This is a really impressive endeavor. I want to flag an important argument that I think is quite important for EAs to take away.
We are familiar with the idea of some interventions having more leverage than others and thus being better. For example, Open Philanthropy does global aid advocacy as a cause area because every dollar they spend on advocacy can increase aid spending by much more than $1. But livelihood interventions point to a different source of leverage: the private market. Market failures are everywhere in developing countries—frictions that prevent mutually beneficial market transactions. Thus, correcting those market failures can unlock transactions that increase incomes by much more than the actual money spent. The success of each of these interventions reflects a corresponding market failure that they are solving: for example, Building Markets is impactful because SMEs in poor countries and buyers in rich countries can’t find each other to make mutually beneficial transactions.
For a long time, EA’s favored approach to development interventions was to focus singlemindedly on health because health impacts are large and direct. I think it’s a good thing that we are now recognizing that there are so many indirect interventions that have much higher leverage. Solving frictions that prevent mutually beneficial market transactions—whether in labor markets or export markets—deserves a lot more attention as a class of interventions.
This is a really impressive endeavor. I want to flag an important argument that I think is quite important for EAs to take away.
We are familiar with the idea of some interventions having more leverage than others and thus being better. For example, Open Philanthropy does global aid advocacy as a cause area because every dollar they spend on advocacy can increase aid spending by much more than $1. But livelihood interventions point to a different source of leverage: the private market. Market failures are everywhere in developing countries—frictions that prevent mutually beneficial market transactions. Thus, correcting those market failures can unlock transactions that increase incomes by much more than the actual money spent. The success of each of these interventions reflects a corresponding market failure that they are solving: for example, Building Markets is impactful because SMEs in poor countries and buyers in rich countries can’t find each other to make mutually beneficial transactions.
For a long time, EA’s favored approach to development interventions was to focus singlemindedly on health because health impacts are large and direct. I think it’s a good thing that we are now recognizing that there are so many indirect interventions that have much higher leverage. Solving frictions that prevent mutually beneficial market transactions—whether in labor markets or export markets—deserves a lot more attention as a class of interventions.