I would expect that living your life in a character building simulator would itself be unvirtuous. You canât actually express most virtues in such a setting, because the stakes arenât real. Consistently avoiding situations where there are real stakes seems cowardly, imprudent, uncharitable, etc.. Spending some time in such simulators could be good, though.
Yes, I imagined spending some time in a simulator. I guess Iâm making the claim that, in some cases at least, virtue ethics may identify a right action but seemingly without giving a good (IMO) account of whatâs right or praiseworthy about it.
On Kantianism, âŚ
There are degrees of coercion, and Iâm not sure whether to think of that as âthere are two distinct categories of action, the coercive and the non-coercive, but we donât know exactly where to draw the line between themâ or âcoerciveness is a continuous property of actions; there can be more or less of itâ. (I mean by âcoercivenessâ here something like âtaking someoneâs decision out of their own handsâ, and IMO taking it as important means prioritising, to some degree, respect for peopleâs (and animalsâ) right to make their own decisions over their well-being.)
So my answer to these questions is: It depends on the details, but I expect that Iâd judge some things to be clearly coercive, others to be clearly fine, and to be unsure about some borderline cases. More specifically (just giving my quick impressions here):
On Kantianism, would trying to persuade people to not harm animals or to help animals mean using those people as mere means? Or, as long as they arenât harmed, itâs fine? Or, as long as youâre not misleading them, youâre helping them make more informed decisions, which respects and even promotes their agency (even if your goal is actually not this, but just helping animals, and you just avoid misleading in your advocacy).
I think it depends on whether you also have the personâs interests in mind. If you do it e.g. intending to help them make a more informed or reasoned decision, in accordance with their will, then thatâs fine. If you do it trying to make them act against their will (for example, by threatening or blackmailing them, or by lying or withholding information, such that they make a different decision than had they known the full picture), then thatâs using as a mere means. (A maxim always contains its ends, i.e. the agentâs intention.)
Could showing people factory farm or slaughterhouse footage be too emotionally manipulative, whether or not that footage is representative?
Yeah, I think it could, but I also think it could importantly inform people of the realities of factory farms. Hard to say whether this is too coercive, it probably depends on the details again (what you show, in which context, how you frame it, etc.).
Should we add the disclaimer to our advocacy that any individual abstaining from animal products almost certainly has no âdirectâ impact on animals through this?
Time for a caveat: Iâd never have the audacity to tell people (such as yourself) in the effective animal advocacy space whatâs best to do there, and anyway give some substantial weight to utilitarianism. So what precedes and follows this paragraph arenât recommendations or anything, nor is it my all-things-considered view, just what I think one Kantian view might entail.
By âdirect impactâ, you mean you wonât save any specific animal by e.g. going vegan, youâre just likely preventing some future sufferingâsomething like that? Interesting, Iâd guess not disclosing this is fine, due to a combination of (1) people probably donât really care that much about this distinction, and think preventing future suffering is ~just as good, (2) people are usually already aware of something like this (at least upon reflection), and (3) people might have lots of other motivations to do the thing anyway, e.g. not wanting to contribute to an intensively suffering-causing system, which make this difference irrelevant. But Iâm definitely open to changing my mind here.
Should we be more upfront about the health risks of veganism (if done poorly, which seems easy to do)?
I hadnât thought about it, but it seems reasonable to me to guide people to health resources for vegans when presenting arguments in favour of veganism, given the potentially substantial negative effects of doing veganism without knowing how to do it well.
Btw, Iâd be really curious to hear your take on all these questions.
What I have in mind for direct impact is causal inefficacy. Markets are very unlikely to respond to your purchase decisions, but we have this threshold argument that the expected value is good (maybe in line with elasticities), because in the unlikely event that they do respond, the impact is very large. But most people probably wouldnât find the EV argument compelling, given how unlikely the impact is in large markets.
I think itâs probably good to promote health resources to new vegans and reach them pretty early with these, but Iâd worry that if we pair this information with all the advocacy we do, we could undermine ourselves. We could share links to resources, like Challenge22 (they have nutritionists and dieticians), VeganHealth and studies with our advocacy, and maybe even say being vegan can take some effort to do healthfully and for some people it doesnât really work or could be somewhat worse than other diets for them (but itâs worth finding out for yourself, given how important this is), and that seems fine. But I wouldnât want to emphasize reasons not to go vegan or the challenges with being vegan when people are being exposed to reasons to go vegan, especially for the first time. EDIT: people are often looking for reasons not to go vegan, so many will overweight them, or use confirmation bias when assessing the evidence.
