Hi Tyler, thanks for your thoughts on this! Note that this post is not about the best philosophical objections, it’s about what EAs actually believe. I have spoken to many EAs who say they are utilitarian but don’t believe in objective moral truth (or think that objective moral truth is very unlikely) and what I’m responding to in this post is what those people say about what they believe and why. I also have spoken to Jeff Sebo about this as well!
In point 1 and 2 in this post, namely, “1. I think (in one sense) it’s empirically false to say that “only utility is valuable” and “2. It can be psychologically harmful to deny your intrinsic values” I’m making a claim about human psychology, not about philosophy.
So it sounds like you’re mainly respoding to this point in my essay: “3. I think (in one sense) it’s incoherent to only value utility if you don’t believe in moral realism”
That’s totally fair, but please note that I actually solicited feedback on that point from tons of people, including some philosophers, and I wrote a whole essay just about that claim in particular which is linked above (of course, I wouldn’t have expected you to have read it, but I’m just pointing that out). Here is that essay:
I will update the post slightly to make it clearer that I have a whole essay discussing objections to that point.
Note that at the bottom of that other essay I discuss every single reasonable-ish objection I’ve heard to that argument, including some from philosophers. Perhaps you have other objections not mentioned there, but I do delve into various objections and have sought a lot of feedback/criticism on that already!
I would be very happy to discuss this topic more with you, and hear your more detailed objections/points you think I am getting wrong—let me know if you’d like to do that!
Finally, I will note though that most of the objections you mention in your comment above are NOT the many EAs I’ve spoken to use to defend their beliefs, so even if they are strong arguments I don’t think they are doing work in why most EAs (who deny objective moral truth but say they are utilitarians) believe what they do.
I’ve only skimmed the essay but it looks pretty good! Many of the ideas I had in mind are covered here, and I respond very differently to this than to your post here.
I don’t know what most EAs believe about ethics and metaethics, but I took this post to be about the truth, or desirability of these metaethical, ethical, and methodological positions, not whether they’re better than what most EAs believe. And that’s what I’m commenting on here.
Hi Tyler, thanks for your thoughts on this! Note that this post is not about the best philosophical objections, it’s about what EAs actually believe. I have spoken to many EAs who say they are utilitarian but don’t believe in objective moral truth (or think that objective moral truth is very unlikely) and what I’m responding to in this post is what those people say about what they believe and why. I also have spoken to Jeff Sebo about this as well!
In point 1 and 2 in this post, namely, “1. I think (in one sense) it’s empirically false to say that “only utility is valuable” and “2. It can be psychologically harmful to deny your intrinsic values” I’m making a claim about human psychology, not about philosophy.
So it sounds like you’re mainly respoding to this point in my essay: “3. I think (in one sense) it’s incoherent to only value utility if you don’t believe in moral realism”
That’s totally fair, but please note that I actually solicited feedback on that point from tons of people, including some philosophers, and I wrote a whole essay just about that claim in particular which is linked above (of course, I wouldn’t have expected you to have read it, but I’m just pointing that out). Here is that essay:
https://www.spencergreenberg.com/2022/08/tensions-between-moral-anti-realism-and-effective-altruism/
I will update the post slightly to make it clearer that I have a whole essay discussing objections to that point.
Note that at the bottom of that other essay I discuss every single reasonable-ish objection I’ve heard to that argument, including some from philosophers. Perhaps you have other objections not mentioned there, but I do delve into various objections and have sought a lot of feedback/criticism on that already!
I would be very happy to discuss this topic more with you, and hear your more detailed objections/points you think I am getting wrong—let me know if you’d like to do that!
Finally, I will note though that most of the objections you mention in your comment above are NOT the many EAs I’ve spoken to use to defend their beliefs, so even if they are strong arguments I don’t think they are doing work in why most EAs (who deny objective moral truth but say they are utilitarians) believe what they do.
I’ve only skimmed the essay but it looks pretty good! Many of the ideas I had in mind are covered here, and I respond very differently to this than to your post here.
I don’t know what most EAs believe about ethics and metaethics, but I took this post to be about the truth, or desirability of these metaethical, ethical, and methodological positions, not whether they’re better than what most EAs believe. And that’s what I’m commenting on here.
Cool, thanks for checking it out! I’ll update the post slightly to make it clearer that I’m talking about beliefs rather than the truth.