Iām not sure if I understand the argument correctly, but what would you say to someone who cites the āfallacy of divisionā? For example, even though recurrent processes are made of feedforward ones, that doesnāt mean the purported consciousness of the recurrent processes also applies to the feedforward parts. My guess is that youād reply that wholes can sometimes be different from the sum of their parts, but in these cases, thereās no reason to think thereās a discontinuity anywhere, i.e., no reason to think thereās a difference in kind rather than degree as the parts are arranged.
I basically agree. I think there are no good lines to draw anywhere so it seems to me to be a difference of degree, although Iād guess we can propose minimal isolated systems that are not conscious, perhaps an isolated electron, but that kind of isolation seems rare (maybe impossible?) in the real world.
That being said, I donāt think the physical theories have picked out precise properties of āwholesā that donāt apply to small ubiquitous systems, just to lesser degrees.
Consider a table made of five pieces of wood: four legs and a top. Suppose we create the table just by stacking the top on the four legs, without any nails or glue, to keep things simple. Is the difference between the table versus an individual piece of wood a difference in degree or kind? Iām personally not sure, but I think many people would call it a difference in kind.
I think people either donāt have a precise definition in mind when they think of tables, or if they do, have something in mind that would specifically rule this out. Or theyāll revise their definition when presented with such an example: āOh, but the legs have to be attached!ā Of course, what do they mean by legs?
I think an alternate route to panpsychism is to argue that the electron has not just information integration but also the other properties you mentioned. It has ārecurrent processingā because it can influence something else in its environment (say, a neighboring electron), which can then influence the original electron. We can get higher-order levels by looking at one electron influencing another, which influences another, and so on. The thing about Y predicting X would apply to electrons as well as neurons.
I basically agree. I think there are no good lines to draw anywhere so it seems to me to be a difference of degree, although Iād guess we can propose minimal isolated systems that are not conscious, perhaps an isolated electron, but that kind of isolation seems rare (maybe impossible?) in the real world.
That being said, I donāt think the physical theories have picked out precise properties of āwholesā that donāt apply to small ubiquitous systems, just to lesser degrees.
I think people either donāt have a precise definition in mind when they think of tables, or if they do, have something in mind that would specifically rule this out. Or theyāll revise their definition when presented with such an example: āOh, but the legs have to be attached!ā Of course, what do they mean by legs?
Agreed. Good point.