In 2025, I worked at the margins of biosecurity research in Nigeria. I did not meaningfully shift global risk trajectories—but I identified several pathogen-agnostic surveillance and prevention ideas that I believe remain unusually high-leverage in low-infrastructure settings. All three stalled primarily due to funding constraints rather than scientific infeasibility. I share them here to invite critique, collaboration, or replication
Context
I am a microbiologist based in Nigeria, working primarily on microbial genomics and bacteriophages. My comparative advantage lies less in access to capital-intensive infrastructure and more in proximity to under-surveilled pathogen ecosystems.
As the year ends, I feel I underperformed relative to what could have been done in biosecurity—not for lack of ideas, but for lack of execution capacity. Below are three concrete projects I hoped to initiate in 2025, each of which I believe would have generated disproportionate informational or preventive value.
1. Nasal-Swab Sentinel Surveillance as an Alternative to Wastewater
The idea
I planned a pathogen-agnostic respiratory surveillance system based on pooled nasal swabs and indoor air sampling, designed as a complement—or, in some contexts, a substitute—for wastewater metagenomic surveillance.
The proposed study would have assessed indoor air and pooled swab sampling for viral pathogen detection in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria.
Why this mattered
Wastewater surveillance has become a gold standard in high-income settings, but it assumes:
centralized sewage infrastructure,
stable plumbing,
and consistent population capture.
In many low- and middle-income cities, these assumptions fail.
By contrast:
nasal swabs sample the actual transmission interface for respiratory pathogens,
pooling drastically reduces per-capita cost,
indoor air sampling captures shared exposure risk in schools, clinics, churches, and markets.
Most importantly, the approach is pathogen-agnostic: sequencing does not presuppose influenza, SARS-like viruses, or any predefined threat. It simply asks what is circulating and how it changes over time.
Why it stalled
The project did not stall due to lack of technical feasibility or institutional interest. I secured conceptual buy-in from SecureBio, with the understanding that the study would proceed contingent on execution funding.
The work was structured as a small, clearly bounded pilot, requiring upfront support for pooled sampling, sequencing, ethics approvals, and minimal personnel time.
Without committed funding, there was no viable pathway to move from design to deployment, despite a defined protocol and an identified implementation partner. The bottleneck was therefore purely financial rather than scientific, regulatory, or collaborative.
Importantly, the project remains shovel-ready: the study design is specified, surveillance sites are identifiable, and the core question—whether pooled nasal swabs and indoor air sampling can complement or outperform wastewater surveillance in low-infrastructure settings—remains unanswered and decision-relevant.
2. A Phage-Based Vaccine Platform
The idea
A phage-display–based vaccine platform, using bacteriophages as modular, low-cost antigen carriers.
This was not intended as a near-term pandemic vaccine solution, but as an exploration of:
ultra-low-cost immunogenic platforms,
thermostable constructs compatible with fragile cold chains,
decentralized manufacturing pathways.
Why this mattered for biosecurity
Most global vaccine platforms assume:
reliable cold chains,
advanced biomanufacturing,
centralized regulatory ecosystems.
These assumptions break precisely in the regions where outbreak detection is slowest and response capacity weakest.
A phage-based platform, even if only partially successful, could:
widen the vaccine design space,
reduce technological monoculture risk,
lower barriers to local prototyping in emergencies.
Why it stalled
High perceived technical risk relative to established platforms.
Difficulty convincing funders that early biological uncertainty was acceptable.
Lack of bridge funding to move from proof-of-concept to animal studies.
3. Pathogen-Agnostic Fungal Surveillance via Airborne Spore Traps
The idea
A third project I hoped to initiate was a pathogen-agnostic early-warning system for fungal threats, built around airborne spore trapping, metagenomics, and machine-learning–assisted classification, producing real-time fungal risk maps.
The premise is straightforward: many fungal pathogens of concern to humans, animals, and crops spread via airborne spores in the 1–10 μm range, which can reach the deep lung when inhaled. Yet fungi remain largely absent from mainstream biosecurity surveillance.
