DiGiovanni’s framework assumes that the only kind of reason that counts is one that compares expected values. But this is a stipulation, not an argument. If we broaden our conception of what counts as a reason, then even under conditions of severe unawareness, we can have reasons to prefer one action over another.
I believe this is built into and accounted for with DiGiovanni’s ultimate conclusion of the unawareness argument. He never claims that there are no reasons to do things, only that what reasons you may find are not universe-wide, self-independent, time-independent altruistic reasons. He argues that they cannot be both impartial and altruistic reasons. (I disagree, but that’s for my own argument).
I believe this is built into and accounted for with DiGiovanni’s ultimate conclusion of the unawareness argument. He never claims that there are no reasons to do things, only that what reasons you may find are not universe-wide, self-independent, time-independent altruistic reasons. He argues that they cannot be both impartial and altruistic reasons. (I disagree, but that’s for my own argument).
But I like the article!