I think you are misrepresenting a few things here.
First, Catholics talk a lot about ethics. Please come up with a better excuse to brush away the critique I made. I am almost offended by the laziness of your argument.
Second, you are misrepresenting the post. It does not assert that we should âvalue everything that we already care emotionally aboutâ. It argues for reflecting about what values we actually hold dear and have good reason to hold dear. This stands in contrast to your position, which amounts to arguing for a premature closing of this process of reflection by deferring to the supremacy of welfare under all circumstances and for all time.
Besides those misrepresentations, I think there is value in discussing reasons for actions and reflecting about values and my hope is you will stay open to this in the future. I personally feel drawn to a critical pragmatist perspective and I believe that at some point we could have a nice discussion about it. There are certainly other perspectives besides utilitarianism that are worth discussing. All I want to do, is to encourage you to keep an open mind.
It wasnât clear which aspect of Catholic dogma you were referring to. Catholic claims about ethics seem to crucially depend on a bunch of empirical claims that they make. Even so, I view such claims as just a subset of claims about ethics that depend on our intuitions.
As above, these conflicting intuitions can only be resolved through a process of reflection. I am glad that you support such a process. You seem disappointed that the result of this process has, for me, led to utilitarianism. This is not a âpremature closing of this processâ any more than your pluralist stance is a premature closing of this process. What we are both doing is going back and forth saying âplease reflect harderâ. I have sprinkled some reading recommendations throughout to facilitate this.
The post does not mention whether we have reasons to hold certain things dear. It actually rejects such a framing altogether, claiming that the idea that we âshouldâ (in a reason-implying sense) hold certain things dear doesnât make sense. This is tantamount to nihilism, in my view. The first two points, meanwhile, are psychological rather than normative claims. As Sidgwick stated, the point of philosophy is not to tell people what they do think, but what they ought to think.
I am always very happy to examine the plural goods that some say they value, but which I do not, and see whether convergence is possible.
As above, these conflicting intuitions can only be resolved through a process of reflection. I am glad that you support such a process. You seem disappointed that the result of this process has, for me, led to utilitarianism. This is not a âpremature closing of this processâ any more than your pluralist stance is a premature closing of this process. What we are both doing is going back and forth saying âplease reflect harderâ. I have sprinkled some reading recommendations throughout to facilitate this.
I am only disappointed if you stop reflecting and questioning your position based on the situations you find yourself in and start to pursue it as dogma that cannot be questioned. I donât face the same concern as I am committed to continue on my open-minded and open-ended quest to better understand what it means to do good in particular situations and to act accordingly. In that sense, I am not âjustâ value pluralist nor a monist but agnostic as to what any particular situation may demand of me.
The post does not mention whether we have reasons to hold certain things dear. It actually rejects such a framing altogether, claiming that the idea that we âshouldâ (in a reason-implying sense) hold certain things dear doesnât make sense. This is tantamount to nihilism, in my view. The first two points, meanwhile, are psychological rather than normative claims. As Sidgwick stated, the point of philosophy is not to tell people what they do think, but what they ought to think.
Just because one is moral anti-realist doesnât mean one is automatically a nihilist. The post argues for Valuism and suggests there can be more than moral reasons for acting such as biological or psychological reasons. One may even argue that these are primary. But I guess thatâs bound to become too long of a conversation for this thread. I tried to make my case and I hope we both got something out of it.
Being âagnosticâ in all situations is itself a dogmatic position. Itâs like claiming to be âagnosticâ on every epistemic claim or belief. Sure, you can be, but some beliefs might be much more likely than others. I continue to consider the possibility that pleasure is not the only good; I just find it extremely unlikely. That could change.
I do not think biological and psychological âreasonsâ are actually reasons, but youâre right that this gets us into a separate meta-ethical discussion. Thank you for the discussion!
Being âagnosticâ in all situations is itself a dogmatic position. Itâs like claiming to be âagnosticâ on every epistemic claim or belief. Sure, you can be, but some beliefs might be much more likely than others. I continue to consider the possibility that pleasure is not the only good; I just find it extremely unlikely. That could change.
