Physicalists think once you’ve specified the way that matter behaves, that is sufficient to explain consciousness. Consciousness, just like tables and chairs, can be fully explained in terms of the behavior of physical things.
Non-physicalists think that the physicalists are wrong about this. Consciousness is its own separate thing that is not explainable just in terms of the way matter behaves. There are more niche views like idealism and panpsychism that we don’t need to go into, which say that consciousness is either fundamental to all particles or the only thing that exists, so let’s ignore them. The main view about consciousness is called dualism, according to which consciousness is non-physical and there are some psychophysical laws, that result in consciousness when there are particular physical arrangements.
This sort framing, which conflates
broad metaphysical positions
theses about the nature of mental states
theses about the causal structure of consciousness
is ironically an excellent example of LessWrong received wisdom leaking into the water supply. These are of course not unrelated topics, but they’re not the same.
1.
Physicalism is the thesis that only the physical exists. It is an extremely broad class of theories, differentiated in large part (but not exclusively) by disputes over what counts as physical. The main alternatives are dualism and neutral monism (though this is arguably still physicalism). Idealism is deader than dead.
Physicalism is not and does not entail illusionism.
Illusionism, aka eliminativism about consciousness, is very fringe and the vast majority of physicalists reject it.
2.
Dualism is not “the main view” of consciousness. A slim majority of philosophers are physicalists.
3.
Panpsychism is a thesis about what sort of physical systems have mental states (namely: all of them), not what mental states are or their causal structure. It is entirely compatible with both physicalism and property dualism. (And I suppose with substance dualism as well, though I’m not sure what would motivate that particular combination.)
4.
Dualism is not emergentism. On the contrary, emergentism is typically (though not always) a physicalist position—and the claim that emergence entails substance dualism is one of the main lines of argument against it!
This is not the subarea of consciousness research I am most expert in, and I am not a very good philosopher, but I have long had the suspicion that “emergent” doesn’t really mean anything precise at all, but is just a term used by scientists who want to (possibly sensibly) avoid thinking about metaphysics. I mean, I’m sure you can find philosophers using it, but if I see a philosopher say it, I don’t feel like I immediately know what they mean, whereas I do (at least roughly) with “physicalism” “dualism” “panpsychism” “elminativism”.
but is just a term used by scientists who want to (possibly sensibly) avoid thinking about metaphysics
It’s certainly that, but I don’t think it’s just that. I’ve seen at least one instance (though I can’t remember where) of someone explicitly not-rejecting the possibility of natural laws that switch on, so to speak, above a certain scale.
Yeah, I know it is sometimes used by philosophers with specific precise meanings, it’s just I’ve never been sure that there is a standard precise(ish) meaning.
This sort framing, which conflates
broad metaphysical positions
theses about the nature of mental states
theses about the causal structure of consciousness
is ironically an excellent example of LessWrong received wisdom leaking into the water supply. These are of course not unrelated topics, but they’re not the same.
1.
Physicalism is the thesis that only the physical exists. It is an extremely broad class of theories, differentiated in large part (but not exclusively) by disputes over what counts as physical. The main alternatives are dualism and neutral monism (though this is arguably still physicalism). Idealism is deader than dead.
Physicalism is not and does not entail illusionism.
Illusionism, aka eliminativism about consciousness, is very fringe and the vast majority of physicalists reject it.
2.
Dualism is not “the main view” of consciousness. A slim majority of philosophers are physicalists.
3.
Panpsychism is a thesis about what sort of physical systems have mental states (namely: all of them), not what mental states are or their causal structure. It is entirely compatible with both physicalism and property dualism. (And I suppose with substance dualism as well, though I’m not sure what would motivate that particular combination.)
4.
Dualism is not emergentism. On the contrary, emergentism is typically (though not always) a physicalist position—and the claim that emergence entails substance dualism is one of the main lines of argument against it!
This is not the subarea of consciousness research I am most expert in, and I am not a very good philosopher, but I have long had the suspicion that “emergent” doesn’t really mean anything precise at all, but is just a term used by scientists who want to (possibly sensibly) avoid thinking about metaphysics. I mean, I’m sure you can find philosophers using it, but if I see a philosopher say it, I don’t feel like I immediately know what they mean, whereas I do (at least roughly) with “physicalism” “dualism” “panpsychism” “elminativism”.
It’s certainly that, but I don’t think it’s just that. I’ve seen at least one instance (though I can’t remember where) of someone explicitly not-rejecting the possibility of natural laws that switch on, so to speak, above a certain scale.
Yeah, I know it is sometimes used by philosophers with specific precise meanings, it’s just I’ve never been sure that there is a standard precise(ish) meaning.