I think the causal closure of the physical is very, very likely, given the evidence. I do not accept it as axiomatic. But if it turns out that it implies illusionism, i.e. that it implies the evidence does not exist, then it is self-defeating and should be rejected.
Or, do you mean that knowing itself is not entirely physical?
I am referring to my phenomenology, not (what I believe to be) the corresponding behavioral dispositions. E.g. so far as I know my visual field can be simultaneously all blue and all dark, but never all blue and all red. We have a clear path towards explaining why that would be true, and vague hints that it might be possible to explain why, given that it’s true, I can think the corresponding thoughts and say the corresponding words. But explaining how I can make that judgement is not an explanation of why I have visual qualia to begin with.
Whether these are also physical in some broader sense of the word, I can’t say.
I think the causal closure of the physical is very, very likely, given the evidence. I do not accept it as axiomatic. But if it turns out that it implies illusionism, i.e. that it implies the evidence does not exist, then it is self-defeating and should be rejected.
I am referring to my phenomenology, not (what I believe to be) the corresponding behavioral dispositions. E.g. so far as I know my visual field can be simultaneously all blue and all dark, but never all blue and all red. We have a clear path towards explaining why that would be true, and vague hints that it might be possible to explain why, given that it’s true, I can think the corresponding thoughts and say the corresponding words. But explaining how I can make that judgement is not an explanation of why I have visual qualia to begin with.
Whether these are also physical in some broader sense of the word, I can’t say.