Does P1 rely in any way on the idealized agent actually using EV specifically, as opposed to other theoretically possible aggregations of all or most of the possible consequences of A and B? It seems like no to me but I was curious since it is explicitly mentioned.
Good question! I think âother theoretically possible aggregations of all or most of the possible consequences of A and Bâ would also suffice, yeah. (Of course, if we ourselves canât specify what this alternative is, we have our work cut out for us if weâre gonna argue that we should expect our idealized self to prefer A over B on this basis.)
Does P1 rely in any way on the idealized agent actually using EV specifically, as opposed to other theoretically possible aggregations of all or most of the possible consequences of A and B? It seems like no to me but I was curious since it is explicitly mentioned.
Good question! I think âother theoretically possible aggregations of all or most of the possible consequences of A and Bâ would also suffice, yeah. (Of course, if we ourselves canât specify what this alternative is, we have our work cut out for us if weâre gonna argue that we should expect our idealized self to prefer A over B on this basis.)