If you read what I have written, you will see that I am not taking a dogmatic position but simply advocate for staying open-minded when approaching a situation. I tried to describe that as trying to be âagnosticâ about the outcome of engaging with a situation. Itâs not my goal to predict the outcome in advance but to work towards a satisfying resolution of the situation at hand. I would argue that this is the opposite of a dogmatic position but I acknowledge that my use of the term âagnosticâ may have been confusing here.
Thank you as well, it was thought provoking and helped me reflect my own positions.
I think you are misrepresenting a few things here.
First, Catholics talk a lot about ethics. Please come up with a better excuse to brush away the critique I made. I am almost offended by the laziness of your argument.
Second, you are misrepresenting the post. It does not assert that we should âvalue everything that we already care emotionally aboutâ. It argues for reflecting about what values we actually hold dear and have good reason to hold dear. This stands in contrast to your position, which amounts to arguing for a premature closing of this process of reflection by deferring to the supremacy of welfare under all circumstances and for all time.
Besides those misrepresentations, I think there is value in discussing reasons for actions and reflecting about values and my hope is you will stay open to this in the future. I personally feel drawn to a critical pragmatist perspective and I believe that at some point we could have a nice discussion about it. There are certainly other perspectives besides utilitarianism that are worth discussing. All I want to do, is to encourage you to keep an open mind.
It wasnât clear which aspect of Catholic dogma you were referring to. Catholic claims about ethics seem to crucially depend on a bunch of empirical claims that they make. Even so, I view such claims as just a subset of claims about ethics that depend on our intuitions.
As above, these conflicting intuitions can only be resolved through a process of reflection. I am glad that you support such a process. You seem disappointed that the result of this process has, for me, led to utilitarianism. This is not a âpremature closing of this processâ any more than your pluralist stance is a premature closing of this process. What we are both doing is going back and forth saying âplease reflect harderâ. I have sprinkled some reading recommendations throughout to facilitate this.
The post does not mention whether we have reasons to hold certain things dear. It actually rejects such a framing altogether, claiming that the idea that we âshouldâ (in a reason-implying sense) hold certain things dear doesnât make sense. This is tantamount to nihilism, in my view. The first two points, meanwhile, are psychological rather than normative claims. As Sidgwick stated, the point of philosophy is not to tell people what they do think, but what they ought to think.
I am always very happy to examine the plural goods that some say they value, but which I do not, and see whether convergence is possible.
I am only disappointed if you stop reflecting and questioning your position based on the situations you find yourself in and start to pursue it as dogma that cannot be questioned. I donât face the same concern as I am committed to continue on my open-minded and open-ended quest to better understand what it means to do good in particular situations and to act accordingly. In that sense, I am not âjustâ value pluralist nor a monist but agnostic as to what any particular situation may demand of me.
Just because one is moral anti-realist doesnât mean one is automatically a nihilist. The post argues for Valuism and suggests there can be more than moral reasons for acting such as biological or psychological reasons. One may even argue that these are primary. But I guess thatâs bound to become too long of a conversation for this thread. I tried to make my case and I hope we both got something out of it.
Being âagnosticâ in all situations is itself a dogmatic position. Itâs like claiming to be âagnosticâ on every epistemic claim or belief. Sure, you can be, but some beliefs might be much more likely than others. I continue to consider the possibility that pleasure is not the only good; I just find it extremely unlikely. That could change.
I do not think biological and psychological âreasonsâ are actually reasons, but youâre right that this gets us into a separate meta-ethical discussion. Thank you for the discussion!
If you read what I have written, you will see that I am not taking a dogmatic position but simply advocate for staying open-minded when approaching a situation. I tried to describe that as trying to be âagnosticâ about the outcome of engaging with a situation. Itâs not my goal to predict the outcome in advance but to work towards a satisfying resolution of the situation at hand. I would argue that this is the opposite of a dogmatic position but I acknowledge that my use of the term âagnosticâ may have been confusing here.
Thank you as well, it was thought provoking and helped me reflect my own positions.