can abstract away. I think we could make all the important phenomena happen on a macroscopic scale where classical physics can adequately describe whatâs happening, e.g. use macroscopic balls instead of particles for signals.