It depends what constraints you put on what can qualify as a āgood reasonā. If you think that a good reason has to be āneutrally recognizableā as such, then thereāll be no good reason to prefer any internally-coherent worldview over any other. That includes some really crazy (by our lights) worldviews. So we may instead allow that good reasons arenāt always recognizable by others. Each person may then take themselves to have good reason to stick with their starting points, though perhaps only one is actually right about thisāand since it isnāt independently verifiable which, there would seem an element of epistemic luck to it all. (A disheartening result, if you had hoped that rational argumentation could guarantee that we would all converge on the truth!)
I discuss this epistemic picture in a bit more detail in āKnowing What Mattersā.
It depends what constraints you put on what can qualify as a āgood reasonā. If you think that a good reason has to be āneutrally recognizableā as such, then thereāll be no good reason to prefer any internally-coherent worldview over any other. That includes some really crazy (by our lights) worldviews. So we may instead allow that good reasons arenāt always recognizable by others. Each person may then take themselves to have good reason to stick with their starting points, though perhaps only one is actually right about thisāand since it isnāt independently verifiable which, there would seem an element of epistemic luck to it all. (A disheartening result, if you had hoped that rational argumentation could guarantee that we would all converge on the truth!)
I discuss this epistemic picture in a bit more detail in āKnowing What Mattersā.