What’s new here, I think, is not only the level of specificity in general but that the concerns included things that raised the specter of what was to come. I submit that refusal “to implement standard business practices,” concealment of “dangerous and egregious shortcuts,” lack of “a distinction between firm capital and trading capital,” especially when combined with evidence of general lack of ethics, would make someone manifestly and obviously unfit to serve as a de facto trustee for over a million depositors of [edit: eleven!] figures in deposits. There are also references to what sounds a lot like repeated allegations of fraud against investors—I know investors properly get less sympathy than depositors, but that would still be serious criminal conduct.
If one accepts the statements in the article and draws certain inferences from them—mainly that leaders knew about as much as was in the article—then it seems more likely to me than not that those leaders knew or should have known there was a substantial probability SBF had committed or would commit significant fraud of some sort (although probably not fraud against depositors specifically).
Adding: I think this article also raises my level of concern that no one seems to have been looking out for the grantees. I’d like to think that this information would have caused people to be much more careful and self-protective around SBF/FTX adjacent stuff at a minimum, like incorporating an organization to receive any grants rather than exposing oneself to liability. But did grantees know about these concerns so they could protect themselves?
What’s new here, I think, is not only the level of specificity in general but that the concerns included things that raised the specter of what was to come. I submit that refusal “to implement standard business practices,” concealment of “dangerous and egregious shortcuts,” lack of “a distinction between firm capital and trading capital,” especially when combined with evidence of general lack of ethics, would make someone manifestly and obviously unfit to serve as a de facto trustee for over a million depositors of [edit: eleven!] figures in deposits. There are also references to what sounds a lot like repeated allegations of fraud against investors—I know investors properly get less sympathy than depositors, but that would still be serious criminal conduct.
If one accepts the statements in the article and draws certain inferences from them—mainly that leaders knew about as much as was in the article—then it seems more likely to me than not that those leaders knew or should have known there was a substantial probability SBF had committed or would commit significant fraud of some sort (although probably not fraud against depositors specifically).
Adding: I think this article also raises my level of concern that no one seems to have been looking out for the grantees. I’d like to think that this information would have caused people to be much more careful and self-protective around SBF/FTX adjacent stuff at a minimum, like incorporating an organization to receive any grants rather than exposing oneself to liability. But did grantees know about these concerns so they could protect themselves?