The short answer is that cognitive āpersonsā have a stronger interest in their future than merely potential persons. So if we have stronger person-directed reasons (to help individuals advance their interests) than impersonal reasons to generically promote the good (including by bringing new persons into existence), then that explains why we have stronger moral reasons to save cognitive persons than newborns.
Mothers are flooded with hormones, the biological purpose of which is to make them value their babies. Itās obviously not the result of dispassionate philosophical assessment.
But you donāt have to think that thereās nothing wrong with killing non-persons. It could just be a lesser wrong.
The short answer is that cognitive āpersonsā have a stronger interest in their future than merely potential persons. So if we have stronger person-directed reasons (to help individuals advance their interests) than impersonal reasons to generically promote the good (including by bringing new persons into existence), then that explains why we have stronger moral reasons to save cognitive persons than newborns.
For a longer answer, see McMahanās Time-Relative Account of Interests.
Yet most mothers seem to value the lives of babies over their own lives.
Baby-killing seems to be a worse crime than killing an adult.
Even people who support abortion are horrified by infanticide.
If babies arenāt persons, is Peter Singer right in that its not wrong to kill a baby 30 days after birthāespecially if it is disabled?
Mothers are flooded with hormones, the biological purpose of which is to make them value their babies. Itās obviously not the result of dispassionate philosophical assessment.
But you donāt have to think that thereās nothing wrong with killing non-persons. It could just be a lesser wrong.
In a hypothetical scenario then, you probably should save the adultās life over the childās, even if the adult protests for the sake of the child.