Why fungi are a biosecurity blind spot
Fungi have several properties that make them particularly concerning:
High lethality in naïve hosts, with documented cases of near-total population collapse.
Environmental resilience and long-range dispersal via air.
Sparse countermeasures: no licensed human fungal vaccines, limited antifungal classes, rising resistance.
Climate sensitivity, enabling rapid range expansion.
Attribution difficulty, especially for agricultural or ecological attacks.
Historically, fungi have reshaped human and ecological history, yet they receive far less attention than viral or bacterial threats.
What the system would have done
The system would combine:
automated airborne spore traps,
microscopy and machine learning to classify known and unknown spores,
targeted ITS metagenomic sequencing for calibration and anomaly investigation,
meteorological and ecological data to model spread and impact.
Rather than targeting predefined pathogens, it would establish baseline spore distributions and flag anomalous growth or dispersal dynamics, analogous to wastewater metagenomics but for airborne fungi.
Why it did not happen
Fungal risk is not yet viewed as a core biosecurity priority.
No pilot-scale funding was available.
What I’m Uncertain About
Whether nasal-swab surveillance would outperform wastewater in practice.
Whether phage-based vaccines can clear regulatory and immunological hurdles.
Whether fungal surveillance should be prioritised over better-studied pathogen classes.
Whether EA-aligned funders should focus more on execution in LMICs rather than centralized modeling.
I am genuinely unsure and welcome correction.
Closing Reflection
All three projects share a common theme: they challenge assumptions embedded in current biosecurity practice—about infrastructure, pathogens, and geography.
My main regret in 2025 is not failure, but non-execution of ideas that might have refined or falsified those assumptions.
If biosecurity is truly a global public good, then work that is:
pathogen-agnostic,
frugally designed,
and rooted in under-surveilled environments
should not fail quietly due to modest funding gaps.
I hope to do better next year. I also hope these ideas find life—whether through me or through others.
Comments, critiques, or pointers to aligned funding mechanisms are very welcome
Year-End Reflection (2025): Biosecurity Ideas I Was Unable to Execute—and Why They Still Matter
TL;DR
In 2025, I worked at the margins of biosecurity research in Nigeria. I did not meaningfully shift global risk trajectories—but I identified several pathogen-agnostic surveillance and prevention ideas that I believe remain unusually high-leverage in low-infrastructure settings. All three stalled primarily due to funding constraints rather than scientific infeasibility. I share them here to invite critique, collaboration, or replication
Context
I am a microbiologist based in Nigeria, working primarily on microbial genomics and bacteriophages. My comparative advantage lies less in access to capital-intensive infrastructure and more in proximity to under-surveilled pathogen ecosystems.
As the year ends, I feel I underperformed relative to what could have been done in biosecurity—not for lack of ideas, but for lack of execution capacity. Below are three concrete projects I hoped to initiate in 2025, each of which I believe would have generated disproportionate informational or preventive value.
1. Nasal-Swab Sentinel Surveillance as an Alternative to Wastewater
The idea
I planned a pathogen-agnostic respiratory surveillance system based on pooled nasal swabs and indoor air sampling, designed as a complement—or, in some contexts, a substitute—for wastewater metagenomic surveillance.
The proposed study would have assessed indoor air and pooled swab sampling for viral pathogen detection in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria.
Why this mattered
Wastewater surveillance has become a gold standard in high-income settings, but it assumes:
centralized sewage infrastructure,
stable plumbing,
and consistent population capture.
In many low- and middle-income cities, these assumptions fail.
By contrast:
nasal swabs sample the actual transmission interface for respiratory pathogens,
pooling drastically reduces per-capita cost,
indoor air sampling captures shared exposure risk in schools, clinics, churches, and markets.
Most importantly, the approach is pathogen-agnostic: sequencing does not presuppose influenza, SARS-like viruses, or any predefined threat. It simply asks what is circulating and how it changes over time.
Why it stalled
The project did not stall due to lack of technical feasibility or institutional interest. I secured conceptual buy-in from SecureBio, with the understanding that the study would proceed contingent on execution funding.
