At the same time, I think Eliezer made a really strong (and well-argued) point that if we believe in epiphenomenalism then we have no reason to believe that our reports of consciousness have any connection to the phenomenon of consciousness. I haven’t seen this point made so clearly elsewhere
Chalmers here says something like that (“It is certainly at least strange to suggest that consciousness plays no causal role in my utterances of ‘I am conscious’. Some have suggested more strongly that this rules out any knowledge of consciousness… The oddness of epiphenomenalism is exacerbated by the fact that the relationship between consciousness and reports about consciousness seems to be something of a lucky coincidence, on the epiphenomenalist view …”)
I liked how Eliezer made that argument more grounded and rigorous by presenting it in the context of Bayesian epistemology.
Also, that Chalmers section that I excerpted above is intermingled by a bunch of counterarguments, and Chalmers eventually says “I think that there is no knockdown objection to epiphenomenalism here.” I think Chalmers loses points for that—I think the arguments are totally knockdown and the counterarguments are galaxy-brained copium, and I say kudos to Eliezer for just outright stating that.
I also think that getting the right answer in a controversial domain and stating it clearly is much more important and praiseworthy than being original (in this context). So even if Eliezer’s point is already in the literature, I don’t care. (The fact that you can’t get academic publications and tenure from that activity is one of many big systematic problems with academia, IMO.)
Chalmers here says something like that (“It is certainly at least strange to suggest that consciousness plays no causal role in my utterances of ‘I am conscious’. Some have suggested more strongly that this rules out any knowledge of consciousness… The oddness of epiphenomenalism is exacerbated by the fact that the relationship between consciousness and reports about consciousness seems to be something of a lucky coincidence, on the epiphenomenalist view …”)
I liked how Eliezer made that argument more grounded and rigorous by presenting it in the context of Bayesian epistemology.
Also, that Chalmers section that I excerpted above is intermingled by a bunch of counterarguments, and Chalmers eventually says “I think that there is no knockdown objection to epiphenomenalism here.” I think Chalmers loses points for that—I think the arguments are totally knockdown and the counterarguments are galaxy-brained copium, and I say kudos to Eliezer for just outright stating that.
I also think that getting the right answer in a controversial domain and stating it clearly is much more important and praiseworthy than being original (in this context). So even if Eliezer’s point is already in the literature, I don’t care. (The fact that you can’t get academic publications and tenure from that activity is one of many big systematic problems with academia, IMO.)
(I am not a philosopher of consciousness.)