I worry we’re going to continue to talk past each other. So I don’t plan to engage further. But for other readers’ sake:
I definitely don’t treat broad imprecision as “a privileged default”. In the post I explain the motivation for having more or less severely imprecise credences in different hypotheses. The heart of it is that adding more precision, beyond what the evidence and plausible foundational principles merit, seems arbitrary. And you haven’t explained why your bottom-line intuition — about which decisions are good w.r.t. a moral standard as extremely far-reaching as impartial beneficence[1] — would constitute evidence or a plausible foundational principle. (To me this seems pretty clearly different from the kind of intuition that would justify rejecting radical skepticism.)
I worry we’re going to continue to talk past each other. So I don’t plan to engage further. But for other readers’ sake:
I definitely don’t treat broad imprecision as “a privileged default”. In the post I explain the motivation for having more or less severely imprecise credences in different hypotheses. The heart of it is that adding more precision, beyond what the evidence and plausible foundational principles merit, seems arbitrary. And you haven’t explained why your bottom-line intuition — about which decisions are good w.r.t. a moral standard as extremely far-reaching as impartial beneficence[1] — would constitute evidence or a plausible foundational principle. (To me this seems pretty clearly different from the kind of intuition that would justify rejecting radical skepticism.)
As I mention in the part of the post I linked, here.