I like the idea but I also doubt a significant number of Palestinians from Gaza would accept that.
A more realistic option might be to try to make it easier for Palestinians to emigrate to any country that accepts them. Maybe Israel could offer everyone who successfully emigrates a $5-10k incentive / “starting budget for a new life abroad” and then maybe some other countries would be more interested in taking them if they have more money to spend. It might also help that most Gazans are young, speak Arabic and many also English, and could help fill labor shortages in other countries.
Which countries might be most open to accepting Palestinian migrants (as refugees, student migrants or work migrants)? Any effective pro-migration interventions there?
Another wild idea I’ve been dreaming about is financialization of immigration.
Assume for the sake of argument that Gazans tend to fall into two groups: Hamas-supporting radical terrorists, and peaceful people who just want safety.
If there was a magical method to identify which group an immigrant falls into, then countries could accept everyone from Group 2, and leave the Group 1 people in Gaza to fight for their epic historical/religious purpose.
There is no magical method, but there are some heuristics. Is the person a woman, child, or elderly? Are they willing to post a video to social media condemning Hamas? Are they willing to sign a statement recognizing Israel’s right to exist and defend itself in some form? Etc. However, we can’t predict with confidence which heuristics will work, and working heuristics are liable to degrade over time as terrorists figure out how to game them.
Therefore, instead of trusting the government to tell the difference, imagine if any citizen could post an “immigration bond” for an immigrant Gazan—analogous to a bail bond. Perhaps the bond would be $100K or something like that. If the immigrant Gazan commits a serious crime or terrorist attack, the person who posted the bond loses the entire amount. If the immigrant Gazan becomes a productive member of society, perhaps the person who posted the bond would be entitled a fraction of the income tax revenue they generate for the government, if that tax revenue exceeds the amount of money the immigrant receives through government programs.
I’m imagining this bond program working via two channels:
Personal relationships. If my cousin is in Gaza and I believe she just wants peace, I post a bond so she can come to my country and live peacefully. If she ever gets tempted to commit a terrorist attack, I remind her that I stand to lose $100K if she does so, and it wouldn’t be right to betray a family member like that.
Financial speculators. Imagine a hedge fund doing a bunch of research and data analysis, conducting interviews, trying to figure out the best predictors of terrorism in order to invest in immigration bonds and receive income tax revenues. Same with financial markets, over time the best speculators make more money and increase their influence on the market, as they’re able to figure out how to separate Group 1 from Group 2 effectively.
I like the idea but I also doubt a significant number of Palestinians from Gaza would accept that.
A more realistic option might be to try to make it easier for Palestinians to emigrate to any country that accepts them. Maybe Israel could offer everyone who successfully emigrates a $5-10k incentive / “starting budget for a new life abroad” and then maybe some other countries would be more interested in taking them if they have more money to spend. It might also help that most Gazans are young, speak Arabic and many also English, and could help fill labor shortages in other countries.
Which countries might be most open to accepting Palestinian migrants (as refugees, student migrants or work migrants)? Any effective pro-migration interventions there?
Another wild idea I’ve been dreaming about is financialization of immigration.
Assume for the sake of argument that Gazans tend to fall into two groups: Hamas-supporting radical terrorists, and peaceful people who just want safety.
If there was a magical method to identify which group an immigrant falls into, then countries could accept everyone from Group 2, and leave the Group 1 people in Gaza to fight for their epic historical/religious purpose.
There is no magical method, but there are some heuristics. Is the person a woman, child, or elderly? Are they willing to post a video to social media condemning Hamas? Are they willing to sign a statement recognizing Israel’s right to exist and defend itself in some form? Etc. However, we can’t predict with confidence which heuristics will work, and working heuristics are liable to degrade over time as terrorists figure out how to game them.
Therefore, instead of trusting the government to tell the difference, imagine if any citizen could post an “immigration bond” for an immigrant Gazan—analogous to a bail bond. Perhaps the bond would be $100K or something like that. If the immigrant Gazan commits a serious crime or terrorist attack, the person who posted the bond loses the entire amount. If the immigrant Gazan becomes a productive member of society, perhaps the person who posted the bond would be entitled a fraction of the income tax revenue they generate for the government, if that tax revenue exceeds the amount of money the immigrant receives through government programs.
I’m imagining this bond program working via two channels:
Personal relationships. If my cousin is in Gaza and I believe she just wants peace, I post a bond so she can come to my country and live peacefully. If she ever gets tempted to commit a terrorist attack, I remind her that I stand to lose $100K if she does so, and it wouldn’t be right to betray a family member like that.
Financial speculators. Imagine a hedge fund doing a bunch of research and data analysis, conducting interviews, trying to figure out the best predictors of terrorism in order to invest in immigration bonds and receive income tax revenues. Same with financial markets, over time the best speculators make more money and increase their influence on the market, as they’re able to figure out how to separate Group 1 from Group 2 effectively.