I appreciate your philosophy being written in a manner that does not require decoding.
”I don’t think there is an objective morality. “
—If a person, such as myself, believes that the value we give to the pursuit of happiness and avoidance of pain is arbitrary (in the sense that we appear to be programmed to give worth to these emotionally attractive ideas for evolutionary survival purposes), then a foundation for objective morality is lost and any selfish or selfless behaviour is ultimately performed to induldge our comfortable delusions.
”I can’t scientifically explain my behavior.[5] I often feel like there are different parts of me fighting each other.[6] Sometimes I feel like a “moral part” of me loses control to another part of me. For example, a fearful part of me could push me to try to please someone.”
- I think we’re ultimately controlled by our emotions. While beliefs do alter emotions, other factors may overpower them. For this reason, I suppose our behaviour can only, at best, roughly approximate our belief about what our behaviour ought to be (utilitarian or otherwise).
I appreciate your philosophy being written in a manner that does not require decoding.
”I don’t think there is an objective morality. “
—If a person, such as myself, believes that the value we give to the pursuit of happiness and avoidance of pain is arbitrary (in the sense that we appear to be programmed to give worth to these emotionally attractive ideas for evolutionary survival purposes), then a foundation for objective morality is lost and any selfish or selfless behaviour is ultimately performed to induldge our comfortable delusions.
”I can’t scientifically explain my behavior.[5] I often feel like there are different parts of me fighting each other.[6] Sometimes I feel like a “moral part” of me loses control to another part of me. For example, a fearful part of me could push me to try to please someone.”
- I think we’re ultimately controlled by our emotions. While beliefs do alter emotions, other factors may overpower them. For this reason, I suppose our behaviour can only, at best, roughly approximate our belief about what our behaviour ought to be (utilitarian or otherwise).