I don’t think it’s possible to give an evolutionary account of impartiality in isolation, any more than you can give one for algebraic geometry or christology or writing or common-practice tonality. The underlying capabilities (e.g. intelligence, behavioral plasticity, language) are biological, but the particular way in which they end up expressed is not. We might find a thermodynamic explanation of the origin of self-replicating molecules, but a thermodynamic explanation of the reproductive cycle of ferns isn’t going to fit in a human brain. You have to move to a higher level of organization to say anything intelligible. Reason, similarly, is likely the sort of thing that admits a good evolutionary explanation, but individual instances of reasoning can only really be explained in psychological terms.
It seems like you’re basically saying “evolution gave us reason, which some of us used to arrive at impartiality” which doesn’t seem very different from my thinking which I alluded to in my opening comment (except that I used “philosophy” instead of “reason). Does that seem fair, or am I rounding you off too much, or otherwise missing your point?
Yes and no: “evolution gave us reason” is the same sort of coarse approximation as “evolution gave us the ability and desire to compete in status games”. What we really have is a sui generis thing which can, in the right environment, approximate ideal reasoning or Machiavellian status-seeking or coalition-building or utility maximization or whatever social theory of everything you want to posit, but which most of the time is trying to split the difference.
People support impartial benevolence because they think they have good pragmatic reasons to do so and they think it’s correct and it has an acceptable level of status in their cultural environment and it makes them feel good and it serves as a signal of their willingness to cooperate and and and and. Of course the exact weights vary, and it’s pretty rare that every relevant reason for belief is pointing exactly the same way simultaneously, but we’re all responding to a complex mix of reasons. Trying to figure out exactly what that mix is for one person in one situation is difficult. Trying to do the same thing for everyone all at once in general is impossible.
I agree that was too strong or over simplified. Do you think there are other evolutionary perspectives from which impartiality is less surprising?
I don’t think it’s possible to give an evolutionary account of impartiality in isolation, any more than you can give one for algebraic geometry or christology or writing or common-practice tonality. The underlying capabilities (e.g. intelligence, behavioral plasticity, language) are biological, but the particular way in which they end up expressed is not. We might find a thermodynamic explanation of the origin of self-replicating molecules, but a thermodynamic explanation of the reproductive cycle of ferns isn’t going to fit in a human brain. You have to move to a higher level of organization to say anything intelligible. Reason, similarly, is likely the sort of thing that admits a good evolutionary explanation, but individual instances of reasoning can only really be explained in psychological terms.
It seems like you’re basically saying “evolution gave us reason, which some of us used to arrive at impartiality” which doesn’t seem very different from my thinking which I alluded to in my opening comment (except that I used “philosophy” instead of “reason). Does that seem fair, or am I rounding you off too much, or otherwise missing your point?
Yes and no: “evolution gave us reason” is the same sort of coarse approximation as “evolution gave us the ability and desire to compete in status games”. What we really have is a sui generis thing which can, in the right environment, approximate ideal reasoning or Machiavellian status-seeking or coalition-building or utility maximization or whatever social theory of everything you want to posit, but which most of the time is trying to split the difference.
People support impartial benevolence because they think they have good pragmatic reasons to do so and they think it’s correct and it has an acceptable level of status in their cultural environment and it makes them feel good and it serves as a signal of their willingness to cooperate and and and and. Of course the exact weights vary, and it’s pretty rare that every relevant reason for belief is pointing exactly the same way simultaneously, but we’re all responding to a complex mix of reasons. Trying to figure out exactly what that mix is for one person in one situation is difficult. Trying to do the same thing for everyone all at once in general is impossible.