I’m pretty sure John Mearsheimer believes P(nuclear war) is higher now that at any time during the Cold War. If you like, I can try to find where he says that in a video of one of his speeches and interviews.
His reasoning is that the US national-security establishment has become much less competent since the decisive events of the Cold War. I’m happy to elaborate if there is interest.
Sure, feel free to elaborate. I would be curious to know a little more about why you think John Mearsheimer’s views are relevant (not saying they are not; I had to google him!).
Note the post I am sharing was published on 24 April 2022. I have now added this important detail to the start of my post. Metaculus’ community was predicting 8 % chance of a global thermonuclear war by 2070 then[1], and now it is forecasting 13 %, which suggests the chance is now higher. On the other hand, Metaculus’ community prediction for a nuclear weapon being detonated as an act of war by 2050 has remained at 33 %.
The members of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists believe it, too, as expressed in their collective decisions about the time shown on the “Doomsday Clock”: source.
I am not a fan of that clock. As argued by Christian Ruhl, I think probabilistic forecasts are more informative.
After I wrote my paragraph about the clock (which you quoted) I noticed that the Bulletin has expanded the meaning of the clock to include risks from climate change, i.e., the clock is no longer about nuclear war specifically, so I deleted that paragraph.
Thanks for commenting!
Sure, feel free to elaborate. I would be curious to know a little more about why you think John Mearsheimer’s views are relevant (not saying they are not; I had to google him!).
Note the post I am sharing was published on 24 April 2022. I have now added this important detail to the start of my post. Metaculus’ community was predicting 8 % chance of a global thermonuclear war by 2070 then[1], and now it is forecasting 13 %, which suggests the chance is now higher. On the other hand, Metaculus’ community prediction for a nuclear weapon being detonated as an act of war by 2050 has remained at 33 %.
I am not a fan of that clock. As argued by Christian Ruhl, I think probabilistic forecasts are more informative.
After I wrote my paragraph about the clock (which you quoted) I noticed that the Bulletin has expanded the meaning of the clock to include risks from climate change, i.e., the clock is no longer about nuclear war specifically, so I deleted that paragraph.