The procreation asymmetry is one of my strongest intuitions. Essentially, it’s never worse for an individual to never be born (for their own sake, since if they’re not born, nothing can matter to them), but it is worse if they are born and have a bad/​miserable life. Furthermore, I don’t think additional good lives can make up for bad lives, so I believe in a hard asymmetry, and am an antinatalist. Thomas’s paper discusses soft asymmetries, according to which good lives can make up for bad lives, but there’s no point in adding more people (for their own sake, ignoring their effects on others) if the total welfare is guaranteed to be positive (or 0).
I’m also not sure that death is bad for the person who dies, since nothing can matter to them after they die, although, like with the procreation asymmetry, I think death can be better.
I’ve written about my views in my shortform, here, here and here. I’m roughly a negative prioritarian, close to a negative utilitarian, so I aim to minimize involuntary suffering.
The procreation asymmetry is one of my strongest intuitions. Essentially, it’s never worse for an individual to never be born (for their own sake, since if they’re not born, nothing can matter to them), but it is worse if they are born and have a bad/​miserable life. Furthermore, I don’t think additional good lives can make up for bad lives, so I believe in a hard asymmetry, and am an antinatalist. Thomas’s paper discusses soft asymmetries, according to which good lives can make up for bad lives, but there’s no point in adding more people (for their own sake, ignoring their effects on others) if the total welfare is guaranteed to be positive (or 0).
I’m also not sure that death is bad for the person who dies, since nothing can matter to them after they die, although, like with the procreation asymmetry, I think death can be better.
I’ve written about my views in my shortform, here, here and here. I’m roughly a negative prioritarian, close to a negative utilitarian, so I aim to minimize involuntary suffering.