The work was structured as a small, clearly bounded pilot, requiring upfront support for pooled sampling, sequencing, ethics approvals, and minimal personnel time.
Without committed funding, there was no viable pathway to move from design to deployment, despite a defined protocol and an identified implementation partner. The bottleneck was therefore purely financial rather than scientific, regulatory, or collaborative.
Importantly, the project remains shovel-ready: the study design is specified, surveillance sites are identifiable, and the core question—whether pooled nasal swabs and indoor air sampling can complement or outperform wastewater surveillance in low-infrastructure settings—remains unanswered and decision-relevant.
2. A Phage-Based Vaccine Platform
The idea
A phage-display–based vaccine platform, using bacteriophages as modular, low-cost antigen carriers.
This was not intended as a near-term pandemic vaccine solution, but as an exploration of:
ultra-low-cost immunogenic platforms,
thermostable constructs compatible with fragile cold chains,
decentralized manufacturing pathways.
Why this mattered for biosecurity
Most global vaccine platforms assume:
reliable cold chains,
advanced biomanufacturing,
centralized regulatory ecosystems.
These assumptions break precisely in the regions where outbreak detection is slowest and response capacity weakest.
A phage-based platform, even if only partially successful, could:
widen the vaccine design space,
reduce technological monoculture risk,
lower barriers to local prototyping in emergencies.
Why it stalled
High perceived technical risk relative to established platforms.
Difficulty convincing funders that early biological uncertainty was acceptable.
Lack of bridge funding to move from proof-of-concept to animal studies.
3. Pathogen-Agnostic Fungal Surveillance via Airborne Spore Traps
The idea
A third project I hoped to initiate was a pathogen-agnostic early-warning system for fungal threats, built around airborne spore trapping, metagenomics, and machine-learning–assisted classification, producing real-time fungal risk maps.
The premise is straightforward: many fungal pathogens of concern to humans, animals, and crops spread via airborne spores in the 1–10 μm range, which can reach the deep lung when inhaled. Yet fungi remain largely absent from mainstream biosecurity surveillance.
Why fungi are a biosecurity blind spot
Fungi have several properties that make them particularly concerning:
High lethality in naïve hosts, with documented cases of near-total population collapse.
Environmental resilience and long-range dispersal via air.
Sparse countermeasures: no licensed human fungal vaccines, limited antifungal classes, rising resistance.
Climate sensitivity, enabling rapid range expansion.
Attribution difficulty, especially for agricultural or ecological attacks.
Historically, fungi have reshaped human and ecological history, yet they receive far less attention than viral or bacterial threats.
What the system would have done
The system would combine:
automated airborne spore traps,
microscopy and machine learning to classify known and unknown spores,
targeted ITS metagenomic sequencing for calibration and anomaly investigation,
meteorological and ecological data to model spread and impact.
Rather than targeting predefined pathogens, it would establish baseline spore distributions and flag anomalous growth or dispersal dynamics, analogous to wastewater metagenomics but for airborne fungi.
Why it did not happen
Fungal risk is not yet viewed as a core biosecurity priority.
No pilot-scale funding was available.
What I’m Uncertain About
Whether nasal-swab surveillance would outperform wastewater in practice.
Whether phage-based vaccines can clear regulatory and immunological hurdles.
Whether fungal surveillance should be prioritised over better-studied pathogen classes.
Whether EA-aligned funders should focus more on execution in LMICs rather than centralized modeling.
I am genuinely unsure and welcome correction.
Closing Reflection
All three projects share a common theme: they challenge assumptions embedded in current biosecurity practice—about infrastructure, pathogens, and geography.
My main regret in 2025 is not failure, but non-execution of ideas that might have refined or falsified those assumptions.
If biosecurity is truly a global public good, then work that is:
pathogen-agnostic,
frugally designed,
and rooted in under-surveilled environments
should not fail quietly due to modest funding gaps.
I hope to do better next year. I also hope these ideas find life—whether through me or through others.
Comments, critiques, or pointers to aligned funding mechanisms are very welcome