There is (or, at least, ought to be) a big gap between âconsideringâ a view and âallyingâ with it. If youâre going to ally with any view no matter its content, thereâs no point in going to the trouble of actually thinking about it. Thinking is only worthwhile if itâs possible to reach conclusions that differ depending on the details of whatâs considered.
Of course weâre fallible, but that doesnât entail radical skepticism (see: any decent intro philosophy text). Whatever premises you think lead to the conclusion âmaybe Nazism is okay after all,â you should have less confidence in those philosophical premises than in the opposing conclusion that actually, genocide really is bad. So those dubious premises canât rationally be used to defeat the more-credible opposing conclusion.
There is (or, at least, ought to be) a big gap between âconsideringâ a view and âallyingâ with it. If youâre going to ally with any view no matter its content, thereâs no point in going to the trouble of actually thinking about it. Thinking is only worthwhile if itâs possible to reach conclusions that differ depending on the details of whatâs considered.
Of course weâre fallible, but that doesnât entail radical skepticism (see: any decent intro philosophy text). Whatever premises you think lead to the conclusion âmaybe Nazism is okay after all,â you should have less confidence in those philosophical premises than in the opposing conclusion that actually, genocide really is bad. So those dubious premises canât rationally be used to defeat the more-credible opposing conclusion.