I guess the other side is that deception or misleading (even by omission) in this case could be like lying to the axe murderer, and any reasonable Kantian should endorse lying in that case, and in general should sometimes endorse instrumental harm to prevent someone from harming another, including the use of force, imprisonment, etc. as long as itâs proportionate and no better alternatives are available to achieve the same goal. What the Health, Cowspiracy and some other documentaries might be better examples of deception (although the writers themselves may actually believe what theyâre pushing) and a lot of people have probably gone vegan because of them.
Misleasing/âdeception could also be counterproductive, though, by giving others the impression that vegans are dishonest, or having lots of people leave because they didnât get resources to manage their diets well, which could even give the overall impression that veganism is unhealthy.
Yes, I imagined spending some time in a simulator. I guess Iâm making the claim that, in some cases at least, virtue ethics may identify a right action but seemingly without giving a good (IMO) account of whatâs right or praiseworthy about it.
There are degrees of coercion, and Iâm not sure whether to think of that as âthere are two distinct categories of action, the coercive and the non-coercive, but we donât know exactly where to draw the line between themâ or âcoerciveness is a continuous property of actions; there can be more or less of itâ. (I mean by âcoercivenessâ here something like âtaking someoneâs decision out of their own handsâ, and IMO taking it as important means prioritising, to some degree, respect for peopleâs (and animalsâ) right to make their own decisions over their well-being.)
So my answer to these questions is: It depends on the details, but I expect that Iâd judge some things to be clearly coercive, others to be clearly fine, and to be unsure about some borderline cases. More specifically (just giving my quick impressions here):
I think it depends on whether you also have the personâs interests in mind. If you do it e.g. intending to help them make a more informed or reasoned decision, in accordance with their will, then thatâs fine. If you do it trying to make them act against their will (for example, by threatening or blackmailing them, or by lying or withholding information, such that they make a different decision than had they known the full picture), then thatâs using as a mere means. (A maxim always contains its ends, i.e. the agentâs intention.)
Yeah, I think it could, but I also think it could importantly inform people of the realities of factory farms. Hard to say whether this is too coercive, it probably depends on the details again (what you show, in which context, how you frame it, etc.).
Time for a caveat: Iâd never have the audacity to tell people (such as yourself) in the effective animal advocacy space whatâs best to do there, and anyway give some substantial weight to utilitarianism. So what precedes and follows this paragraph arenât recommendations or anything, nor is it my all-things-considered view, just what I think one Kantian view might entail.
By âdirect impactâ, you mean you wonât save any specific animal by e.g. going vegan, youâre just likely preventing some future sufferingâsomething like that? Interesting, Iâd guess not disclosing this is fine, due to a combination of (1) people probably donât really care that much about this distinction, and think preventing future suffering is ~just as good, (2) people are usually already aware of something like this (at least upon reflection), and (3) people might have lots of other motivations to do the thing anyway, e.g. not wanting to contribute to an intensively suffering-causing system, which make this difference irrelevant. But Iâm definitely open to changing my mind here.
I hadnât thought about it, but it seems reasonable to me to guide people to health resources for vegans when presenting arguments in favour of veganism, given the potentially substantial negative effects of doing veganism without knowing how to do it well.
Btw, Iâd be really curious to hear your take on all these questions.
What I have in mind for direct impact is causal inefficacy. Markets are very unlikely to respond to your purchase decisions, but we have this threshold argument that the expected value is good (maybe in line with elasticities), because in the unlikely event that they do respond, the impact is very large. But most people probably wouldnât find the EV argument compelling, given how unlikely the impact is in large markets.
I think itâs probably good to promote health resources to new vegans and reach them pretty early with these, but Iâd worry that if we pair this information with all the advocacy we do, we could undermine ourselves. We could share links to resources, like Challenge22 (they have nutritionists and dieticians), VeganHealth and studies with our advocacy, and maybe even say being vegan can take some effort to do healthfully and for some people it doesnât really work or could be somewhat worse than other diets for them (but itâs worth finding out for yourself, given how important this is), and that seems fine. But I wouldnât want to emphasize reasons not to go vegan or the challenges with being vegan when people are being exposed to reasons to go vegan, especially for the first time. EDIT: people are often looking for reasons not to go vegan, so many will overweight them, or use confirmation bias when assessing the evidence.
I guess the other side is that deception or misleading (even by omission) in this case could be like lying to the axe murderer, and any reasonable Kantian should endorse lying in that case, and in general should sometimes endorse instrumental harm to prevent someone from harming another, including the use of force, imprisonment, etc. as long as itâs proportionate and no better alternatives are available to achieve the same goal. What the Health, Cowspiracy and some other documentaries might be better examples of deception (although the writers themselves may actually believe what theyâre pushing) and a lot of people have probably gone vegan because of them.
Misleasing/âdeception could also be counterproductive, though, by giving others the impression that vegans are dishonest, or having lots of people leave because they didnât get resources to manage their diets well, which could even give the overall impression that veganism is unhealthy.