âWhat have we come to when we call a diversification of business portfolios by these [agribusiness and fast food] companiesâwhich are involved, through their caucus in Congress, in the dismantlement of environmental laws, human rights, and animal protection lawsâa success for the animals, and even going as far as to offer âveganâ certifications to a Unilever product?â
(I wouldâve thought that any vegan product could be certified as such, but apparently it doesnât count if itâs made by the wrong people?)
I think these are indeed successes overall, but I can imagine being more concerned about vegan-washing, humane-washing or otherwise legitimizing bad stuff a company does and improving their reputation and nonvegan/âinhumane sales by applauding them for the little good they do or small improvements they make. The profits made off vegan products by non-vegan companies can also be reinvested in harmful products, at the same company or by shareholders in other nonvegan products, or to undermine âenvironmental laws, human rights, and animal protection lawsâ. Of course, the profits can be reinvested into more vegan stuff, but weâd expect a greater share of reinvestment in vegan products from vegan companies.
Plus, I think products can still be labeled as vegan even if literal human slavery/âforced labour was involved in their production (or at least wasnât certified not to be involved, from regions/âindustries of concern, like cocoa production). I donât think we should consider human slavery to be vegan.
So, it could cause harm, which may be of concern even if the benefits seem greater, and, at least a priori, it could even cause more harm than benefit.
But I disagree with them (or at least what I expect theyâre arguing; again I havenât read any of the book, although Iâve read Craryâs critiques elsewhere), because I think benefits can outweigh harms, the numbers actually matter, and the specific harms they worry about seem small in comparison to the more direct benefits (the effects on farmed animals from people buying vegan products instead of nonvegan ones), and they might even have the sign wrong for the harms.[1] Some similar points here: https://ââwww.sentienceinstitute.org/ââfoundational-questions-summaries#momentum-vs.-complacency-from-welfare-reforms.
Also, brand recognition could be important. Iâd guess vegan items from large nonvegan companies would replace more animal products than vegan items sold by vegan companies, because the former sell more among those who arenât committed to veganism than the latter, and we donât get as much out of targeting committed vegans.
The more a company is invested in vegan or more humane products, the less their profits depend on opposing them and laws protecting animals, and the more likely they are to actually support animal protection laws, even just to avoid being undercut by less humane companies (e.g. cage-free eggs vs caged eggs). Itâs not even clear counterfactuals matter to them; maybe just participating in a system that cause harm, even if your particular participation has no expected effect on how much harm is caused by that system (or even reduces it?).
I think these are indeed successes overall, but I can imagine being more concerned about vegan-washing, humane-washing or otherwise legitimizing bad stuff a company does and improving their reputation and nonvegan/âinhumane sales by applauding them for the little good they do or small improvements they make. The profits made off vegan products by non-vegan companies can also be reinvested in harmful products, at the same company or by shareholders in other nonvegan products, or to undermine âenvironmental laws, human rights, and animal protection lawsâ. Of course, the profits can be reinvested into more vegan stuff, but weâd expect a greater share of reinvestment in vegan products from vegan companies.
Plus, I think products can still be labeled as vegan even if literal human slavery/âforced labour was involved in their production (or at least wasnât certified not to be involved, from regions/âindustries of concern, like cocoa production). I donât think we should consider human slavery to be vegan.
So, it could cause harm, which may be of concern even if the benefits seem greater, and, at least a priori, it could even cause more harm than benefit.
But I disagree with them (or at least what I expect theyâre arguing; again I havenât read any of the book, although Iâve read Craryâs critiques elsewhere), because I think benefits can outweigh harms, the numbers actually matter, and the specific harms they worry about seem small in comparison to the more direct benefits (the effects on farmed animals from people buying vegan products instead of nonvegan ones), and they might even have the sign wrong for the harms.[1] Some similar points here: https://ââwww.sentienceinstitute.org/ââfoundational-questions-summaries#momentum-vs.-complacency-from-welfare-reforms.
Also, brand recognition could be important. Iâd guess vegan items from large nonvegan companies would replace more animal products than vegan items sold by vegan companies, because the former sell more among those who arenât committed to veganism than the latter, and we donât get as much out of targeting committed vegans.
The more a company is invested in vegan or more humane products, the less their profits depend on opposing them and laws protecting animals, and the more likely they are to actually support animal protection laws, even just to avoid being undercut by less humane companies (e.g. cage-free eggs vs caged eggs). Itâs not even clear counterfactuals matter to them; maybe just participating in a system that cause harm, even if your particular participation has no expected effect on how much harm is caused by that system (or even reduces it?).