I worry weāre going to continue to talk past each other. So I donāt plan to engage further. But for other readersā sake:
I definitely donāt treat broad imprecision as āa privileged defaultā. In the post I explain the motivation for having more or less severely imprecise credences in different hypotheses. The heart of it is that adding more precision, beyond what the evidence and plausible foundational principles merit, seems arbitrary. And you havenāt explained why your bottom-line intuition ā about which decisions are good w.r.t. a moral standard as extremely far-reaching as impartial beneficence[1] ā would constitute evidence or a plausible foundational principle. (To me this seems pretty clearly different from the kind of intuition that would justify rejecting radical skepticism.)
I worry weāre going to continue to talk past each other. So I donāt plan to engage further. But for other readersā sake:
I definitely donāt treat broad imprecision as āa privileged defaultā. In the post I explain the motivation for having more or less severely imprecise credences in different hypotheses. The heart of it is that adding more precision, beyond what the evidence and plausible foundational principles merit, seems arbitrary. And you havenāt explained why your bottom-line intuition ā about which decisions are good w.r.t. a moral standard as extremely far-reaching as impartial beneficence[1] ā would constitute evidence or a plausible foundational principle. (To me this seems pretty clearly different from the kind of intuition that would justify rejecting radical skepticism.)
As I mention in the part of the post I linked, here.